In April 2019, longtime ruling Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika submitted his resignation after two decades in power. His era was marked by a noticeable absence from the public eye following his incapacitation in 2013. The popular protest movement, prominently known as the Hirak, which erupted in February 2019 and brought down Bouteflika’s ailing legacy recently commemorated its fourth anniversary this year. Since then, Algeria has been in a state of informal transition inducing policy shifts on multiple levels under the leadership of current president Abdelmadjid Tebboune, inaugurated in December 2019, while many are reminiscing the old Bouteflika days for their limited yet existent freedoms. On the other hand, Algiers also became a hot topic in international media after decades of self-isolation and international sidelining. In that context, Algeria seems to witness interesting dynamics on the domestic front as much as on the international level.
Regardless of any hasty assumptions on the outcome of the Hirak movement, it is first critical to acknowledge the reality of a post-Bouteflika reign that Algerians themselves are exploring. Even if protesters’ demands were much bigger than changing a president, success in doing so constitutes an achievement that must be recognized. Radical reforms that were requested by millions who represented all social spheres were not introduced for several considerations that will become clearer in time. However, Algeria is scene to subtle changes on sociopolitical, economic, and foreign policy levels that are likely to shape the country’s future. The Tebboune administration has muzzled the political scene and proved more prone to populist social welfare policies while reclaiming a proud foreign policy stance. These shifts also highlight a systemic attempt to redefine the “new Algeria” all while social actors struggle to safeguard historical gains on individual and collective liberties.
Understanding Algeria’s ongoing transition in light of the 2019 Hirak uprising is vital to form a realistic conception of the future. The country is changing, even if the direction of its domestic and foreign shifts may not be as some pro-opposition actors imagined prior to Bouteflika’s resignation. These transformations are hostage to Algerians’ daily realities and limitations of an outdated post-colonial social contract. Today, the crowds chanting “Silimiya [Peaceful]” in 2019 are facing a confusing political slumber and a costly socioeconomic stability that are interlinked with an increasingly dynamic and assertive foreign policy posture. Despite the Hirak’s hopes, Bouteflika’s departure brought more repression that is covered by a pro-investment economic philosophy and which lives off a nationalist and popular international standing.
Post-crisis Political Slumber
Assessing post-Bouteflika’s Algeria on the political level draws a gloomy portrait of how Algerians’ hopes of a democratic country quickly faded into an aggressive authoritarianism. Today’s reality depicts a country that is back to pre-Bouteflika’s repression after a controlled liberalization during the former president’s era, which indicates systemic fears of a new Hirak upheaval. Almost four years into President Tebboune’s tenure, the reforms conducted so far do not seem to have encouraged potent political participation. This is not an indication of the administration’s success or failure, though, as participation in such tense environments also depends on other factors including the masses’ skepticism vis-à-vis elites in general. Nonetheless, the traditional political arena that encompasses parties and local actors is dormant due to political ambiguity and repressive measures. In contrast with Bouteflika’s approach to allow a margin for activism, public opposition of the government is now almost always synonymous with judicial prosecution which limits prospects of any changes in the country’s leadership ahead of the 2024 presidential elections. Moreover, the national press body whose mission is to encourage public debate is struggling against stifling local control and self-censorship which undermines any process to renew elites.
When millions of Algerians took to the street in 2019, they were suffering from two decades of political marginalization. Bouteflika’s administration survived through a desertification of the political scene and the cooptation of local actors. Therefore, opposition figures were victims of lack of organization and political skills as they faced a system that is best known for its adaptation and sustainability. The spontaneity that empowered the Hirak since its inception quickly turned into a liability that hindered all efforts of forming an alternative. Meanwhile, the establishment engaged in its post-presidential election reconstruction that eventually rehabilitated its ranks and old figures.
After Bouteflika’s resignation, and despite the increasing popular pressure, the renewal of the civilian façade of the establishment resumed under various forms. First, the Tebboune administration saw the constitutional referendum and local elections as the best option to stabilize the political situation and solidify legitimacy. But the low voter turnout that stood at 24% for the referendum and 30% for the subsequent legislative elections underscored the great trust deficit between authorities and the population. Nonetheless, for its domestic and international narrative that depicts a “stable Algeria”, the establishment orchestrated a status quo that could be questionable as per democratic standards but is proving useful in managing its reputation, especially with international partners. This is especially valid as the opposition remains weak and unapt to handle state affairs leaving the establishment, for its unity and experience, as the only functional actor that could collectively decide on sensitive dossiers at a time of international tensions.
Partially, the circumstances privileging the establishment as the only capable political player are of its own making. On the eve of his arrival to power, president Tebboune made several commitments to safeguard human rights; however, the policies of his cabinet were reflective of a harsh crackdown on activists, journalists, and even researchers. The popular official rhetoric of “sovereignty above all” that dominates the political scene and guides local authorities is enabling a widespread repression campaign against the opposition. Additionally, the firm interpretation of sovereignty by senior officials, for structural reasons pertaining to Algeria’s difficult history, is facilitating an authoritarian behavior that is difficult to ignore. Average Algerians still recall colonial atrocities and international embargo amid the 1990s civil war and have very little trust for other countries’ offers of assistance which complicates the mission of local democratic actors.
As the situation stands on the ground, the repressive campaign is targeting the main figures and organizations who advocate for democratic freedoms and a free press. Journalists such as Ihsane El Kadi and Mustapha Bendjemaa were jailed as the last media’s independent hub, Radio M, was closed for receiving foreign funds. Furthermore, pioneering human rights and youth organizations such as the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH) were dissolved while their leaders seek refuge in exile.
The ongoing repressive approach of Algerian authorities is not restricted to the political and human rights fields. The securitization of the political scene extended to state affairs amidst the covid-19 pandemic and Ukraine war with authorities’ monopolization of politics, economy and foreign policy. Criticism of the government could now be regarded as an attempt at “unconstitutional regime change” as per the contested 2020 reform of the penal code. All this places the system within its habitual and historic role as the “republic’s guardian”, albeit at the expense of all attempts to form a viable alternative as the current administration is more forceful than the previous one in imposing its authority. This regression reflects a fear by authorities after 2019 of any attempts to re-imagine a more liberal Algeria that does not necessarily approve post-independence redlines and is willing to fight for more rights than the ones granted by the Bouteflika’s administration.
Socioeconomic Stability at a Price
Algerians’ uprising in 2019 was in part triggered by Bouteflika’s nepotic and dysfunctional rule but it was also a cry for necessary economic reforms. Since independence in 1962, the most important social contract has assumed that authorities provide socioeconomic relief and security in exchange for political and economic control. However, the international interest sparked by the Hirak protests and political leadership changes raised aspirations about the possibility to attract investments across sectors, especially for the ailing hydrocarbon infrastructure. On the other hand, authorities and private actors alike are facing the daunting mission of piloting their projects within a domestic environment that is still restricted and rentier oriented.
As the world is halfway through the second year of the Ukraine war, Algeria proved itself as an important player for its gas resources. Throughout the past few months, Algiers benefited from an unprecedented international interest, particularly from European countries, that brought new cash flow to the state’s public treasury after the past difficult years. According to official statements, hydrocarbons’ revenues reached 60 billion dollars in 2022. At first, such figures would suggest a booming economic revival to recover from the crippling political and covid-19 crises. Nonetheless, a sober evaluation of the Algerian economic situation by the World Bank gives pessimistic prospective growth rates that will go down to two from three percent in 2023 despite Algiers’ energy diplomacy.
In recent months, Algiers became a diplomatic center for multiple energy deals. In addition to the classical gas exports which nurtured a renewed partnership with Italy, authorities are also exploring opportunities in renewable energy. While efforts are still timid compared to Algeria’s potential, they show a desire to move beyond the “gas vessel” role that characterized the country’s international posture for decades. Yet, a desire is not enough on its own given that these efforts are constantly challenged by the rentier mentality that aims to safeguard social peace irrespective of economic development and even the state’s financial abilities. In that sense, this socioeconomic stability is maintained today through a set of welfare policies including unemployment allowances and extravagant subsidies that are funded by these recent energy revenues.
On the other hand, authorities are exploring different pathways to manage youth’s economic marginalization. Entrepreneurship serves as the most prominent policy to capitalize on the country’s youthful potential to attract foreign investment. To that end, the Tebboune administration appointed senior officials in charge of youth’s economic empowerment including a minister for start-ups and set up special funds for entrepreneurial projects. Moreover, a new law was passed to facilitate the integration of freelancers and entrepreneurs within the social security system and regulate this promising market. Such efforts are reinforced with agreements with private foreign investors to accompany and facilitate projects according to the new investment code promulgated in 2022. In that context, international partners see entrepreneurship as an opportunity for a deeper rapprochement with Algiers through economic diplomacy as was highlighted during the visit of French president Macron to Algeria in August 2022.
Despite these initiatives and international support, diversifying Algeria’s economy will need more than a momentary empowerment of its young entrepreneurs and pro-investment campaigns. According to the 2023 budget announced last December, Algerian authorities preferred to maintain an outdated economic model that benefits largely from the booming oil and gas sector in the wake of the Ukraine war. Reforms to tackle the subsidies and taxation system are continuously postponed to avoid a social upheaval ahead of the 2024 presidential elections. Moreover, it is unclear if the digitization process will result in concrete outcomes as promised by the Tebboune administration as the bureaucratic elites remain powerful and hostile to any modernization of the national economy. Consequently, authorities’ efforts to benefit from the current momentum linked to the Ukraine war are unlikely to lead to serious changes in the short term given the archaic economic landscapes and administrative barriers to investment projects. In the absence of modern financial institutions, it is hard to concretely follow up on projects which are hostage of an inadequate environment. Furthermore, the pro-investment rhetoric and policies are incompatible with the post-independence social contract that grants the government monopoly over economic decisions as the main generator and distributor of wealth.
The Geopolitical Context at Play
For decades, Algeria aspired to underscore a principled foreign policy doctrine that is based on the support of just causes, respect for nations’ sovereignty and peaceful settlement of conflicts. Today, Algiers finds itself at the heart of a complex global and regional geopolitical context that requires a careful approach and untraditional maneuvering. Dossiers such as the war in Ukraine, regional tensions, and diplomatic revival are clear priorities for the governing elite. These shifts will have a substantial impact on the mindset and engagement of Algerian citizens in the future.
The world has so far been living through the events of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the financial benefits and strategic importance that this war granted Algiers in recent months, it also came as an opportunity to re-introduce the pillars of Algerian diplomacy including the non-alignment movement to the global scene. Unlike the previous leadership, the Tebboune administration is unapologetic about making assertive, and at times risky, foreign policy steps like contemplating military interventions in Libya or renouncing a two-decade friendship treaty with Spain over geopolitical differences. Moreover, Algiers is seeking a proactive and engaged role in the region to rehabilitate its diplomacy from the ruins of Bouteflika’s last years in power. This is confirmed by its unwavering support for causes like Western Sahara and Palestine in addition to its recent election to the UN Security Council for a two-year term beginning in January 2024. But beyond symbolic policies and stances, Tebboune’s Algeria is also facing new regional circumstances which are likely to draw the limits of its old foreign policy doctrine. These include regional disputes and instability across Algiers’ immediate neighborhood.
Atop of Algiers’ perceived international threats is the rising cold war with Morocco. In 2021, the Tebboune leadership decided to cut diplomatic ties with Rabat for the latter’s “hostile actions”. Since then, both capitals lead an aggressive media campaign from several state and non-state actors that aim to advance their narrative. In addition to these diplomatic tensions, Algeria is encircled by an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment characterized by security chaos across the Sahel and political ambiguities in neighboring Tunisia and Libya. Even as Algiers attempts to deploy its classical foreign policy tools like mediation, and despite the Tebboune leadership’s emergence on the global scene, current challenges may need multilateral and untraditional solutions that seem rather complicated. Moreover, it is debatable whether the traditional Algerian foreign policy is still viable in today’s complex geopolitical context and if serious shifts will be necessary.
Conclusion
In all cases, the Algerian diplomatic revival may serve the establishment’s interest but is not enough to build the post-Hirak Algeria. The ongoing difficulties on the political and economic levels showcase a choice to embrace a more authoritarian model that benefits from existing financial privileges and structures but is cautiously exploring modern strategies. Due to the covid-19 limitations and the Ukraine war’s context, the Algerian system managed to impose a truce with the protest movement by proposing slow-paced reforms and resorting to clientelism and repression if these reforms failed. It is yet still unable to reach its old status quo that characterized the Bouteflika era, which opens doors for more sociopolitical and economic shifts – for better or worse. Essentially, Algeria is a country in transition without a clear destination and whose outcomes are yet to be determined. In other terms, the governance model that was established post-independence has reached its limits but reaching a consensus on a sustainable alternative for 2024 elections is still problematic.
Four years after the 2019 hopeful moment of radical change, Algerian protesters will have to battle for their own space within the structures of the political establishment while suffering from their own lack of political skills and systemic limitations. To add to the serious day-to-day challenges, the political class is also facing a deeply rooted system of governance that is now empowered by a favorable international atmosphere that curbs prospects of democratic change. Popular segments may be aware of the government’s issues, but it is unlikely to jump into an unknown path of change in the absence of a clear alternative. Still, it is premature to announce a “failure verdict” for the Hirak since the root causes of the 2019 uprising, essentially injustice and socioeconomic grievances, are still prevalent without a sustainable answer. In the end, reforming a sixty-year-old social contract is a long journey that started in 2019 but is very far from reaching its terminus.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
