Trump’s victory is one of the biggest calamities to befall the west and the effect is that every racist, woman-hater, homophobe and rightwing authoritarian feels vindicated. This rightwing populism can no longer be dismissed as a blip. Indeed, without an urgent change in strategy, the left – perhaps all progressive opinion – will be marginalised to the point of irrelevance. Our crisis is existential.
Multiple factors explain this calamity. First: racism. The legacy of slavery means racism is written into the DNA of US society. The determined efforts by African Americans to claim their civil rights has been met with a vicious backlash. The exit polls suggest that Trump won a landslide among both male and female white non-graduates: only white women with degrees produced a majority for Hillary Clinton.
Second: misogyny. Trump – who brags of sexually assaulting his victims – ran a campaign defined by hatred of women. Clinton was self-evidently an establishment candidate, but a male candidate of the establishment would have been treated differently. Some American men feel emasculated by two factors: the demise of skilled secure jobs that gave them a sense of pride and status, and the rise of women’s and LGBT movements, which some men feel undermine their rightful dominance.
But there is a factor that cannot be ignored. Centrism, the ideology of self-styled moderates, is in a state of collapse. In the 1990s, the third way project championed by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair could claim political dominance in much of the US and Europe. It has shrivelled in the face of challenges from the resurgent populist right and new movements of the left.
Younger citizens feel aggrieved at being condemned to a life less affluent than that of their parents; older working-class voters feel economically and socially dislocated. Whether it be the dramatic surge of the leftist Podemos in Spain, the popularity of the far-right Front National in France, or Brexit – it’s all interlinked. The aftermath of financial crisis left centrism with ever fewer answers, and yet its advocates continue to attack the political hopelessness and failures of their leftwing opponents. Lashing out is easier than addressing their own lack of clear vision or strategy at a time of crisis.
Whenever the economic insecurities that fuelled Trumpism are mentioned, several objections are raised. It’s an explanation, some say, that fails to account for the large majority of working-class Americans from minority backgrounds who vote Democrat. Then there is the issue of culpability. Many insist that working-class Republican voters must take responsibility for electing a racist, misogynist candidate. True, some will be racists and misogynists beyond redemption but others have the potential to be peeled away if the lure is attractive enough.
Early evidence suggests depressed Democratic turnout, indicative of a lack of enthusiasm for Clinton’s campaign. But Trump appears to have done best among middle-income Americans, and narrowly beat Clinton among the affluent. But the biggest shift to Trump – a 16-point swing– came from those earning less than $30,000 a year, even though he still lags behind Clinton among this group. Last time they voted for the country’s first black president. This time they shifted to a candidate backed by avowed racists, and ensured he won.
Centrism has failed these and many other voters. Clinton was not handpicked by the Democratic party’s elite: she defeated an unexpectedly successful challenge by self-described socialist Bernie Sanders, partly because of his failure to inspire African Americans. But her political machine did make it virtually impossible for other candidates – say, Elizabeth Warren – to stand.
At a time of anti-establishment sentiment sweeping the west, a dynastic establishment candidate – close to Wall Street, close to foreign despots, the backer of calamitous foreign wars – was a disastrous choice.
Centrists have an easy retort. OK, smug radical, if we’re not the answer, let’s hear you list the flourishing leftwing governments, describe how the left bridges its divide? And, of course, they have a point. The style and culture of the radical left is often shaped by university-educated young people (a group that includes me). They are a growing and diverse group; often they hail from modest backgrounds. But their priorities, their rhetoric and their outlook is often radically different to older working-class voters in small town England, France or the US. Both groups are critical to building a victorious electoral coalition, and yet they are, indeed, divided.
That must change. Unless the left is rooted in working-class communities – from the diverse boroughs of London to the ex-mill towns of the north, unless it speaks a language that resonates with those it once saw as its natural constituency, shorn of contempt for working-class values or priorities, then it has no political future. In Britain, Theresa May understands where history is heading, hence her clumsy, partisan, attempt to pit a supposedly unpatriotic liberal elite against a working-class for whom patriotism is a priority.
In his seminal book, Don’t Think of an Elephant!, the US political linguist George Lakoff said voters were motivated above all else by “moral identity and values”, even if that meant voting against economic self-interest. Progressives, by contrast, believed that yelling the facts would somehow bring people round.
But human beings are emotional creatures. We want emotionally compelling stories. Clinton’s pitch was that of someone applying to be a bank’s chief executive. She was paraded as the most experienced presidential candidate in history, but that hardly mattered. She was beaten by Obama, then a junior senator; bested again by a political novice.
So what next for the left? It clearly cannot compromise in the fight against racism, misogyny and homophobia but it must urgently work out how to do that in a way that connects with the unreached. The working class is increasingly diverse and the left must have a message that resonates with all constituencies. It cannot allow the populist right to portray it as a hater of working-class values.
We need to project an emotionally compelling vision. Because now we know that stating the facts and hoping for the best will not blunt the right or build a progressive alliance. There is a common thread, but centrists and radicals have failed to find it. We must redouble our efforts. From the US, we see what tragedy occurs in a vacuum.