OPERATION BRIDGE - Cumbria Constabulary

THIS REPORT IS EMBARGOED 

UNTIL 4PM MONDAY 28 TH MARCH 2011 



OPERATION BRIDGE 

PEER REVIEW INTO THE RESPONSE OF CUMBRIA CONSTABULARY 

FOLLOWING THE ACTIONS OF DERRICK BIRD ON 2nd JUNE 2010. 

INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEW – FINAL REPORT 

MARCH 2011 

ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE SIMON CHESTERMAN 

WEST MERCIA POLICE 

ACPO LEAD – ARMED POLICING WORKING GROUP 

1

SECTION 1 



CONTENTS PAGE 

Contents Page No’s 

1. Title Page and Contents 1 - 4 

2. List of Victims 5 

3. Executive Summary (Including the list of 

Recommendations and Observations) 6 - 13 

4. Introduction 14 - 17 

- Introduction 14 - 16 

- The Purpose of the Peer Review 16 - 17 

5. The Community Served by Cumbria Constabulary 18 - 19 

6. Cumbria Constabulary on the morning of the 2nd June 2010 20 

7. The Availability of Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) 21 

in Cumbria at the Time of the Incident Being Reported 

8. The Events of 2nd June 2010 22 - 54 

- Commentary on the sighting of Derrick BIRD by 

police officers 31 - 33 

- The Command and Directions provided by the FIM 

at this stage 33 - 34 

- Radio Command Channel 34 - 36 

- Mutual Aid Mobilised 36 - 37 

- Cumbria Constabulary and the Ambulance service 37 – 38 

- The changing nature of the attacks by Derrick BIRD 38 - 39 

- Professional discussion between the review team and 

the FIM 39 - 40 

- Further shootings by Derrick BIRD 40 

- Utilisation of a Negotiator 40 - 41 

- Incidents at Thornhill and Wilton 41 - 46 

- Seascale 46 - 47 

- Drigg Road 48 

- Eskdale Valley 49 - 52 

- The final phase of the Operation to locate Derrick BIRD 52 - 54 

9. The Review Process 55 - 56 



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10. Review Team’s Approach to Interviews with Police Staff 57 

11. Terms of Reference 58 – 60 

- Guidance to the Terms of Reference 59 - 60 

12. Cumbria Constabulary’s Arrangement for the Management 

Command and Deployment of its Resources 61 - 73 

- Communications Room Structure 61 - 62 

- Command of Firearms Incidents 62 - 65 

- Firearms Training 65 

- The Firearms Command Suite 65 - 66 

- Interoperability with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary 66 - 68 

- The Recording of Information Relating to the Management, 

Command and Deployment of Armed Officers 68 - 69 

- Call Signs 69 - 70 

- Automatic Resource Location System (ARLS) 70 - 71 

- Helicopter (Air Support) to Cumbria Constabulary 71 - 72 

- Armed response arrangements 72 

- Accreditation of the Firearms Commanders 72 - 73 

13. Relevant Background Information in Relation to 

Derrick BIRD 74 - 79 

- Assaults/Road Traffic Collisions/Crimes 74 - 75 

- Medical 75 - 76 

- Vehicles 76 

- Interests and Hobbies 76 

- Previous Arrests/Incidents 76 

- Previous Convictions 76 - 77 

- Firearms Licensing 77 - 78 

- Derrick BIRD’S Finances 78 - 79 

14. Conclusion 80 - 81 

15. Glossary of Acronyms 82 



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SECTION 2 

Deceased Victims 

David BIRD 

Kevin COMMONS 

Darren REWCASTLE 

Susan HUGHES 

Kenneth FISHBURN 

Isaac DIXON 

Jennifer JACKSON 

James JACKSON 

Garry PURDHAM 

James CLARK 

Michael PIKE 

Jane ROBINSON 



LIST OF VICTIMS 

Surviving Victims 

Donald REID 

Paul WILSON 

Terry KENNEDY 

Emma PERCIVAL 

Leslie HUNTER 

Christine HUNTER-HALL 

Harry BERGER 

Jacqueline LEWIS 

Fiona MORETTA 

Nathan JONES 

Samantha CHRYSTIE 



4





5

SECTION 3 

GPMS RESTRICTED 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INCLUDING THE LIST OF 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 

3. Executive Summary 

3.1 This is the report of the Peer Review into the response of Cumbria 

Constabulary following the tragic events of 2 nd June 2010 during 

which 12 innocent members of the public lost their lives and a further 

11 people were seriously injured. 

3.2 The Peer Review has been conducted at the request of the Cumbria 

Constabulary Chief Constable, Mr Craig MACKEY, to agreed Terms 

of Reference and under the scrutiny of a Reference Group. 

3.3 This report is not protectively marked in accordance with the 

Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS). It has always 

been Mr MACKEY’S intention that this report should enter the public 

domain in the interests of openness and transparency. The 

appendices remain GPMS Restricted as they contain sensitive 

information, such as the Force Firearms Strategic Threat and Risk 

Assessment. 

3.4 In completing this Peer Review, my team and I have been afforded 

full co-operation from Cumbria Constabulary and we have had full 

access to all relevant information. The depth of this review would not 

have been possible without this level of co-operation and access for 

which I am extremely grateful. 

3.5 Cumbria Constabulary have carried out their own major investigation 

on behalf of HM Coroner. The Peer Review has had full access to all 

materials gathered as a result of the Cumbria Constabulary major 

investigation. 

3.6 The Peer Review Terms of Reference are re-produced in full at 

Section 11 of this report. The following excerpt highlights the overall 

objectives of the review. 

‘To consider the policing issues arising there from, and any lessons 

which can be learned by Cumbria, the region or nationally and, to 

make such recommendations as may seem appropriate’. 

3.7 In summary, the Peer Review has sought to address two concerns:- 

- Could this incident have been prevented before it started? 

83


- During the incident, could more have been done to stop Derrick 

BIRD any sooner? 

Both questions have been carefully considered. 

3.8 This report will go into some detail regarding Cumbria Constabulary’s 

dealings with Derrick BIRD prior to the 2 nd June 2010. I have been 

able to establish that Cumbria Constabulary had no opportunity to 

prevent this incident. In fact, the first time they had an opportunity to 

intervene was at 10.13 hrs on 2 nd June 2010 when they received the 

initial 999 call. 

3.9 In answer to the second question, the response provided by the force 

has been examined in detail. Events of this magnitude are thankfully 

rare and would challenge any police force, regardless of size. On this 

occasion geography was a major factor. 

3.10 Cumbria Constabulary were able to deploy sufficient resources to 

deal with the threat posed by Derrick BIRD. It is important to note 

that throughout the whole incident, which lasted only two hours, 

police officers saw Derrick BIRD only twice. Having examined these 

encounters carefully I have concluded that the overall response was 

reasonable under the circumstances and police officers did not have 

the opportunity to stop Derrick BIRD any sooner. 

3.11 I can not imagine any circumstances under which a post incident 

review of an incident of this magnitude would not expose areas of 

weakness in the police response and result in recommendations. 

This Peer Review has highlighted areas of weakness, for example, a 

lack of clarity of command in the early stages of the response and the 

immediate availability of armed police officers in West Cumbria. The 

Review Team is unable to conclude that had these areas of 

weakness not been present, that Derrick BIRD would have been 

stopped any sooner. 

3.12 The Peer Review also found strengths in the response and we have 

found examples of bravery, innovation and dedication to duty, which 

are highlighted in the report. 

3.13 This report makes 15 formal Observations and 9 Recommendations. 

The Observations largely relate to Cumbria Constabulary and are for 

further consideration by the Chief Constable and his team. The 9 

Recommendations relate to the issues that the Peer Review Team 

suggest should lead to improvements in policy or professional 

practice. 

3.14 Two of the Observations are of high national importance. 

Observation 1 relates to Cumbria’s use of the Airwave police radio 

network, which was very nearly overwhelmed. This is a common 



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theme with other major incidents and large operational exercises and 

may in part be due to user error. However, this needs to be resolved 

particularly in light of the 2012 Olympics. 

3.15 Observation 3 relates to police interoperability with the ambulance 

service, which the Review Team highlight as a significant issue. In 

summary, the ambulance service felt unable to dispatch ambulances 

to the scenes in the absence of police protection. This is despite the 

fact that unarmed police officers and members of the public were at 

all scenes. 

3.16 This section will now briefly describe the contents of each of the 14 

sections of this Peer Review report and summarise each of the 15 

Observations and 9 Recommendations. 

3.17 Section 4. - Introduction – This section provides the context of the 

information collated within the report and outlines the purpose of the 

Peer Review in greater detail. 

3.18 Section 5. - The community served by Cumbria Constabulary – 

This section describes the impressive community cohesion that has 

been observed by the review team during the process of creating this 

report. 

3.19 In particular, this section identifies how this cohesion remains 

steadfast in the time period that has followed the events of the 2nd 

June 2010. 

3.20 Section 6. - Cumbria prior to the offences being committed – 

From a policing perspective, this section provides a snapshot of 

Cumbria in the time immediately prior to the incident under review. 

3.21 Two significant events were being managed by Cumbria 

Constabulary when this incident was initially reported. 

3.22 Section 7. - Cumbria Armed response capability – This section 

describes the availability of Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) in 

Cumbria at the time of the incident being reported and how additional 

armed officers were deployed throughout the incident. 

3.23 Section 8. - The events of 2nd June 2010 – This section details the 

events as they unfolded. I have thoroughly examined all previous 

contact between Derrick BIRD and the police service to establish if 

there was any opportunity to intervene to reduce the risks that he 

ultimately posed. 

3.24 Furthermore, I have examined in minute detail the actions of Derrick 

BIRD and how Cumbria Constabulary reacted to each incident they 

became aware of. 



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3.25 Section 9. - The Review Process – This section outlines the 

process that my team and I adopted to establish the information in 

conjunction with the Cumbria Constabulary Major Investigation Unit. 

3.26 Section 10. - Review team’s approach to interviews with police 

staff – This section examines the method that was employed by my 

team and I, to secure additional information from key members of 

Cumbria Constabulary staff. 

3.27 The concept of ‘professional discussions’ was created to ensure that 

we were not only able to obtain facts but were also able to establish 

the feelings and emotions that were present within the various 

departments that collectively worked to stop Derrick BIRD from his 

offending. 

3.28 Section 11. - Terms of Reference – This section is included to 

provide clarity on the specific directions that my team and I were 

provided in order to create a Peer Review that would meet the needs 

and expectations of Chief Constable MACKEY and Cumbria 

Constabulary. 

3.29 The original terms of reference that were set are reproduced in their 

entirety. 

3.30 Section 12. - Background information relating to the routine 

policing delivered by Cumbria Constabulary – This section 

provides information relating to the way that Cumbria Constabulary 

routinely operated prior to the 2nd June 2010. 

3.31 This section is subdivided into various different business areas and 

where relevant, following each one, an Observation or 

Recommendation is produced in an identical format to those in 

Section 8. 

3.32 The purpose of this section is to suggest ways that Cumbria 

Constabulary could amend or improve its processes, in light of this 

incident. 

3.33 Section 13. - Background Information in relation to Derrick BIRD 

- This section examines all available details that are known about 

Derrick BIRD. I have used this information to identify any instances 

where Cumbria Constabulary is likely to have had contact with him 

and whether opportunities to prevent this incident were missed. 

3.34 I can say without hesitation that there were no opportunities for 

Cumbria Constabulary to foresee what Derrick BIRD would do on the 

2nd June 2010 and therefore, had no opportunity to prevent the 

incident before it started. 



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3.35 Section 14. - Conclusion - Could the Incident Have Been 

Prevented? – This section summarises the entire facts as they are 

presented throughout the report and addresses the key questions 

that were asked at the beginning of the process. 

3.36 Section 15. – Glossary of Acronyms - This section provides a list of 

acronyms used within this document in order for them to be 

understood by those not used to the specific terms. 

3.37 Observations and Recommendations - Within the following 

paragraphs, I have recreated all of the Observations and 

Recommendations that I have identified within the body of the report 

for ease of reference. 

3.38 Observation 1: The local Airwave Radio Channel was overwhelmed 

by the radio traffic caused by this incident. This became more acute 

when armed officers from neighbouring forces deployed to Cumbria 

as they were unable to access the local channel. 

3.39 Observation 2 makes specific comment on how high volume 

communication usage can be minimised within an Armed policing 

communication structure. 

3.40 Observation 2: That Cumbria Constabulary considers options to 

ensure that the Tactical Firearms Commander can communicate 

directly with armed police officers under their command whilst 

minimising interference with the incident command channel during 

more complex incidents. 

3.41 Observation 3: Interoperability between the police service and 

ambulance service should be improved. This is particularly true in 

relation to differing risk thresholds. 

3.42 Observation 4: The decision to deploy a trained negotiator and to 

make the first attempts to contact Derrick BIRD without delay was 

sound. To achieve this within such a fast moving incident and be able 

to place the first call only 42 minutes after the police were first made 

aware of the incident, is commendable. 

3.43 Observation 5: Cumbria Constabulary quickly identified that it had a 

duty to warn the public. They used their media line, their website, 

shop watch radio links, direct phone calls to vulnerable locations and 

the use of “sky shout” from the police helicopter to warn the public. 

3.44 The review team commends the proactive use of the media and other 

means to warn members of the public in this case. 



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3.45 Observation 6: Informing ARVs of potential Tactical Options is good 

practice as is providing all officers of an indication of any emotional or 

mental distress which the subject may be experiencing and any 

potential reason for their behaviour whether real or perceived. 

3.46 Observation 7: That Cumbria Constabulary reinforce the importance 

of command protocols to both the Tactical Firearms Commander and 

the FIM and to ensure that a Commander is clearly defined at all 

times during a Firearm’s Operation. 

3.47 The implementation of Recommendation 3 should minimise the 

likelihood of this occurring in the future. 

3.48 Observation 8: The overriding priority of the police service is to 

protect the public. These officers had to decide whether to stop and 

render first aid, or to continue in their efforts to locate and stop 

Derrick BIRD, before he could kill or injure anyone else. The casualty 

was being cared for by members of the public and on reflection, the 

review team believes that these firearms officers made the right 

decision and continued to search for Derrick BIRD in an attempt to 

prevent further loss of life. 

3.49 Observation 9: Taking account of the fact that it is now only one 

hour since Cumbria Constabulary have been made aware of a crime 

in action with no prior warning, they have approximately 30 armed 

officers deployed across the County. Many forces with considerably 

larger numbers of resources, would have found it difficult to deploy 

such large numbers of armed officers within such a time period. 

3.50 Observation 10: Having reconstructed the incident it is now clear 

that Derrick BIRD drove along routes that could have been highly 

populated with tourists. The police response to ‘warn and inform’ the 

public was so effective, that many of these locations were deserted. 

It is impossible to be sure, but it is highly likely that lives were saved 

by this strategy. 

3.51 Observation 11: The bravery of the officers who entered the woods 

to search for Derrick BIRD cannot be overstated. The woodland is 

dense and is situated on a hill; it is commonly used by local Scout 

groups to build hides. From his elevated, well camouflaged position, 

it is very likely that Derrick BIRD could have seen the officers 

approaching before they saw him. 

3.52 Observation 12: In common with many Police Forces, Cumbria 

Constabulary operate two force control rooms. This provides 

resilience and business continuity. In light of the FIM’s comments to 

the review team, the force may wish to satisfy itself that, appropriate 

communication links and processes are in place to maximise the 

FIM’s ability to command incidents across two control rooms. 



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3.53 Observation 13: That Cumbria Constabulary consider raising the 

subject of call signs with the ACPO Lead for Airwave 

Communications. If the UK were to adopt a national call sign 

structure for specialist roles, any patrol deployed on mutual aid would 

be immediately recognised. 

(This would be particularly useful for PSU’s, Dog Handlers, DVI 

Teams, Negotiators, Search Teams and Firearms Officers). 

3.54 Observation 14: Cumbria Constabulary may wish to re-examine the 

standard operating procedures and interoperability between the 

various organisations that provide air support within Cumbria. 

3.55 The difficulties that were presented with the use of the helicopters 

were not unique to the police service. Their primary use was casualty 

evacuation and therefore the Ambulance Service should play a 

pivotal role. 

3.56 Visibility for the staff within the various helicopters was particularly 

poor on the 2nd June 2010. The low cloud made flying particularly 

difficult. The crews of each of the aircraft should be commended for 

their perseverance. 

3.57 Observation 15: That Cumbria Constabulary take the opportunity to 

reassess its position with regards to the overt carriage of firearms by 

its ARV crews. 

3.58 Recommendation 1: That Cumbria Constabulary review its policy 

with regard to the deployment of ARVs, with emphasis on the 

challenge presented by geography and the road network. 

3.59 Recommendation 2: That Cumbria Constabulary considers access 

to intelligence resources during weekends and evenings. The 

provision of an intelligence capability within the force control room on 

a 24/7 basis is achieved within many forces and could benefit 

Cumbria. 

3.60 Recommendation 3: That Cumbria Constabulary nominate an 

Operational Firearms Commander at the start of each tour of duty. 

3.61 Recommendation 4: That Cumbria Constabulary convert the 

existing Gold Command Suite, at Force Headquarters, into a fully 

functioning Command Suite suitable for a Tactical Firearms 

Commander to take command of a firearms operation. 

3.62 Recommendation 5: That the CNC adopt the full range of firearms 

tactical options as used by the Home Office forces nationally. That 

they also adopt the same glossary of terms that are used to describe 

this tactic to facilitate an effective interoperability. 



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3.63 It is recognised that the CNC has a unique role and will require a 

range of additional bespoke tactics and equipment to undertake their 

daily duties to protect the nuclear industry, which this 

recommendation does not seek to alter. 

3.64 Recommendation 6: That Cumbria Constabulary review the manner 

in which their Force Incident Managers, contemporaneously record 

their decisions, in respect of authorising the deployment of armed 

officers. 

3.65 The use of a loggist in more complex incidents would be a particularly 

useful consideration. 

3.66 The use of a Dictaphone has been a useful means of capturing 

decisions where the pace of an incident means that the recording of 

written material is impracticable. 

3.67 Recommendation 7: That Cumbria Constabulary create a readily 

recognised call sign structure for its resources, that more accurately 

identifies their role, their usual geographic location and most 

importantly, whether they are an armed resource. 

3.68 Recommendation 8: That Cumbria Constabulary completes its 

planned introduction of ARLS. 

3.69 Recommendation 9: Cumbria constabulary should instigate a 

process for monitoring the accreditation retraining of all Firearms 

Commanders so as to ensure that all accreditations remain current. 



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SECTION 4 

4. Introduction 


INTRODUCTION 

4.1 This Peer Review was commissioned by the Chief Constable of 

Cumbria Constabulary, Mr Craig MACKEY, in order to learn lessons 

and assess whether the armed response to the events of 2nd June 

2010 was reasonable. 

4.2 Policing throughout England and Wales is delivered by 43 Home 

Office police forces. Each force is led by a Chief Constable who is 

responsible for the direction and control of all policing activity within 

the geographic area covered by their force. In addition, several non- 

Home Office police forces exist to provide specialist law enforcement 

to our ports, transport infrastructure, Ministry of Defence 

establishments and nuclear installations. 

4.3 Police forces have to be ready to deliver a complex variety of 

services from providing visible reassurance to counter terrorism. 

Also, despite the contrast between policing a densely populated inner 

city area and a sparsely populated rural area, each force has a duty 

to deliver a service which meets the needs and expectations of their 

local communities. 

4.4 The British Police Service is proud of its tradition of policing with the 

consent of the communities it serves and the fact that this remains 

one of very few, unarmed police services, across the world. 

4.5 Only the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and Ministry of Defence Police 

routinely arm the majority of its uniformed operational police officers. 

4.6 Chief Constables have to decide upon the level of armed policing 

which is proportionate to an assessment of the risks within their area. 

This assessment is informed by an annual Strategic Threat and Risk 

Assessment 1 . Each force produces its own assessment, within a 

national template, taking into account, local, regional and national 

threats. 

4.7 Deciding how many officers to train in the use of firearms is not an 

exact science. Cumbria Constabulary is a good example, where the 

day to day threat from armed criminality is assessed to be low; 

however, the tragic events of the 2nd June 2010 highlight the fact that 

1 The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is produced at Appendix 1. 



14


critical incidents can occur, even in the most idyllic and safest of 

areas. 

4.8 The Cumbria Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is completed to 

a high standard and is entirely appropriate. 

4.9 Geography had a major influence throughout this incident. Cumbria 

is a very large area and, although it has excellent road networks from 

North to South, local roads do not lend themselves to emergency 

response. In addition, a central mountain range divides the county 

down the middle and this further restricts access from West to East. 

4.10 From a national perspective, regardless of whether the demand for 

armed policing is high or low in any given area, incidents where 

armed criminals discharge firearms in the United Kingdom are 

extremely rare. 

4.11 The only incidents within the whole of the UK which would compare 

with the events in Cumbria on the 2nd June 2010, were those which 

occurred in Hungerford on the 19 th August 1987 and Dunblane 

School on 13 th March 1996. 

4.12 Incidents of this nature would present a serious challenge to any 

police force, whether armed or not. 

4.13 Significant numbers of lawfully held firearms (including shotguns) are 

owned by members of the public across the United Kingdom. 

Residents in the more rural communities are far more likely to own a 

firearm 2 . Each of the aforementioned incidents involved offenders 

who used firearms that were in their lawful possession. 

4.14 The overarching, and most difficult question to answer is, ‘could 

police have intervened and stopped Derrick BIRD’? 

4.15 In addressing the Terms of Reference there were two key questions 

to be considered, these were: 

• Could this incident have been prevented before it started? 

• During the incident, could more have been done to stop Derrick 

BIRD any sooner? 

4.16 This Peer Review examines the Cumbria Constabulary response to 

the events as they occurred and findings are categorised as follows; 

2 

Home Office statistics show that in March 2008, almost 32000 licensed shotguns and 

firearms were held in Cumbria alone. 



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• Observations. The report makes a number of observations in 

order to highlight issues worthy of further consideration by the 

most appropriate authority or to address a key point. 

• Recommendations. These are the specific findings of the Peer 

Review and should be considered for inclusion in policy or 

procedure. 

4.17 Both Chief Constable MACKEY and I have always recognised that 

the families of those who sadly lost their lives would clearly have an 

interest in the content of this report. 

4.18 Given the tragic nature of the events, the individuals and communities 

affected have a need to ensure that issues of public policy and 

operational policing are appropriately considered. This report has 

been formatted in a manner intended to encourage wide readership. 

4.19 The report follows the chronology of events as they unfolded. Where 

possible, all observations and recommendations are identified 

throughout so they can be placed in the context of the unfolding 

incident. 

4.20 Additional observations and recommendations are produced within 

the report where they have been identified during the review process. 

4.21 I am very grateful for the openness and transparency with which all 

staff we have encountered within Cumbria Constabulary have 

responded to the Peer Review. 

4.22 The Purpose of the Peer Review 

4.23 On the 2nd June 2010, a local taxi driver, Derrick BIRD, went on a 

shooting spree, resulting in the murder of twelve innocent members 

of the public and the serious injury and attempted murder of 11 

others. 

4.24 It is only by good fortune that the number of victims was not greater. 

Several other members of the public came close to becoming a 

victim, with some actually being fired at, but escaping unharmed. 

4.25 Derrick BIRD committed the offences using a .22 rim fire rifle, 12 

gauge shotgun and associated ammunition that prior to the offences, 

had been in his lawful possession. 

4.26 The impact of his actions has not only touched the families of those 

who fell victim to him that day, but also many others across the 

country who felt their grief 3 . 


UNTIL 4PM MONDAY 28 TH 3 

This is demonstrated by the significant number of letters of appreciation that have been 

received and the absence of any formal complaints against Cumbria Constabulary or its staff. 

16 

MARCH 2011


4.27 The Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary, Mr Craig MACKEY, 

sought an expeditious review of the way his staff responded to the 

events that day. Mr MACKEY remains keen to understand whether 

more could have been done by his staff and to identify lessons that 

could be used by all UK Police Forces, in the event that they face a 

similar situation. 

4.28 Mr MACKEY commissioned this Peer Review and sought assistance 

from the Association of Chief Police Officers for England, Wales and 

Northern Ireland, (ACPO). As the ACPO lead for Armed Policing, I 

was asked to undertake this review. 

4.29 This report examines precursor events in the life of Derrick BIRD and 

Cumbria Constabulary’s knowledge of him prior to the incident. 

Specifically it focuses on the actions of Cumbria Constabulary in 

response to information as it became available to them, in particular, 

the reports during 2nd June 2010. It also examines the effectiveness 

of the police response. 

4.30 The review process has been conducted by a small team of officers 

and police staff from West Mercia Police and supported by specialists 

where required. 

4.31 The process has been complex as the review has involved the 

examination of significant quantities of documents and reference 

material 4 . 

4.32 The review process has been conducted in parallel with the Cumbria 

Major Investigation Unit enquiry. The Cumbria enquiry is being 

completed on behalf of the West Cumbria Coroner for the purpose of 

a formal inquest. 

4.33 It was essential that the Peer Review did not interfere with the 

investigation being carried out on behalf of HM Coroner but equally 

that my staff had full access to material that would be of benefit to the 

Review. 

4.34 I can say without reservation that my team and I have been afforded 

unhindered access to all material that was collated by the 

investigation team; we have been fully supported throughout the 

review process. 

4 The full list of material referred to is produced at Appendix 2 



17

SECTION 5 


THE COMMUNITY SERVED BY CUMBRIA CONSTABULARY 

5. Every community is unique and has individual nuances that make it 

special to those who live and work there. This is particularly true for 


5.1 I have included the following information in order to demonstrate the 

extent of community cohesion that I have seen during the review 

process. This is particularly relevant when taking account of the 

impact that this incident had on the community and the overwhelming 

support that was shown towards Cumbria Constabulary, both during 

and after the incident 5 . 

5.2 Cumbria is the second largest county in England and covers 2268 

square miles. 

5.3 The resident population is less than 500,000 but tourism, attracted 

predominantly by the natural beauty of the Lake District, results in 

over 15 million visitors staying as guests within the county each year. 

5.4 Approximately 50% of the resident population live within small rural 

communities. 

5.5 West Cumbria is a distinct area within the county. It has a natural 

perimeter of the coast to one side and the Cumbrian Mountains to the 

other. The result is that West Cumbria is a close knit community 

where the level of community cohesion is almost tangible. 

5.6 My team and I have extensive experience across a number of 

different police areas but have never experienced such community 

bonds as is evident here. 

5.7 It is difficult to describe how close the community ties are, but this is 

self evident when you appreciate the fact that many witnesses were 

related to, worked with or had knowledge of several victims (and the 

suspect) despite the incident occurring across an area of many 

square miles. 

5.8 The result of this cohesion is that the whole community felt the full 

impact of these events. 

5 The Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary reports an overwhelming support from 

community groups and partners in the way they responded on 2 nd June 2010. 



18


5.9 Almost all police officers and staff, who work within West Cumbria are 

also an integral part of that community and were managing an 

incident which was directly affecting their friends, neighbours and 

colleagues. 

5.10 As an example, one communications operator working within West 

Cumbria Communications Centre was recognised by the review team 

as being particularly competent in the way she conducted her duties 

that day. This was despite the fact that her husband was an unarmed 

officer searching for Derrick BIRD during the incident, her parents 

were in Whitehaven town centre with her young baby at the relevant 

time and her brother was one of the potential targets whose home he 

attended (and whose neighbour he shot dead). 

5.11 There are very few places in the country where such a strong 

community bond exists. 

5.12 This is particularly relevant when considering the number of officers 

who booked themselves on duty from home to assist with the 

response. 



19

SECTION 6 


CUMBRIA CONSTABULARY ON THE MORNING OF THE 

2nd JUNE 2010 

6. On the 2nd June 2010, it was not entirely a routine day for Cumbria 


6.1 On the 24 th May 2010, a coach carrying school children had been 

involved in a collision near Braithwaite in Cumbria. This collision 

resulted in the deaths of two of the children and a car driver. The 

funeral of one of the victims was being held on the 2nd June and had 

attracted national media interest with the presence of a significant 

number of journalists, television and radio broadcasters within the 

county. 

6.2 A policing operation to ensure the safety of those attending the 

funeral had been prepared. A number of officers had been assigned 

to duties relating to the funeral. 

6.3 Coincidentally that day, the BBC was filming an episode of 

“Helicopter Heroes” with the Yorkshire Air ambulance. This air 

ambulance service was deployed to West Cumbria as a result of the 

murders that occurred and in doing so, the BBC camera crew were 

conveyed straight to the scene of the incident. 

6.4 In addition, Appleby Fair was due to take place, starting late 

afternoon that same day. This is an annual horse fair that attracts 

10,000 Gypsies and Travellers and up to 30,000 visitors, making it 

one of the largest events of its kind. High demands on Cumbria 

Constabulary in previous years have resulted in them undertaking a 

significant policing operation. The Appleby Fair event is traditionally 

the largest single policing operation in the force calendar. 

6.5 Particular tensions between two Gypsy/Traveller families during the 

event in 2009 had resulted in a bespoke operational plan being 

invoked in 2010. 

6.6 Authorised Firearms Officers (AFO’s) from the force Roads Policing 

Unit and Tactical Support Group (TSG) were rostered to perform 

duties at this event, albeit the majority of these officers were required 

to start their duty later in the day. 

6.7 The morning of 2nd June had started relatively quietly for Cumbria 

Constabulary and appropriate numbers of officers and police staff 

were on duty. 



20




21

SECTION 7 


THE AVAILABILITY OF ARMED RESPONSE VEHICLES (ARVs) 

IN CUMBRIA AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT BEING 

REPORTED 

7. In addition to the officers who had been tasked with duties at Appleby 

Fair or the funeral, Cumbria had two dedicated Armed Response 

Vehicles (ARVs) on duty and additional Roads Policing Unit (RPU) 

vehicles. 

7.1 The Western ARV (Call sign MB30) would ordinarily have been 

located within West Cumbria but had attended Penrith in order to 

have repairs to the vehicle. They had not notified the Force Incident 

Manager (FIM) that they were leaving West Cumbria. The second 

ARV was also at Penrith. 

7.2 All ARVs are a ‘force resource‘ and are deployed across the force 

area. It is not uncommon for ARVs to be undertaking duties in 

different parts of the Force area. In addition, ARVs are generally 

deployed in pairs meaning that it is common for two ARVs to be 

deployed to the same incident. 

7.3 When this incident started, 25 Authorised Firearms Officers were on 

duty within Cumbria. Five of these officers were situated in West 


7.4 The majority of these officers were deployed as Roads Policing Unit 

unarmed patrols and had no immediate access to firearms or their 

ballistic protection. This equipment is only carried in vehicles that are 

designated as ARV’s for that tour of duty. 

7.5 Cumbria Constabulary ensure that ARV coverage never falls below 

two ARV’s. The force deploys additional Roads Policing Unit 

vehicles, any of which could become ARVs, at no additional cost, 

simply by placing firearms within the safe in the vehicles. 

7.6 The deployment of two ARVs is supported by the force Strategic 

Threat and Risk Assessment; however, bearing in mind the unique 

geography and the isolation of West Cumbria should both ARVs be 

deployed to the East, additional deployments could be justified. 

RECOMMENDATION 1: 

That Cumbria Constabulary review its policy with regard to the 

deployment of ARVs, with emphasis on the challenge presented by 

geography and the road network. 



22




23

SECTION 8 


THE EVENTS OF 2nd JUNE 2010 

8. In this section my Peer Review Team have critically reviewed the 

Police Response to events in the chronological order in which the 

incident unfolded. 

8.1 Within this section the opportunity has been taken to address and 

make comment on issues relating to command structures, mutual aid 

assistance provided by other police services and issues associated 

with the ambulance service response and helicopter support. 

8.2 It is believed that the first person shot by Derrick BIRD was his 

brother David. The investigation has been unable to confirm at what 

time the shooting occurred; however, it is known that it could not have 

occurred before 00.45 hrs on the 2nd June. The shooting occurred at 

David’s home and he was repeatedly shot with Derricks .22 rifle and 

died at the scene. 

8.3 The rifle could fire a maximum of 11 rounds before being reloaded 

and 11 spent cartridges were recovered at the scene. 

8.4 David BIRD was found by neighbours and a colleague later that 

morning when he didn’t attend work. Cumbria Constabulary was 

notified of this incident a short time later at 11:00 hrs. 

8.5 At 05:14 hrs Derrick BIRD arrived at Mowbray Farm, the home 

address of Kevin COMMONS. 

8.6 A number of witnesses saw him sitting in his taxi on the road leading 

up to the farm. 

8.7 At approximately 10:00 hrs Kevin COMMONS drove down his drive 

until he found his way blocked by Derrick BIRD’S Citroen Xsara 

Picasso taxi. 

8.8 The investigation has concluded that Derrick BIRD fired a shotgun 

twice at Kevin’s vehicle damaging the windscreen and roof during 

which time Kevin was wounded in the shoulder. 

8.9 Kevin ran back towards the house, followed by Derrick BIRD. Kevin 

was found dead at the entrance to the farmyard having been shot 

twice with a .22 rifle. 

8.10 At 10:10 hrs, Derrick BIRD was seen to drive away from the scene 

towards his home address in Rowrah. 



24


8.11 At 10:13 hrs Cumbria Constabulary received the first telephone report 

pertaining to a shooting incident. It came from a Susan ROONEY 

and made reference to a male shooting at another person with what 

she thought was an air rifle. 

8.12 Prior to making the call Susan ROONEY, who was unsure if anyone 

had been injured, sought advice from neighbours before deciding on 

what to do. This delayed her initial call to the police by several 

minutes. 

8.13 Due to the incident being reported in West Cumbria, the call was 

received by the Workington control room. 

8.14 The Force Incident Manager (FIM) who would ultimately command 

this incident was located at Penrith. 

8.15 The details of the information that was obtained from this call was not 

directly passed to the FIM, who was only provided with a brief 

summary on which to base any decisions with regard to whether to 

deploy armed officers. 

10:13:20 Call 

handler 

10:13:22 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:13:26 Call 

handler 

10:13:27 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:13:35 Call 

handler 

10:13:37 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:13:52 Call 

handler 

10:13:54 Susan 

ROONEY 

Telephone Good morning Cumbria Police 

what’s your emergency? 

Telephone Erm, there’s been an incident on 

you know the tip road? 

Telephone Sorry where? 

Telephone You know where the tip road is 

Yeathouse Road and there’s a farm 

up at the top, off Frizington Road 

Telephone I don’t really no. What’s the incident, 

what’s the problem? 

Telephone Well I’ve heard like an air rifle shot 

and a fella’s got out of a car and 

he’s run up the farm lonning erm 

and he’s shooting , shooting. Well 

that other taxi, it’s a taxi that’s took 

off but the van’s still there and I 

dunno where that other fella is eh? 

Telephone Right so you’ve heard some shots 

Telephone Yeah like air rifle eh. I thought they 

were shooting at the sheep, but he 

was running after a fella eh 



25

10:14:03 Call 

handler 

10:14:06 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:14:35 Call 

handler 

10:14:38 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:14:55 Call 

handler 

10:15:04 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:15:06 Call 

handler 

10:15:08 Susan 

ROONEY 


Telephone You heard the shots and then sorry 

what? 

Telephone A fella getting out of a car and they 

were parked like nose to nose and 

I’ve liked watched it and thought oh 

they’re not shooting the sheep and 

I’ve seen a fella running up the road 

out the white van up the lonning and 

then this other fella kept shooting 

and I’ve watched it til he’s got to the 

top and outta sight but I haven’t 

seen this fella come back into this 

car but the other fella’s took of in his 

car. I’m just frightened he’s 

wounded up the top eh. 

Telephone Right so a male got out and started 

shooting at another male is that 

what you’re saying? 

Telephone Yeah. From where I’m standing like 

yeah there were two males. But 

there on like someone’s property as 

well eh 

Telephone Right just bear with ez. Right so did 

you say that one of the males has 

returned back to his car? 

Telephone And then took off yeah come down 

the lonning 

Telephone But the other male hasn’t 

Telephone No and the car’s still parked up 

8.16 Susan ROONEY was understandably affected by what she had seen 

and this made it difficult for the call taker to establish the facts. 

8.17 However, significant details were missed. It was clear that someone 

was discharging a firearm towards another person and the shots 

could be heard by the witness who was concerned that someone was 

injured. 

8.18 A firearm being heard as it was discharged would indicate that it was 

not an air weapon. This is a relevant fact for the FIM to decide 

whether to send armed resources. 

8.19 Irrespective of whether the weapon was an air rifle or not, the fact 

that the allegation was that an individual had discharged the weapon 



26


at another person and that there was possibly someone injured, 

would itself be good reason to consider sending the crew of an 

Armed Response Vehicle to investigate. 

8.20 The review does not seek to criticise the decision, not to declare the 

incident as a spontaneous firearms incident at this time, as it is clear 

that the FIM did not have access to all relevant information on which 

to base their decision. 

8.21 Susan disclosed that the one person had left the scene in a taxi and 

described the vehicle in significant detail. 

10:16:32 Call 

handler 

10:16:33 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:16:35 Call 

handler 

10:16:38 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:16:42 Call 

handler 

10:16:43 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:16:46 Call 

handler 

10:16:51 Susan 

ROONEY 

10:16:55 Call 

handler 

10:16:56 Susan 

ROONEY 

Telephone And sorry the taxi was 

Telephone Oh like a silvery blue 

Telephone No but did you say there was a name 

on it 

Telephone No it just had yellow taxi written on it 

Telephone What on the side? 

Telephone Yeah round the door across the bottom, 

round the door 

Telephone Yellow taxi? Could that be the name of 

the firm then do you think? Yellow taxi? 

Telephone No it’s just got taxi on it to say it’s a taxi 

eh. 

Telephone What kind of vehicle do you know then? 

Telephone A Picasso 

8.22 NB: Please note that the reference to “Yellow Taxi” is in relation to 

the description of the vehicle and does not refer to the taxi company 

by that name that is situated in West Cumbria. 

8.23 The call was ended and the call taker sought to transmit the details 

as they had understood them. Significant differences appear within 

this recall when compared to that of the conversation with the caller. 

8.24 What started as a silvery blue Picasso vehicle with the word ‘taxi’ in 

yellow writing around the bottom of the door was passed by the 

control room as a ‘yellow taxi’. 



27


8.25 The below excerpts from the telephone log demonstrate this clearly 

when the Call Centre attempts to update the patrols and the HQ Call 

Centre. 

Comms Airwave 2041 I’ll just give you a (over 

talking /inaudible)Susan ROONEY 

from Frizington Road contacted 

saying that she heard some air rifle 

shots near the tip, she’s seen two 

vehicles parked nose to nose 

10:25:48 9254 Telephone 2 fellas are shooting each other 

with air rifles 

10:25:58 Dispatcher Unfortunately not all I’ve got is a 

yellow taxi and a white van the 

male in the yellow taxi has made 

off but the other male in the white 

van hasn’t so believe he’s currently 

still on scene 

Comms Airwave Unfortunately not all I’ve got is a 

yellow taxi and a white van. The 

male in the yellow taxi has made 

off, but the other male in the white 

van hasn’t so we believe that he is 

currently still on scene 

8.26 The duty FIM has worked within the force Call Management Centre 

for many years and has managed numerous firearms incidents. 

8.27 Reports of people in possession of air weapons to shoot the rats at or 

near to the tip at Frizzington, are a regular occurrence. 

8.28 The information that was passed to the FIM lacked the detail that the 

call taker had been told and coupled with his local knowledge, the 

FIM decided that this incident was not one that required a firearms 

response, at that stage, and local patrols could attend. 

8.29 At 10:26 hrs, the Workington Call Centre decided to re-contact the 

caller to establish more details. The call centre supervisor in West 

Cumbria also decided to contact the duty Roads Policing Sergeant to 

make them aware of the incident. 

8.30 This second call to Susan ROONEY did not illicit too much additional 

information other than the fact that someone had been injured. It was 

still unclear what type of weapon was fired. 



28


10:26:31 Comms Telephone (Telephone ringing). Susan it’s the 

police station control room, you 

alright. Did you get any details of 

any vehicles by any chance, and 

registrations or anything 

10:26:36 Susan Telephone Here there’s a fella been, one of our 

neighbours has run up the farm, 

he’s running back down; this other 

fella must be injured eh. 

10:26:47 Comms Telephone So you think there’s injury 

10:26:51 Susan Telephone It looks that way the way Jack’s 

running back down the yard, this 

white’s van still on the Lonning, the 

taxi’s gone 

10:26:56 Comms Telephone The man in the taxi, was the 

offender 

Susan Telephone Wait, Jack’s shouting so we need an 

ambulance or something, Jack’s 

shouting this other fella’s injured eh. 

10:27:09 Comms Telephone OK, do you know what the injury is. 

10:27:11 Susan Telephone A shotgun 

10:27:13 Comms Telephone It’s a shotgun then, because 

originally it came in as an air rifle, so 

it’s now a shot gun 

Susan Telephone It sounded like an air rifle 

10:27:20 Comms Telephone There’s a difference between an air 

rifle and a shotgun, I need you to tell 

me which one it is 

10:27:20 Susan Telephone It was a shot, er, air rifle it sounded 

like 

10:27:26 Comms Telephone So you think it’s an air rifle 

10:27:27 Susan Telephone Yeah, but this fella’s went up to see 

if he’s alright and he’s running down 

shouting for help eh. 

10:27:30 Comms Telephone So, someone’s been shot with an air 

rifle pellet 

10:27:32 Susan Telephone Yeah, yeah, It was a few shots eh. I 

don’t know I haven’t… 



29


10:27:36 Comms Telephone No it’s alright, don’t worry, possibly 

more than once 

10:27:41 Susan Telephone It was yeah, about six times 

Comms Telephone Do we know what the injury is 

10:27:44 Susan Telephone I haven’t a clue, they’re away up the 

top, we’re at the bottom where our 

houses are and Jack’s gone up to 

the lonning eh. 

8.31 At 10:27 hrs the following information was passed by the Western 

Control room. 

10:27:24 Comms 

centre 

Airwave 2041 we’re getting further calls that 

it was actually a shot gun I just need 

ya to stand down at this time 

10:27:32 PC 2041 Airwave Say again 

10:27:36 Comms 

centre 

Airwave Yeah, just yeah cancel me last ‘er 

there was conflicting reports that it 

was actually shot guns that were 

being used, ‘er we’ve advised to 

stand ya down but now it’s gone 

back to air rifles 

10:27:48 PC 2041 Airwave Yeah standing back up 

10:27:50 Comms 

centre 

Airwave Sorry about that ‘er I think that the 

lady on the phone was a wee bit 

confused at the minute 

8.32 At 10:30 hrs unarmed officers attended the scene and discovered the 

body of Kevin COMMONS and the FIM authorised the deployment of 

ARV’s. 

8.33 It is difficult to establish exactly what information the FIM had, at any 

given time, as much was passed verbally by his staff in response to 

information received from the Western Call Centre. 

8.34 This demonstrates the importance of the FIM recording information in 

relation to the decisions that they make. 

8.35 Great emphasis was clearly placed on the type of weapon that was 

believed to be in the possession of the suspect. 


UNTIL 4PM MONDAY 28 TH 8.36 It is the opinion of the review team that based on the information, 

originally given to the call taker, that it would have been entirely 

30 

MARCH 2011


appropriate to deploy armed officers and manage the incident 

accordingly. 

8.37 It should however be stressed that at this stage, there was no reason 

to believe the police were dealing with anything other than a single 

event. It would not have been possible to foresee that it would 

escalate the way that it did. 

8.38 The FIM authorised ARVs to attend the incident reported by Susan 

ROONEY at 10:28 hrs. However, by this time, unknown to the FIM, 

Derrick BIRD had already arrived in Whitehaven Town Centre and 

had shot and killed Darren REWCASTLE and injured Donald REID. 

8.39 It is important to note that even if the FIM had given an immediate 

authority to deploy ARVs, they would not have been able to make it to 

the subsequent incidents in Whitehaven in time. 

8.40 At the same time as giving the authority to deploy armed police 

officers, the FIM also requested the support of a Tactical Advisor. 

This decision is in line with routine procedures. 

8.41 After shooting Kevin COMMONS, Derrick BIRD went to the address 

of a friend, who the previous evening he had given one of his 

shotguns to. This shotgun was more modern, accurate and quicker to 

use, due to its mechanism to self eject spent cartridges. 

8.42 Derrick BIRD asked his friend’s wife if he could have the shotgun 

returned to him, but she had no access to it. 

8.43 At 10:25 hrs Derrick BIRD then drove to the taxi rank in Duke Street 

in the town of Whitehaven. 

8.44 This is a small taxi rank at which local drivers, including Derrick BIRD, 

wait for fares. There had been recent disputes between the taxi 

drivers who work form this rank over allegations that some of them 

were poaching fares from their colleagues. 

8.45 Derrick BIRD had also been the subject of ridicule by other drivers 

around his personal hygiene and the cleanliness of his taxi. 

8.46 One particular taxi driver, Darren REWCASTLE, had upset Derrick 

BIRD over a protracted period of time, over allegedly poaching fares 

and his general behaviour toward him. 

8.47 Darren was believed to have played “tricks” on other drivers by 

causing criminal damage to their vehicles. On one occasion he was 

known to have damaged the tyres on Derrick BIRD’S vehicle and had 

boasted about this openly. 



31


8.48 At 10:27 hrs Derrick BIRD arrived at the taxi rank and called Darren 

REWCASTLE over to his taxi. As Darren bent down to speak to him, 

Derrick BIRD shot Darren from close range in the lower face and 

neck area with the first shot. As he fell, Derrick BIRD fired a second 

shot striking him in the abdomen. Darren died as a result of multiple 

gunshot wounds. 

8.49 Derrick BIRD then drove a short distance to the front end of the taxi 

rank where he stopped and pointed the .22 rifle at another taxi driver, 

Donald REID. 

8.50 Donald was shot in the back as he tried to take cover. He crawled 

along the taxi rank towards the body of Darren REWCASTLE. 

8.51 Derrick BIRD got out of his car and followed him, aiming his rifle as if 

to shoot Donald again, until someone shouted at him to stop. 

8.52 Derrick BIRD returned to the taxi without firing again, but did not 

leave the area. He drove around the one-way system once more 

returning to the Duke Street Taxi Rank where Donald was waiting for 

the arrival of the emergency services. 

8.53 As he drew level with Donald REID again, Derrick BIRD fired two 

further shots out of the passenger window in his general direction, 

which caused damage to nearby properties but caused no injury. 

Donald REID survived his injuries. 

8.54 At 10:31 hrs Derrick BIRD then drove along Duke Street and onto 

Scotch Street away from the Taxi Rank. 

8.55 At the junction with Scotch Street and Lowther Street he stopped his 

car alongside another taxi driver, Paul WILSON who was walking 

along the pavement. 

8.56 Derrick BIRD called Paul over to him and as he looked down into the 

passenger window he fired at him once with the shotgun hitting him in 

the right side of the face. Paul survived these injuries. 

8.57 As a result of the Duke Street and Scotch Street incidents, unarmed 

police officers from Whitehaven Police Station were informed and 

made their way directly to the town centre. 

8.58 At 10:32 hrs the force control room issued a directive to all officers to 

look out for the suspect vehicle but not to make any attempt to stop it. 

8.59 The call centre supervisor made contact with the Tactical Advisor to 

request his support for the FIM. 



32


02/06/2010 10:32:00 Mark, Mark GRUNDY its Andy, Comms Supervisor, 

from FIM can you listen to the Egremont 1 Talk 

Group, we’ve got a fella that he’s got facial injuries, 

been shot with a shotgun possibly deceased looks 

like it’s a murder. 

8.60 Commentary on the sighting of Derrick BIRD by police officers 

8.61 A member of the public, Paul GOODWIN, had seen the incidents in 

Whitehaven and stopped a Police Officer as he walked from the 

Police Station in response to the incidents as they occurred. 

8.62 The officer got into the car driven by Paul GOODWIN and they 

followed directly behind Derrick BIRD’S car. A police van followed 

directly behind them. 

8.63 Derrick BIRD, followed by the unarmed officers, drove into Coach 

Road where at approximately 10:34 hrs he pulled alongside another 

taxi that was travelling towards him. 

8.64 Despite the fact that he was clearly being followed by the police, 

Derrick BIRD discharged the shotgun from the driver’s side window of 

his vehicle, seriously injuring fellow taxi driver Terry KENNEDY and 

also injuring Terry’s passenger, Emma PERCIVAL. 

8.65 At the same time, Paul WILSON had been taken into the local police 

station, where he was able to tell officers that Derrick BIRD was the 

gunman. 

8.66 At 10:35 hrs, calls from members of the public started to be received 

by Cumbria Constabulary in relation to the murder in Duke Street. 

8.67 In an incident of this nature, there is a risk that the number of calls 

being received and the scale and pace of events, that there can be 

information overload and confusion as to what is taking place and the 

disposition of police resources. This is both understandable and to 

be expected. However, the Call Centre and FIM would, by this stage, 

have been aware of the following issues: 

• the identity and name of the suspect, 

• the vehicle he was driving, 

• the fact that the suspect would appear to be in possession of a 

lethal barrelled weapon, 

• is most likely to be responsible for two murders and several other 

shootings, 



33


• Police Officers were travelling directly behind the suspect and had 

witnessed the latest incident. 

8.68 After shooting Terry KENNEDY and Emma PERCIVAL, Derrick BIRD 

started to turn his vehicle around as if he was intending to drive back 

into Whitehaven town centre. This manoeuvre was not possible, as 

his way back was blocked by Terry’s taxi, Paul GOODWIN’S car and 

the police van. 

8.69 With his driver’s window open and now facing the police vehicle, 

Derrick BIRD raised the shotgun and pointed it directly at the police 

vehicle where the two unarmed officers took cover behind the 

dashboard and bodywork of the vehicle. When they looked up a 

short time later, he was driving away from them at speed. 

8.70 They attempted to follow, but the head start and the fact that their van 

had limited acceleration compared to Derrick BIRD’S car meant that 

they were unable to see which route he had taken when they arrived 

at the five way junction at Ginns. 

8.71 Following the incident there was speculation regarding whether these 

unarmed officers could have done more to stop Derrick BIRD at this 

point. The review team has examined this aspect in some detail. 

8.72 These officers had just witnessed Derrick BIRD shooting two 

members of the public with no regard for the fact that the police were 

directly behind him. It was reasonable to assume that he would not 

hesitate to shoot them either. It was also entirely reasonable for the 

officers to take cover as Derrick BIRD discharged the firearm from 

close quarters. 

8.73 The police vehicle was a large van with limited acceleration and its 

proximity to Derrick BIRD’S vehicle would have limited the likelihood 

of a successful ramming to immobilise his car. Such action would 

also have placed the lives of the officers involved and those at the 

immediate scene at risk. As Derrick BIRD was in the vehicle it was 

also, most unlikely that this sort of action would have incapacitated 

him. 

8.74 Unknown to the police, Derrick BIRD had taken the Ginns to Kells 

Road and drove in the general direction of Sandwith and Rottington 

to St Bees, using minor roads. 

8.75 The FIM then spoke to the ARVs and advised them not to attend any 

rendezvous point but to actively search for Derrick BIRD and 

repeated the tactical command to “confront” him. It is clear that the 

FIM wanted the officers to search for and stop Derrick BIRD from 

continuing his offending. 



34


8.76 At this time, the control room start to receive calls relating to the first 

shooting in Duke Street and at 10:36 hrs the on-call Tactical Firearms 

Commander was made aware of the incident and asked to attend the 

force control room. 

02/06/2010 10:45:25 I currently have 4 officers at Workington who are 

just about armed and going to deploy from 

Workington er just soon as you know where you 

want them I told them 

02/06/2010 10:45:34 I know where I want them straight onto the 

woodhouse estate last sighting there is no 

rendezvous point we will confront 

8.77 This was followed up by the same command repeated. 

02/06/2010 10:49:44 Roger, there is no rendezvous point, last sighting of 

this individual was Monkwray Brow, Monkwray 

Brow Whitehaven, we will confront, do you roger? 

We will confront inaudible 

8.78 At no time was any recognised tactical command given by the FIM. 

8.79 The Command and Directions provided by the FIM at this stage 

8.80 It is important to place any comments on the command and direction 

provided at this stage into perspective, in terms of the time scales 

which have elapsed since the first incident and the situation which is 

still developing at this stage. 

i. The first report of a possible air rifle shooting had occurred at 

10:13 am. 

ii. The FIM had been made aware of the incident and Tasked 

ARVs. 

iii. As a result of this call the murdered body of Kevin COMMONS 

was discovered at approximately 10:30 am. 

iv. While ARVs are en route to the above incident, the first shooting 

in Whitehaven had occurred at the TAXI Rank. Darren 

REWCASTLE had been shot and killed and Donald REID 

seriously injured. 

v. A short time later Paul WILSON is shot and injured nearby. 

vi. The first report of the Taxi Rank shooting is relayed to the FIM. 

vii. At 10:32 am the Force Control Room issues a directive to all 

officers to look for the suspect vehicle but make no attempt to 

stop it. A Tactical Advisor had also been contacted and was 

providing advice. 



35


viii. At 10:34 am Taxi Driver, Terry KENNEDY and passenger 

Emma PERCIVAL are shot in Coach Street whilst being 

followed by police officers. 

ix. Derrick BIRD drives away from the scene and is lost from sight 

of the police officers. 

x. At the request of the FIM, the Tactical Firearms Commander 

was made aware of the incident and asked to go to the Force 

Control Room. 

8.81 It is evident that what had started as a single incident reported to 

involve an air-rifle, had quickly developed into one of multiple 

murders involving what had internationally become known within 

police circles as an Active Shooter situation. 

8.82 Such situations are very rare in the UK and at the time of this incident 

Active Shooter incidents were are only afforded a short reference in 

training for AFO’s or Firearms Commanders. Largely as a result of 

counter terrorism work, this has now been rectified. 

8.83 It is also important to note that guidance and training for more routine 

incidents, emphasises an orderly hand over of command between 

FIM’s and dedicated Tactical Firearms Commanders. 

8.84 The guidance sets out the criteria which should take place before 

such transfer of command takes place. Incidents of this nature 

highlight the need for someone to firmly grip the tasking and direction 

of all (armed and unarmed) operational resources, irrespective of the 

limited amount of information available, or the speed at which issues 

are developing. 

8.85 In the circumstances which presented itself, despite the arrival of the 

Tactical Firearms Commander, the FIM continued to direct resources. 

8.86 No criticism is levied at him for doing so, as it was for the Tactical 

Firearms Commander to assess what was taking place and make the 

operational decision to assert his command authority. 

8.87 It is clear, however, that by the stage where Derrick BIRD had driven 

off from the police officers that a very dangerous situation was in 

existence involving Police and public safety. 

8.88 Radio Command Channel 

8.89 The FIM directed that all patrols in West Cumbria should change their 

radio channel to “Egremont 1”. 



36


8.90 It is usual for a Firearms Incident Commander to choose a single 

channel on which to manage an incident. This enables all patrols to 

have full knowledge of the incident and understand the 

responsibilities that each patrol has been allocated. 

8.91 On this occasion this caused difficulty, both on the ground and in the 

control room. An incident of this size and complexity requires a great 

deal of resources to resolve. Towards the end of the incident, officers 

were managing over thirty crime scenes and numerous urgent 

requests for ambulances were being made to treat casualties. 

Simultaneously firearms officers were being deployed and briefed. 

OBSERVATION 1: 

The local Airwave Radio Channel was overwhelmed by the radio traffic 

caused by this incident. This became more acute when armed officers 

from neighbouring forces deployed to Cumbria as they were unable to 

access the local channel. 

8.92 An effective police response would need to incorporate three 

separate command roles. The early introduction of a scene 

commander/supervisor would have reduced the demands on the 

FIM/Tactical Firearms Commander. 

8.93 The use of three radio channels would have assisted to facilitate 

these varied command functions whilst minimising the impact that 

they had on each other. A suggested command/communication 

structure is produced below. 

. 

• The pursuit of Derrick BIRD (including both armed and unarmed 

response) 

• The management of each scene after the suspect had left 

(including the support to casualties, the identification of fatalities 

and casualties and the management of forensic evidence and 

witnesses). 

• The command of the armed police officers in order to deliver a 

coordinated and effective armed response within the agreed 

strategy and utilising the agreed tactics set by the Tactical 

Firearms Commander. 

8.94 The FIM could have retained command of all unarmed officers and 

coordinated their response in the pursuit of Derrick BIRD with the 

primary objective to locate (but not intercept) him. This could have 

been managed within the existing channel, 'Egremont 1'. 

8.95 The early appointment of an additional commander to manage the 

scene of all incidents that had occurred, would have reduced the 

demand on the control room. The appointed person could have 

utilised a separate channel to coordinate the resources at those 



37


scenes. They would also have been able to coordinate the response 

of partners, including liaison with the ambulance service. 

8.96 A dedicated firearms command channel would have enabled the 

Tactical Firearms Commander to manage the firearms response in 

concert with the incident command channel. Several forces provide 

two separate radios for the use of all of its armed officers to enable 

them to monitor the incident channel and a firearms command 

channel simultaneously. 

8.97 This is particularly important to enable the Tactical Firearms 

Commander to brief the armed police officers and direct the working 

strategy and tactical options, without interrupting the communication 

on the local channel during such a dynamic incident. 

8.98 Providing an armed policing communication structure would provide 

significant benefit. 

8.99 Having routine access to a national firearms channel on the Police 

Airwave radio system would ensure that all armed officers, regardless 

of which Police service they have attended from, have an effective 

tactical channel on which they can operate. 

8.100 The channel is not available to unarmed officers. 

8.101 This communication structure would also provide a direct 

communication between the armed officers and their Operational and 

Tactical Commanders. 

8.102 This report identifies a particular difficulty with transfer of command 

between the Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) and the FIM. The 

provision of a dedicated Armed Policing communication structure 

would ensure that the Tactical Firearms Commander would have 

access to all of their resources without interruption to the routine local 

channels. 


That Cumbria Constabulary consider options to ensure that the Tactical 

Firearms Commander can communicate directly with armed police 

officers under their command whilst minimising interference with the 

incident command channel during more complex incidents. 

8.103 Mutual Aid Mobilised 

8.104 The helicopter from Lancashire had been notified and was directed to 

attend the area to assist. 



38


8.105 The Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) were informed and advised of 

the potential risk to the Sellafield site and to forewarn them that 

Cumbria Constabulary may need to call upon them for their support. 

8.106 All available Cumbria firearms trained officers that could staff ARVs, 

were directed to do so. 

8.107 Four officers who were at Workington Police Station, immediately 

attended the armoury to obtain firearms. Their prompt action resulted 

in the creation of two additional ARV’s. 

8.108 The two on-duty ARVs who were at Penrith were deployed to West 

Cumbria and several additional officers trained to use firearms were 

tasked with creating additional armed resources. 

8.109 By this stage there are at least three prongs to the police operation 

these involve; 

• Providing medical treatment and casualty evacuation to the 

injured. 

• Maintaining public safety and attempting to create calm in the town 

centre. 

• Locate/contain operation for an armed subject with a view to 

neutralising the threat to police and public safety. 

8.110 It is most unusual for police in the UK to have to undertake all three 

roles simultaneously and would stretch the capability of most police 

forces. 

8.111 Cumbria Constabulary and the Ambulance service 

8.112 At 10:37 hrs the ambulance service were asked to attend the 

incidents in Duke Street by Cumbria Constabulary. It is clear from 

their telephone logs that they had received a number of calls directly 

in relation to the incidents. The ambulance service was then 

contacted by Cumbria Constabulary and members of the public 

throughout the incident. 

8.113 Further communication was made with the ambulance service clearly 

requesting attendance to Duke Street. 

8.114 Although the Terms of Reference for this Peer Review does not 

extend to the actions of any group other than Cumbria Constabulary, 

it is almost impossible to comment on the police response without 

having to take account of the interoperability with the ambulance 

service. Therefore the following brief comments and observations are 

made. 



39


8.115 The ambulance staff on duty on the 2nd June 2010 provided 

statements to the investigation. It is apparent that the ambulance 

service had a significant number of resources on duty. During the 

incident, at least one of those ambulances was deployed with a 

Doctor on board. 

8.116 It is clear that the ambulances were not deployed to the majority of 

the incidents, despite being requested by members of the public and 

Cumbria Constabulary. 

8.117 The North West Ambulance service NHS Trust, Head of Service, Mr 

MULCAHY, produced a statement of evidence on the 21 st January 

2011. The statement contains significant reference to the safety of 

his staff and the responsibility on the police service to create a safe 

environment for the ambulance service to deploy and to provide an 

escort to each scene. 

8.118 The content of the statement demonstrates the procedures of the 

ambulance service and provides an insight into why the ambulances 

available that day were not deployed. 

8.119 The effect on Cumbria Constabulary was significant. 

8.120 Police officers were left at scenes for significant periods of time with 

seriously injured casualties. 

8.121 During the latter stages of the incident, police patrols were diverted 

from their deployments to convey casualties to the local hospital. 

8.122 In every case that the ambulance service were requested to attend by 

Cumbria Constabulary, police officers were at the scene. 

8.123 One ambulance attended the scene in Coach Road and was treating 

Terry KENNEDY when the ambulance crew were instructed to leave 

the scene by ambulance control. It was only at the insistence of the 

police officer at that location that prevented the casualty being left in 

situ. 

8.124 In the event of a future similar incident it is essential that the police 

service and ambulance service fully understand each others needs. 

During an incident such as this, it is very unlikely that the police will 

be in a position to guarantee that the scene is safe; however, it would 

be reasonable for the public to expect the ambulance service to 

attend scenes where there is residual risk. 

8.125 Whilst Derrick BIRD was still at large, the armed police officers had to 

make containing him their priority. In events such as this, the 

chances of armed officers being available to protect ambulance staff 

is unlikely; however, where the suspect has left the scene, a dynamic 



40


risk assessment can be conducted and unarmed staff deployed. In 

this case unarmed police officers were at all the scenes. 


Interoperability between the police service and ambulance service 

should be improved. This is particularly true in relation to differing risk 

thresholds. 

8.126 The changing nature of the attacks by Derrick BIRD 

8.127 It is important to appreciate whilst reading this chronological version 

of events that the reports to the emergency services were far from 

clear. The reports lacked detail in terms of the offender and how the 

victims became injured. The reports were made in a sequence that 

did not replicate the actual events. 

8.128 At 10:37 hrs, 24 minutes had elapsed since the Cumbria 

Constabulary had been informed of the first incident. It appears that 

each person who was killed or injured by Derrick BIRD had been 

known to him and specifically targeted. 

8.129 This appeared to change at this stage and subsequent victims appear 

to have been randomly targeted. 

8.130 During some calls to the police, it was clear that someone had been 

shot. Others reported accidents, road traffic collisions and some had 

no idea of the events that had occurred. 

8.131 In some cases the police received no calls and officers simply came 

across the scene as they searched for Derrick BIRD. 

8.132 This only added to the complexities that existed as those involved in 

managing the incident attempted to send a police response to every 

scene and at the same time track Derrick BIRD in order to intercept 

him with armed officers. 

8.133 At approximately 10:48 hrs, Derrick BIRD was travelling along Out 

Rigg towards the market town of Egremont. He saw Jacqueline 

WILLIAMSON who was walking her dog and he stopped and asked 

her the time. As Jacqueline was about to respond she saw a gun in 

the vehicle and her dog pulled on the lead taking her away from the 

open window. He drove off towards Egremont. 

8.134 At 10:51 hrs, the CNC were formally asked to provide two ARVs to 

supplement the Cumbria Constabulary armed deployment. 

8.135 Professional discussion between the review team and the FIM 



41


8.136 During the incident the FIM was never aware of the totality of the 

armed resources he had available to him. During the Peer Review 

team discussion with the FIM, he described how he deployed as 

many armed resources as he could and maintained a commentary 

about where Derrick BIRD was last sighted, allowing the patrols to 

respond accordingly to locate and stop Derrick BIRD in line with their 

own training and professionalism. 

8.137 Greater situational awareness of the precise location of all armed and 

unarmed officers and what they were dealing with could have 

improved the police response. 

8.138 This could only have occurred effectively by use of enhanced 

technology, particularly the use of the Automatic Resource Location 

System referred to separately within this report. 

8.139 The following transcripts demonstrate that the FIM did attempt to 

identify the armed police officers that were available to support his 

strategy even though unable to establish any detail. 

02/06/2010 10:54:12 Any arv on this channel please west to confirm er 

officers collar numbers and vehicles that are 

travelling into the scene please 

02/06/2010 10:54:30 West comms , we’ve got Sellafield listening, they’re 

doing us a favour, they’re arming up and they ‘re 

going to St. Bees. Sellafield patrols identify your call 

signs 

02/06/2010 10:54:38 Telephone call to West Comms regarding the ACC 

wanting to know what resources we’ve got and 

where: Everybody at Whitehaven at Whitehaven 

and Egremont all North Allerdale to meet at 

Workington and for them to sent down as well. 

Comms Inspector has sent ever 

8.140 Further shootings by Derrick BIRD 

8.141 At 10:53 hrs Susan HUGHES was walking along Grove Road, 

Hagget End from Egremont town centre when Derrick BIRD stopped 

alongside her and shot her. 

8.142 The post mortem examination shows that Susan received two 

shotgun wounds to the left breast and the abdomen which would 

have incapacitated her. Witnesses describe seeing Derrick BIRD get 

out of his vehicle and physically struggling with Susan whilst holding 

the rifle. The post mortem examination also revealed a fatal shot to 

the back of the head from the .22 rifle. 



42


8.143 At 10:54 hrs Derrick BIRD drove a short distance to Bridge End 

where Kenneth FISHBURN was walking towards him on the opposite 

side of the road. He then drove his taxi across the road close to the 

bridge parapet and shot Kenneth in the neck/head using the shotgun. 

This resulted in a fatal injury. 

8.144 At 10:55 hrs Derrick BIRD drove a short distance further to where 

Leslie HUNTER was walking along the pavement at Cringlethwaite. 

It appears that he called Leslie over to his vehicle and as he bent 

down to look into the passenger window Derrick BIRD fired at him 

with the shotgun hitting his face and then in his back as he turned 

away to protect himself. Leslie survived his injuries despite the close 

proximity that the shots were fired from. 

8.145 Utilisation of a Negotiator 

8.146 At this time, at the request of the FIM, a Force Negotiator was 

identified and briefed with the facts. Without delay the Negotiator 

began to try and contact Derrick BIRD via the various phone numbers 

that were held on police systems. 


The decision to deploy a trained negotiator and to make the first 

attempts to contact Derrick BIRD without delay was sound. To achieve 

this within such a fast moving incident and be able to place the first call 

only 42 minutes after the police were first made aware of the incident is 

commendable. 

8.147 Derrick BIRD did not take any of his phones with him and so the 

Negotiator deployment was futile. Despite this fact, it demonstrates a 

real clarity in giving consideration to all methods available to stop him 

in addition to the physical search for him. 

8.148 At 10:56 hrs the ambulance service had not attended Duke Street 

and officers had continued to provide first aid to Donald REID at that 

location, preventing them from being redeployed to assist with the 

ongoing operation. The continued calls for the ambulance service to 

attend were having an impact on the operational effectiveness of the 

officers at that location. 

8.149 Incidents at Thornhill and Wilton 

8.150 At 10:57 hrs Derrick BIRD drove out of Egremont onto the A595 

where he turned south, towards and onto the Thornhill Estate. As he 

drove along Thorny Road he stopped alongside a 15 year old girl, 

Ashleigh GLAISTER. As she bent down to the passenger window 

she saw a gun and ducked. Derrick BIRD fired the shotgun at her but 

missed, striking the house behind. Ashleigh ran away from the car. 

He fired a second shot which again fortunately missed her. 



43


8.151 At 11:00 hrs Derrick BIRD left the Thornhill Estate and crossed the 

A595 into narrow lanes past the village of Carleton towards Wilton. 

8.152 Gladys and Joseph WARBRICK were unloading shopping from their 

car in Carleton when Derrick BIRD pulled up close to their drive and 

shouted out, again asking for the time. Joseph called out the time but 

neither of them approached the taxi window and he drove on. 

8.153 At this time, around 11:00 hrs the police were informed of David 

BIRD’S death. Whilst this incident occurred several hours before, this 

was not known at the time of the report and resulted in Cumbria 

Constabulary having to take account of incidents being reported out 

of sequence. This could easily have resulted in resources being 

diverted to attend locations away from Derrick BIRD’S last known 

offence, although it is clear that such confusion did not occur. The 

FIM accurately assessed each call and was not affected by the 

sequence of reporting. 

8.154 By this time 20 armed Cumbria Constabulary officers were deployed 

at strategic locations around the force area. They were supported by 

two CNC ARVs. 

8.155 These additional CNC resources were in addition to every available 

uniformed, armed and unarmed, resource that Cumbria had at its 

disposal, in an attempt to locate and intercept Derrick BIRD. 

8.156 At 11:00 hrs Cumbria Constabulary closed down their website and 

utilised it to support a media message that had gone to all local 

media to warn them of the incident and the presence of a man 

actively shooting members of the public. 


Cumbria Constabulary quickly identified that it had a duty to warn the 

public. They used their media line, their website, shop watch radio 

links, direct phone calls to vulnerable locations and the use of “sky 

shout” from the police helicopter to warn the public. 

The review team commends the proactive use of the media and other 

means to warn members of the public in this case. 

8.157 At 11:05 hrs Derrick BIRD continued along single track lanes and unmade 

roads until he came across Isaac DIXON on the Egremont to 

Haile Road. He was seen to slow down and stop alongside Isaac. 

The post mortem examination shows he received two fatal wounds 

from the shotgun at close range. Isaac’s body was not found until 

some time later. 



44


8.158 Derrick BIRD then drove on to the village of Wilton having performed 

a u-turn on his route near to the village of Grange. 

8.159 Wilton is home to Jason CAREY and his wife Deborah. Jason is a 

committee member of the Solway Sub-Aqua Club, of which Derrick 

BIRD was a member. It was subsequently established that he had 

been involved in a number of disputes with the diving club committee 

over use of the club boat and potentially dangerous diving practices. 

It is clear from witness evidence that he bore grudges against some 

of the committee members. 

8.160 As Derrick BIRD drove into Wilton he passed Jennifer JACKSON who 

was walking through the village to meet her husband James who had 

been out for a walk. 

8.161 Derrick BIRD pulled into the drive of Jason’s home and sounded his 

horn. Jason heard the noise but was in bed having worked a night 

shift. Deborah CAREY put her dog into another part of the house as 

it was barking and she wanted to avoid disturbing her husband. By 

the time she opened the front door the taxi was reversing off the 

drive. 

8.162 Almost as soon as he pulled off the drive of the CAREY’S home, 

Derrick BIRD stopped his car alongside Jennifer JACKSON who was 

by now nearby, having walked through the village. Witnesses 

including Jennifer’s son, Christopher, who was working close by 

heard gunshots. The post mortem examination shows that Jennifer 

suffered a shotgun injury to the chest and two .22 rifle wounds to the 

head which proved fatal. 

8.163 At 11:10 hrs Derrick BIRD continued on his route through the village 

passing Town Head Farm where, coincidentally, Jennifer’s husband 

James was talking to a neighbour, Christine HUNTER-HALL. He 

drove past them but turned around and came back through the village 

stopping alongside the two neighbours. He fired the shotgun at 

James from the driver’s window killing him instantly with a shot to the 

head and then again at Christine who was taking cover assisted by 

her husband who had witnessed the shooting. Christine was hit in 

the back, with the shotgun pellets causing extensive injuries including 

a punctured lung. 

8.164 Derrick BIRD drove back through the village passing the body of 

Jennifer JACKSON lying on the roadside. His exact route to the next 

scene is unclear but it is believed that he drove through the village of 

Haile, on to the A595 at Blackbeck Roundabout close to the northern 

entrance of the Sellafield plant. 

8.165 Witnesses describe following Derrick BIRD’S vehicle travelling south 

on the A595 at Calder Bridge where he drove past a cyclist and then 



45


drove through a red traffic light. He was seen to stop in a gateway on 

the roadside adjacent to the Red Admiral Public House. 

8.166 At 11:15 hrs the Police helicopter from Lancashire was still making 

their way to the area to assist. Their progress had been frustrated by 

the low cloud that was present that day, as evidenced by the 

following extract from the helicopter communications log: 

02/06/2010 11:15:18 ON 99 still 8 minutes from Egremont ‘er still 

struggling with cloud just an update on what’s 

happened, just to give us an idea of how high we 

need to be 

8.167 At 11:19 hrs the Tactical Advisor to the Tactical Firearms 

Commander had identified that no firearms command decisions had 

been given to any of the armed officers that had been deployed. 

02/06/2010 11:19:11 All patrols stand by from FIM speaking to TAC 

advisor, the tactics as soon as we sight him are 

level one enforce stop using two ARVS. Level one 

enforced stop two ARVS engage immediately. 

8.168 At this time, almost an hour had passed since the authority to deploy 

armed police officers had been given; the tactical option of a “level 1 

enforced stop” was communicated to the ARVs. 

8.169 This is a specific tactic that all ARVs would understand and would 

ensure that any patrol that saw Derrick BIRD driving his vehicle would 

have a clear understanding of the tactical approach recommended to 

stop him. 

8.170 At the same time, all officers were informed of the fact that Derrick 

BIRD could be ‘emotionally or mentally distressed’, (terminology used 

by firearms officers to describe an individual who may be suffering 

from mental ill health or could be acting irrationally owing to a 

distressing episode), and that due consideration should be given to 

this fact. 

8.171 Reminding the ARVs of the various reasons why someone is 

behaving in a certain way is very important as it may influence the 

way in which they would approach or communicate with the subject 

should any contact occur. 

8.172 It is essential that where information is held, that it is shared with the 

Operational Firearms Commanders and ARVs. 



46



Informing ARVs of potential Tactical Options is good practice as is 

providing all officers of an indication of any emotional or mental 

distress which the subject may be experiencing and any potential 

reason for their behaviour whether real or perceived. 

8.173 At 11:20 hrs Garry PURDHAM was working in a field close to the 

Public House. Derrick BIRD shot Garry at this location. 

8.174 Witnesses report seeing him getting out of his car at this scene. 

8.175 The post mortem examination shows that Garry died from wounds 

consistent with being shot 

8.176 Derrick BIRD drove South on the A595 and turned off towards 

Seascale on the Gosforth Road. A short distance along this road he 

slowed and waved a vehicle on to pass him. A number of witnesses 

report seeing him parked on the side of the road. 

8.177 At 11:25 hrs a local Estate Agent, James CLARK was returning from 

a cancelled appointment in Seascale. 

8.178 His manager had spoken to him on the telephone at 11:22 hrs and 

had mentioned the reported shootings and advised him to leave the 

area and ensure that he was safe. The witnesses report seeing 

James parked at the side of the road, consistent with that telephone 

call. 

8.179 James’s car was found on its side on a grass verge. There was 

damage to the driver’s window and roof lining and the wheels were 

still turning. James was found dead inside the vehicle having been 

shot in the head by a shotgun. 

8.180 The investigation team have been unable to conclusively establish 

the exact sequence of events. 

8.181 This incident was reported as a Road Traffic Collision. 

8.182 At 11:25 hrs, the telephone log on which all information was being 

recorded was updated with the fact that the FIM was being replaced 

by a Tactical Firearms Commander. 

8.183 All firearms command communication from the call centre following 

this change, continued to be made directly by the FIM. 

8.184 I was able to identify that for the next hour, ARV officers made a 

number of requests for specific direction, this was provided without 

delay and was passed directly by the FIM. 



47


8.185 I formed the opinion that the FIM had continued to maintain the 

firearms commander role throughout the incident. 

8.186 During the professional discussions with the FIM and the Tactical 

Firearms Commander, it was apparent that command had not been 

exchanged at 11:25 hrs. 

8.187 The Tactical Firearms Commander had understood that he had 

command at that time, but in the absence of any appropriate working 

environment, he had to operate from the corner of the call centre. He 

understood that the FIM was maintaining the communication with 

patrols due to the absence of a radio for his use. 

8.188 The FIM had not understood that command had been exchanged and 

believed that he was in command until the point which occurred later 

when Derrick BIRD’S vehicle was abandoned. 

8.189 The FIM saw that the incident was a fast moving spontaneous 

incident where command could not effectively be handed over to the 

Tactical Firearms Commander. 

8.190 The Tactical Firearms Commander was unaware that the FIM had 

maintained command and had continued to direct armed officers. 

8.191 Due to the fact that Derrick BIRD was not located during this period of 

ambiguity, the failure to have a single tactical commander had not 

become a critical issue. 

8.192 This would not have been the case if he had been located and the 

officers required specific command advice. 

8.193 The review team has also conducted a professional discussion with 

the Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC), who was in overall 

command of the incident. The Strategic Firearms Commander has 

responsibility for setting the overall strategy to resolve the incident 

and to ensure that sufficient resources are deployed. The review 

team has examined the Strategic Firearms Commander’s strategy 

and found it to be appropriate and clear. It is apparent that the 

Strategic Firearms Commander liaised with neighbouring forces in 

order to arrange mutual aid. The review team found that the Tactical 

Firearms Commander and FIM were never fully aware of the totality 

of resources they had available to them and this appears to have 

been a breakdown in communication. 


That Cumbria Constabulary reinforce the importance of command 

protocols to both the Tactical Firearms Commander and the FIM and to 

ensure that a Commander is clearly defined at all times during a 



48

Firearm’s Operation. 


The implementation of Recommendation 2 should minimise the 

likelihood of this occurring in the future. 

8.194 At 11:26 hrs, attempts were made by the FIM to establish the number 

of armed police officers available. Limited replies were given which 

only provided a partial understanding of the level of ARVs available. 

02/06/2010 11:26:13 Comms Inspector speaking ARV staff just give me 

a quick ref where you are whose where, 00 just 

passing Egremont nick south now 595, Mike Bravo 

38 Stanley Arms 595, Alpha Alpha 22 on the A66 

between Keswick and Cockermouth making 

ground, Mike Sierra 60 stationary. 

8.195 At this stage 23 armed Cumbria officers were deployed searching for 

Derrick BIRD, supported by their CNC colleagues who had deployed 

additional resources, including two armoured vehicles from the 

Sellafield site. 

8.196 Seascale 

8.197 At 11:27 hrs Derrick BIRD was travelling towards the village of 

Seascale where he had to navigate a narrow passage under a 

railway bridge, this resulted in him approaching head on with a 

Landrover driven by Harry BERGER. 

8.198 The road is only sufficiently wide for one vehicle to pass at a time and 

Harry reversed back out of the tunnel towards the seafront to allow 

Derrick BIRD to pass. 

8.199 Harry saw the gun in the taxi as he mouthed a comment towards 

Derrick BIRD and then saw that the weapon was pointed at him. 

8.200 Harry BERGER was shot twice through his Landrover causing severe 

damage and tissue loss to his right arm. Derrick BIRD drove off along 

the seafront and onto Drigg Road. 

8.201 Three ARVs (two from Cumbria Constabulary and one from CNC) 

travelled through this scene in convoy a short time after Derrick BIRD 

had left. They were unable to pass Harry BERGER’S vehicle and 

members of the public had to push the Landrover to enable them to 

pass. The footage from a mobile telephone, from a witness at the 

scene, clearly demonstrates the relief that is displayed on the arrival 

of the emergency services. 



49


8.202 A call to the police from a member of the public at the scene where 

Harry BERGER was injured shows the confusion they felt when the 

police did not stop to assist them. 

8.203 The three ARVs had the sole aim to locate and stop Derrick BIRD 

and although the officers briefly spoke to the members of the public 

they continued their pursuit of him. 


The overriding priority of the police service is to protect the public. 

These officers had to decide whether to stop and render first aid or to 

continue in their efforts to locate and stop Derrick BIRD before he could 

kill or injure anyone else. The casualty was being cared for by members 

of the public and on reflection the review team believes that these 

firearms officers made the right decision and continued to search for 

Derrick BIRD in an attempt to prevent further loss of life. 

8.204 At 11:29 hrs Cumbria Constabulary informed the North West 

Ambulance Service that military helicopters were available to assist 

them with any casualty evacuation that they could not resource. The 

helicopters were not deployed. 

02/06/2010 11:29:03 I’ve got two RAF helicopters that are actually gonna 

travel to Workington erm police station the cricket 

pitch behind there now they will be available to you 

if you wish to sort of erm 

8.205 Drigg Road 

8.206 At 11:30 hrs Derrick BIRD drove along the seafront onto Drigg Road 

where Michael PIKE, who was cycling in the same direction, was 

travelling ahead of his car. 

8.207 Derrick BIRD drew alongside Michael where he fired twice. The first 

shot missed but the second hit Michael in the neck which killed him 

instantly. 


Taking account of the fact that it is now only one hour since Cumbria 

Constabulary have been made aware of a crime in action with no prior 

warning, they have approximately 30 armed officers deployed across 

the County. Many forces with considerably larger numbers of 

resources would have found it difficult to deploy such large numbers of 

armed officers within such a time period. 

8.208 At 11:32 hrs Derrick BIRD continued along Drigg Road, stopping 

adjacent to a well known, local lady, Jane ROBINSON, who was 

delivering catalogues. 



50


8.209 It appears that Derrick BIRD caused her to lean into the passenger 

window, similar to the way he had done to several people 

beforehand. Jane was killed instantly with a shotgun wound to the 

neck and head. 

8.210 Following this incident, witnesses describe Derrick BIRD driving at 

speed along the road towards Drigg. Whereas he had previously 

been seen to be driving in a controlled manner, even when he had 

the police vehicle directly behind him in Whitehaven, his driving 

appears to be increasingly erratic. 

8.211 At 11:33 hrs one of the ARVs was travelling from Holmrook towards 

Drigg when they passed Derrick BIRD travelling in the opposite 

direction. This sighting demonstrates that the police response was 

closing in. 

02/06/2010 11:33:55 Three zero just passed the vehicle heading back 

towards Holmrook 

8.212 The officers turned to follow but were forced to manoeuvre through 

temporary road works at Holmrook and lost sight of the taxi. 

02/06/2010 11:36:01 Does an ARV by Holmrook garage wanna take the 

left he possibly could have gone down that road 

have got a temporary loss at the moment. Comms 

inspector speaking don’t break up the ARVs I want 

two together let Oscar November nine nine do the 

search Oscar No 

8.213 Eskdale valley 

8.214 The officers continued south on the A595 but it has since been 

established that Derrick BIRD had turned off the main road and 

travelled towards the Eskdale valley. 

8.215 Additional police resources including Air Support were deployed to 

the area and began to close in around Derrick BIRD. 

8.216 At 11:34 hrs, Jackie LEWIS, who is an elderly resident of Drigg 

village, was out walking. Jackie was shot in the head with a single 

.22 round. She does not recall the incident and was found by 

passers-by at the side of the road, who initially thought she had 

collapsed. 

8.217 A number of witnesses describe seeing Derrick BIRD travelling 

towards Eskdale. As a local taxi driver and having lived in West 

Cumbria for his entire life, he knew the area very well. He was seen 



51


to take a route through Irton before doubling back towards the Bower 

House Public House. 

8.218 A single round of live .22 ammunition was found on the roadside 

close to Irton giving reason to believe that Derrick BIRD had travelled 

through that location. 

8.219 From the Bower House, he continued through the Eskdale valley 

towards Eskdale Green. 

8.220 Police officers, having identified Derrick BIRD’S direction of travel, 

began to telephone ahead to warn businesses and tourist attractions 

to keep people inside and so, despite the fact that it was a fine day 

during half term holidays, there were fewer people than normal on the 

roads in the valley. 

8.221 From a very early stage, following Cumbria Constabulary being 

notified of this incident, they deployed a Detective Inspector from their 

intelligence unit to identify all locations with a high population and 

start to warn members of the public. As a result, a small team was 

established to ‘warn and inform’ the public. This process was 

impressive with all significant tourist sites being contacted and being 

told to advise their customers to stay inside and stay away from the 

windows of the premises. 

8.222 As Derrick BIRD’S route became clearer, this same team telephoned 

every campsite and Public House, as well as the smaller tourist sites, 

with the same message. This complemented the media and website 

strategy that was also deployed to warn the general public. 


Having reconstructed the incident, it is now clear that Derrick BIRD 

drove along routes that could have been highly populated with tourists. 

The police response to ‘warn and inform’ the public was so effective, 

that many of these locations were deserted. It is impossible to be sure 

but it is highly likely that lives were saved by this strategy. 

8.223 Had this incident occurred during an evening or at the weekend, the 

outcome may have been different, as this team of intelligence officers 

would not have been readily available. 


That Cumbria Constabulary considers access to intelligence resources 

during weekends and evenings. The provision of an intelligence 

capability within the force control room on a 24/7 basis is achieved 

within many forces and could benefit Cumbria. 



52


8.224 At 11:40 hrs the Lancashire Police Helicopter advised the call centre 

that they were located at Drigg and requested direction for where 

they were required to attend. 

8.225 The FIM misinterpreted the comments and believed the helicopter 

had sighted Derrick BIRD at that location. 

8.226 ARVs were tasked to move from their locations to respond to the 

sighting. 

02/06/2010 11:40:39 ARVs from Comms Inspector car is stationery at 

Drigg first thing we want to contain it. I want armed 

vehicles at least one preventing its egress, I want 

two to challenge. Call signs please….. 

8.227 The FIM directed that the ARVs should challenge the subject. He 

failed to use a recognised tactical option again, despite having been 

prompted earlier by the Tactical Advisor. 

8.228 Despite this fact, the FIM attempted to pair up the ARVs in order to 

deploy the Level 1 enforced stop. 

02/06/2010 11:45:00 Yeah, all standby, Comms Inspector speaking, I 

need to pair up the ARVs for the tactic were gonna 

engage in. We need to have the ARVs working in 

pairs. 38 who are you nearest to, is it 30 

8.229 At 11:50 hrs Fiona MORETTA, who was in the area on holiday, was 

walking along the road close to the King George IV Public House. 

Derrick BIRD stopped alongside her. Fiona thought she was going to 

be asked for directions and so she bent down to the passenger 

window to speak to him. 

8.230 Derrick BIRD fired his .22 rifle, the round hit Fiona in the face, 

resulting in serious injuries. Fiona ran towards the rear of his car. He 

initially began to reverse after her but then drove off on his original 

route towards Boot. 

8.231 At approx 12:00 hrs, in excess of 40 armed officers, from Cumbria 

Constabulary and CNC, were deployed in the search for him. Armed 

resources from Lancashire and Yorkshire were also deployed on the 

periphery of the county to ensure that Derrick BIRD was contained 

into the smallest geographic location as possible. 

8.232 The FIM and call centre again attempted to identify the number of 

armed officers and also tried to designate two Operational Firearms 

Commander’s. 



53


8.233 In Cumbria there were a number of ARV officers who were trained to 

perform this role. However, it was not the practice for this role to be 

designated when officers came on duty. 

8.234 The appointed Operational Firearms Commander’s could not 

establish what ARVs they had available and as a result, they were 

unable to perform this role effectively. 

8.235 Derrick BIRD travelled along the valley road and into Boot where he 

stopped outside a business premises called Sims Travel. At this 

location he was seen to fire the rifle at people in the vicinity but 

fortunately missed. 

8.236 A short distance further down the road he fired at the ALTY family 

who were walking with their children towards Dalegarth Station. 

8.237 Dalegarth is one location that would have been heavily populated 

with customers but had responded to the police warnings and 

everyone was locked in the building for their protection. 

8.238 The ALTY family had not reached the station and so were unaware of 

the danger. Again, fortunately the shot missed. 

8.239 A further short distance along the road, within 100 metres of the 

ALTY family, Derrick BIRD stopped again and pointed the rifle at 

Reginald MILLER who was walking along the road but did not appear 

to fire at him. 

8.240 The armed police patrols were by now very close to the scene but 

had not yet come across him. 

8.241 Nathan JONES and Phillip MOORE were leaving the campsite at 

Hollins Farm, a short distance further on. Derrick BIRD stopped 

alongside them and fired at Nathan hitting him in the face with a .22 

bullet causing internal injuries. 

8.242 Samantha CHRYSTIE and her partner Craig ROSS had been driving 

in the same direction, but ahead of Derrick BIRD, when they had 

stopped to take a photograph. He pulled up alongside Samantha and 

asked if she was having a nice day. As she began to respond Derrick 

BIRD shot her in the face with his rifle causing internal injuries. 

8.243 Craig had seen what had happened and got out of his vehicle but 

was told by Derrick BIRD to drive away. Craig did as he was 

instructed and drove off up the valley. As he drove away, Derrick 

BIRD fired at the car smashing the rear window but fortunately Craig 

was uninjured. 



54


8.244 Craig quickly came upon two cyclists, Phillip and Anne LOWE, and 

stopped to warn them before he continued to the nearby Woolpack 

Public House to ask for assistance. 

8.245 Derrick BIRD also continued his route and stopped alongside Phillip 

and Anne, firing the rifle at Phillip, narrowly missing him. 

8.246 The final phase of the Operation to locate Derrick BIRD 

8.247 Derrick BIRD then began to drive off at speed along the very narrow 

road, colliding with a number of oncoming vehicles and the dry stone 

wall which caused the front offside tyre of the taxi to deflate. 

8.248 This resulted in him being unable to continue and so he turned off the 

road at the next turning, a no-through road to Doctor Bridge, Boot. 

8.249 A short distance down this road the tyre came off the wheel and 

Derrick BIRD brought the car to a halt at the roadside near the stone 

bridge. 

8.250 At approximately 12:15 hrs, two families of holidaymakers, who were 

nearby, and who were totally unaware of anything that had occurred, 

asked if he wanted assistance. 

8.251 Derrick BIRD declined their offer of help, removed the rifle from the 

vehicle and walked over the bridge towards Oak How Woods where a 

short time later it is suspected he took his own life. 

8.252 These were the last people to see Derrick BIRD alive. 

02/06/2010 12:15:57 From a member of the public believe the male has 

abandoned the vehicle towards Hardknott pass 

we’re hopefully gonna get there in about two 

minutes 

02/06/2010 12:16:05 Nine nine did you get the last he’s on foot vehicle 

abandoned Hardknott pass. Oscar November nine 

nine making back to hard nose er Hardknott now 

Wrynose appears clear Wrynose appears clear 

8.253 The whole incident, from the time that Cumbria Constabulary had 

been first contacted until Derrick BIRD walked into the woods, was 

only two hours (10:13 – 12:15 hrs). 

8.254 Taking account of the geography, his extensive local knowledge and 

the distance of approximately 52 miles that he had covered in that 

time, it is clear to see why it had been difficult to locate him. 



55


8.255 Armed police and dog handlers arrived at the scene of the 

abandoned vehicle and began a search along Derrick BIRD’S route. 

02/06/2010 12:36:27 Yeah in view of the location of where this vehicle 

may be I now have six, eight…eight officers all 

armed and waiting for permission to advance 

towards the vehicle to make a check, so far 

02/06/2010 12:37:36 Once we have seized the vehicle are we authorised 

for an open country search and start looking for 

him, we’ve got dog handlers here and a lot of 

AFO’s. An open country search, just stand by, tell 

us what he’s got in the vehicle and therefore what 

he’s got 

02/06/2010 12:37:47 Approaching 5 minutes left on scene we are doing 

a very quick open area search ‘er we’ve now 

located the vehicle ‘er as of the ARVs ‘er your 

instructions please. ON 99 ‘erm you’ve heard the 

direction he’s made off in and I understood it was 

South ‘er if 

02/06/2010 12:38:18 Yeah just for information, we’ve got two dogs with 

us now heading towards the car 

02/06/2010 12:39:29 Yeah, 04, we’ve got the vehicle ND55 ZFC we’re 

not able to see in the vehicle , all the doors are 

closed , we’re just going to move forward and clear 

the vehicle 

02/06/2010 12:46:24 We have with us two dog handlers and ten AFO’s, 

are we in order to do an open country search in 

relation to this male. 1512 to 882 just standby that 

on that we need to discuss this regarding the 

weapon that he now has standby 

8.256 They found the sound moderator before eventually finding Derrick 

BIRD’S body. 


The bravery of the officers who entered the woods to search for Derrick 

BIRD cannot be overstated. The woodland is dense and is situated on a 

hill; it is commonly used by local Scout groups to build hides. From his 

elevated, well camouflaged position, it is very likely that Derrick BIRD 

could have seen the officers approaching before they saw him. 



56


8.257 Derrick BIRD’S body and his vehicle were searched and it was 

established that there were 6 live .22 rounds in his trouser pocket 

with a further 8 live rounds in the magazine of the rifle. 

8.258 No live shotgun cartridges were recovered which suggests that he 

ran out of shotgun ammunition after the shooting of Jane ROBINSON 

in Seascale. 

8.259 During the course of the shootings, Derrick BIRD is known to have 

discharged at least 29 shotgun cartridges and 18 rounds of .22 

ammunition. 

8.260 In common with all certificate holders, Derrick BIRD had no restriction 

on the amount of shotgun ammunition he could hold and was 

permitted to have a maximum of 1,500 rounds of .22 ammunition at 

any one time. 

8.261 Derrick BIRD’S home address was searched by the police and over 

750 rounds of .22 ammunition and 240 live shotgun cartridges were 

recovered indicating that he was well within his permitted quantities of 

ammunition. 

8.262 Also found at his house were quantities of paperwork relating to his 

financial difficulties, these were prominently placed in the kitchen as 

were the deeds to his home. 



57

SECTION 9 


THE REVIEW PROCESS 

9. The West Mercia Police review team were invited to Cumbria on the 

23 rd and 24 th June 2010. They were briefed by the Cumbria 

Constabulary Chief Officer Team and the appointed Senior 

Investigating Officer (SIO) who was leading their investigation on 

behalf of HM Coroner. 

9.1 The Terms of Reference set out in section 11 of this report were 

agreed and the review team were given an escorted tour of the 

incident scenes in the chronology that it was understood to have 

occurred. 

9.2 It was agreed that the Cumbria investigation team would have the 

primary responsibility for investigating the incident including 

interviewing the majority of witnesses and securing evidence in 

respect of Derrick BIRD’S activities and the crimes committed. This 

included police officers and staff including the Authorised Firearms 

Officers. 

9.3 The Peer Review team would take primacy of securing evidence from 

all of the firearms commanders and their tactical advisors. 

9.4 Nothing within this agreement was intended to preclude the Peer 

Review Team from speaking to any specific witness, if it was felt that 

such a requirement would add value to the review process. 

9.5 The review team had direct access to all evidence recorded having 

had direct access to a secure link to the Cumbria Home Office Large 

Major Enquiry System (HOLMES). This computer based system is 

used nationally by all police forces to manage complex and major 

crime investigations. 

9.6 A guidance document 6 created by the review team and agreed with 

the Cumbria investigators proved most beneficial in ensuring that all 

needs and expectations of the two teams were understood. This 

minimised the potential for any witness to be interviewed more than 

once. 

9.7 It was agreed that any additional information that was required by the 

review team would be obtained by the Cumbria investigation team. 

All information would be incorporated into the primary investigation, 

6 The guidance document is produced at Appendix 3. 



58


regardless of the purpose that it had been requested. This ensured 

that the Coroner’s file would be based on all available evidence. 

9.8 Following the initial briefing on the 23 rd June 2010 to the present date, 

the review team has examined significant numbers of documents and 

other relevant material as it became available. 

9.9 It was imperative that this material was properly assessed and it is for 

this reason that the review process has taken several months to 

complete. 

9.10 The collation of this material, particularly the telephone and Police 

radio transcripts were extremely time consuming. This accounts for 

the length of time that this report has taken to produce. Examination 

of this material was essential to ensure that I was able to complete a 

comprehensive assessment of the incident response. 

9.11 A Reference Group of relevant professionals was formed in order to 

scrutinise the review process and hold the review team to account 

throughout the review process. 

9.12 The Reference Group included Chief Constable Ian ARUNDALE who 

is a subject matter expert in relation to armed policing and Mrs 

Deborah GLASS, Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints 

Commission. 



59

SECTION 10 


REVIEW TEAM’S APPROACH TO 

INTERVIEWS WITH POLICE STAFF 

10. The purpose of this Peer Review was to establish the facts and 

assess the response of Cumbria Constabulary in order that any 

lessons can be learned. 

10.1 In order for real value to be achieved and operational lessons 

learned, it was important that all those involved in this incident, felt 

they were able to openly share their experience. 

10.2 The review team recognised the importance of being able to 

understand the emotional and practical experiences of key members 

of staff. It was also recognised that some members of police staff 

would not be required to submit a statement of evidence and those 

that did would concentrate on the evidential tasks that they 

performed. 

10.3 The review team created a strategy to conduct “Professional 

Discussions”. 7 The purpose of this was to enable the review team to 

speak openly with relevant members of staff and maximise the 

opportunities to fully understand the detail of how they responded on 

that day. 

10.4 As a result, the review team and Cumbria Constabulary in 

consultation with the Police Federation and the Police staff union 

agreed a protocol in relation to Professional Discussions. 

10.5 This enabled the review team to create an environment where staff 

felt that they were able to talk openly to the review team in a way 

which might not have been possible, if the review team were 

conducting a criminal or disciplinary investigation. 

10.6 To support this process, Chief Constable MACKEY afforded immunity 

for any minor disciplinary issues which might arise during these 

discussions, in order to encourage open and transparent 

communication. 

10.7 It is important for me to highlight that no misconduct issues were 

identified. 

10.8 The “Terms of Reference” were agreed from the outset in order to 

ensure that the Peer Review remained focussed; these are 

reproduced here in their entirety for clarity of those reading this 

review. 

7 The strategy of Professional Discussions is produced at Appendix 4 



60

SECTION 11 


TERMS OF REFERENCE 

11. The Terms of Reference were set as follows: 

11.1 On behalf of the Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary, conduct a 

Peer Review into the circumstances surrounding Cumbria 

Constabulary’s response to Operation Bridge in West Cumbria on 

Wednesday 2nd June 2010. To consider policing issues arising there 

from, and any lessons which can be learned by Cumbria, the region 

or nationally and, to make such recommendations, as may seem 

appropriate. 

11.2 In particular the Review will focus upon the following areas:- 

- The proportionality of Cumbria Constabulary’s general firearms 

capability and capacity including training and deployment, and, 

how this compares to other similar Police Forces Nationwide, 

taking into account Cumbria’s Strategic Firearms Threat and Risk 

Assessment. 

- The reasonableness of Cumbria Constabulary’s armed policing 

response to the events on 2nd June 2010. 

- The reasonableness of Cumbria Constabulary’s general response 

(unarmed officers and staff) to the events on 2nd June 2010. 

- The reasonableness of Cumbria Constabulary’s command 

response to the events on 2nd June 2010. 

- The reasonableness of Cumbria Constabulary’s use, deployment 

and effectiveness of mutual aid to the events on 2nd June 2010 

- The reasonableness of Cumbria Constabulary’s deployment of 

Civil Nuclear Constabulary Officers who supported the response. 

11.3 At the conclusion of the Review, the report, containing the Review 

Team’s findings in respect of the matters outlined above and any 

recommendations which the Review Team considers appropriate, are 

to be provided to the Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary. 

11.4 The report will be published in full, subject only to redaction of 

material properly attracting Public Interest Immunity. Material subject 

to Public Interest Immunity is to be contained within an annexe to the 

main report. 



61


11.5 Any recommendations, findings or lessons to be learned in respect of 

the actions of Cumbria Constabulary officers or staff will be 

expressed against the force generally and not against specific 

persons. 

11.6 Guidance to the Terms of Reference 

11.7 In addition to the Terms of Reference, the Chief Constable has set 

the following parameters within which the Review Team will operate: 

11.8 The Review is not a formal investigation under the Police Reform Act 

2002. 

11.9 The Review is to be a review of existing material and evidence 

gathered following the events on 2nd June 2010. The Review Team 

will be provided with full access to all documents and audio and 

visual recordings which came into existence during the events under 

review. They will also be provided with all documents in the 

possession of Cumbria Constabulary touching upon the issues of 

Cumbria Constabulary’s general firearms resourcing, training and 

deployment. 

11.10 In order to ensure that there is no risk of prejudice to the adjourned 

inquests and/or to any proceedings which might flow from a referral 

under paragraph 4 below this is to be confined to a review of the 

existing material and evidence. For this reason no public witnesses 

to the events of 2nd June 2010 should be interviewed by the Review 

Team. 

11.11 During the course of the Review, if the Review Team identify any 

evidence of potential conduct/discipline matters, as defined within the 

Police Reform Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”) and/or The Police (Conduct) 

Regulations 2008, (the “2008 Regulations”), they should draw this to 

the immediate attention of the Deputy Chief Constable of Cumbria 

Constabulary, as Appropriate Authority, who will determine whether 

or not action needs to be taken pursuant to the 2002 Act and/or 2008 

Regulations. 

11.12 The Review is concerned with the response of officers and staff of 

Cumbria Constabulary. If the Review Team identifies any issues 

arising out of the response of other Agencies these issues should be 

referred back to the Chief Constable. 

11.13 It is requested that the Review Team report back to the Chief 

Constable as soon as is practicable. During the course of the review 

the Chief Constable is to be provided with updates on the progress of 

the review on a fortnightly basis. The Chief Constable of Cumbria 

may suggest further issues and lines of inquiry to the Review Team 

within the Terms of Reference arising from these updates. 



62


11.14 In order to avoid the risk of prejudice to any other proceedings, the 

Review Team should not work outside these Terms of Reference. 

The Terms of Reference should only be amended following 

consultation and agreement with the Chief Constable of Cumbria 


11.15 In order to avoid the risk of prejudice to any other proceedings and to 

maintain the integrity of the Review, the Review Team and other 

contributors to the Review should not disclose any information 

pertaining to the Review until the Review Report has been published. 

As agreed by Chief Constable MACKEY (Cumbria Constabulary) 

and ACC CHESTERMAN (ACPO lead for armed policing) 



63

SECTION 12 


CUMBRIA CONSTABULARY’S ARRANGEMENT FOR THE 

MANAGEMENT, COMMAND and DEPLOYMENT OF ITS 

RESOURCES 

12. The review process has taken an in-depth view of how Cumbria 

Constabulary performed on the 2nd June 2010. 

12.1 In order to comment about that performance, it is useful to examine 

how the force operates within its normal routine business. 

12.2 I have included the following paragraphs to outline how the force 

operates and identify any additional observations and 

recommendations that may have assisted the force to deal with the 

events under review. 

12.3 Communications Room Structure 

12.4 Cumbria Constabulary has two Call Management Centres. The 

primary centre is within force HQ at Penrith and the second is at 

Workington, West Cumbria. 

12.5 The Force Incident Manager (FIM), Firearms Tactical Advisors and 

the majority of call centre staff are based at Headquarters. 

12.6 Both call centres have an identical infrastructure and both have the 

capability to manage communications for the whole of the force area. 

In the event of one call centre being unavailable, the second control 

room could manage the needs of Cumbria Constabulary. As an 

example, during the floods in November 2009, the Western control 

room was flooded and the force was managed from a single site. 

12.7 The control room at Penrith is well structured with bays containing 

staff that have specific geographic responsibility for communications 

for locations in the North and South of the Force area. 

12.8 The FIM sits in a central location in the room in order to command 

any incident that is being managed from within any one of the bays. 

12.9 The majority of incidents that occur within the West Cumbria area are 

managed from Workington. 

12.10 With incidents managed from Workington, the FIM does not have the 

same interaction with his control room staff and relies on the 



64


computerised command and control log, telephone briefings and 

monitoring the Airwave radio to command an incident. 

12.11 In our interviews with the FIM, who coordinated the incident under 

review, he expressed concerns about the Communication Room 

structure. His view was that having staff on two sites makes it very 

difficult to establish every detail when being briefed by colleagues 

over a telephone or radio, compared with being face to face in a 

single call centre. 

12.12 His decisions on the 2nd June 2010 were made based on brief radio 

transmissions and commentary passed via a third party, from phone 

calls between the two call centres. 

12.13 The FIM favours a single control room to negate such difficulties 

which he will say had a detrimental impact on his ability to 

comprehend the full facts, in real time, as they unfolded. 


In common with many Police Forces, Cumbria Constabulary operate 

two force control rooms. This provides resilience and business 

continuity. In light of the FIM’s comments to the review team, the force 

may wish to satisfy itself that appropriate communication links and 

processes are in place to maximise the FIM’s ability to command 

incidents across two control rooms. 

12.14 The review team make specific recommendations later in the report in 

relation to the communication between the Armed Response Vehicle 

officers and the firearms commander in isolation of the overall 

incident and this may have an impact on the control room structure. 

12.15 Command of Firearms Incidents 

12.16 The generic command structure used in the UK Police Service 

operates at three levels, strategic, tactical and operational. This 

structure is often referred to as Gold, Silver and Bronze levels of 

command. 

12.17 In situations where Firearms Officers are deployed, the command 

functions are usually assigned to specific officers and the roles 

assigned are as follows: 

12.18 The Strategic Firearms Commander - has responsibility for 

determining the strategic objectives and sets any tactical, functional 

or territorial responsibilities related to a tactical plan. The Strategic 

Firearms Commander retains strategic oversight and overall 

command responsibility. 



65


12.19 A Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) – is responsible for 

developing, commanding and coordinating the overall tactical 

response in accordance with strategic objectives. 

12.20 Operational Firearms Commander(s) (OFC) – Commands a group of 

officers carrying out the tactics. 

12.21 Where a Strategic Firearms Commander is not yet in place, as is 

often the case where an incident is reported or comes to the attention 

of the police and an immediate operational deployment of AFO’s is 

considered appropriate, the command structure is likely to be 

condensed. 

12.22 Initial command will usually sit with the person having ready access 

to information, communications and resources. 

12.23 In Cumbria as in many other Forces in England and Wales, the Force 

Incident Manager referred to as the FIM undertakes this role until 

such time as a dedicated command structure for the incident can be 

established. 

12.24 In order to achieve this, the FIM would use an operational decisionmaking 

tool known as the Conflict Management Model (CMM). From 

this they would create a working strategy and set some tactical 

parameters for the armed officers to work to. 

12.25 In addition to the command roles outlined above, each Force has 

designated firearms Tactical Advisers who are on call. The Tactical 

Advisers are an important resource particularly to the Strategic and 

Tactical commanders. 

12.26 It is however important to note that the role of a Tactical Advisor is to 

advise and not to make command decisions. The responsibility for 

the validity and reliability of the advice lies with the advisor, but the 

responsibility for the use of that advice lies with the commander. 

12.27 For as long as the FIM is in command he or she acts as the Tactical 

Firearms Commander setting the working strategy, including any 

appropriate tactical parameters. These will be reviewed and ratified 

by a Strategic Firearms Commander as soon as is practicable. 

12.28 Forces should therefore, have structures in place that ensure the 

ready availability of Tactical and Operational Firearms Commanders. 

12.29 Where incidents become protracted, there should be arrangements 

which enable command to be transferred to a dedicated Tactical 

Firearms Commander, thereby enabling others to return to their 

normal duties. 



66


12.30 The command of the incident and responsibility for its management 

rests with the initial Commander until such time as command is 

transferred. 

12.31 Until strategic firearms command is established, the Tactical Firearms 

Commander (TFC) will be responsible for developing a working 

strategy, which may include the setting of tactical parameters. 

12.32 They must ensure that all officers are sufficiently briefed, information 

flows are established and all officers are given as full a briefing as 

possible in the time available. 

12.33 A Strategic Firearms Commander should be contacted as soon as 

practicable and informed that an incident requiring the deployment of 

armed officers is taking place. 

12.34 The Strategic Firearms Commander, when in a position to do so, 

should then review, agree or amend the strategy and any tactical 

parameters set and where necessary, confirm or rescind any given 

authority. 

12.35 This command structure offers flexibility in response to a varied and 

developing range of circumstances and is functional and not based 

on rank. 

12.36 The actions of Derrick BIRD on the 2nd June 2010 resulted in a 

situation where public safety had to be prioritised and an immediate 

operational response was necessary. 

12.37 The FIM managed the initial response as described. Cumbria 

Constabulary responded exactly as would be expected within this 

established structure 

12.38 Police firearms officers and the officers that command them, are 

trained to agreed national standards. All officers who perform armed 

duties are fully aware of the CMM and the full range of tactics that are 

available to them. 

12.39 Cumbria has sufficient Firearms Officers, Commanders and Tactical 

Advisors to meet the requirements of a 24/7 capability. 

12.40 On the 2nd June 2010, despite the early deployment of ARVs, there 

was difficulty in coordinating and directing resources on the ground 

with each ARV crew attempting to respond as they considered 

appropriate. 

12.41 The review team have concluded that had one of the ARV’s already 

on duty contained an officer who was the nominated Operational 

Firearms Commander for any incident which might have occurred, 



67


that would have greatly assisted in managing the response by 

Firearms officers. 

12.42 By the time an Operational Firearms Commander was appointed, at 

approx 12.00 hrs, it had become increasingly difficult to gain 

situational awareness and understanding of the staffing levels that 

were available. This made coordination of resources more difficult. 


That Cumbria Constabulary nominate an Operational Firearms 

Commander at the start of each tour of duty. 

12.43 Firearms Training 

12.44 Cumbria Constabulary has a firearms training school situated at 

Force Headquarters in Penrith. 

12.45 The Chief Firearms Instructor is a very capable firearms officer, who 

is held in high regard nationally. 

12.46 The National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) inspect and license 

police forces to deliver firearms training. The NPIA had recently 

conducted an assessment of Cumbria. In April 2010, a self 

assessment process was conducted by Cumbria Constabulary 

following a successful independent review during the previous year. 

12.47 As part of the review process, the Peer Review team have visited the 

training school and met with the Chief Firearms Instructor. We have 

also had the opportunity to read the NPIA inspection reports. 

12.48 We are satisfied that the Cumbria Constabulary firearms training 

school delivers appropriate training and that there is no evidence to 

suggest that firearms training had any impact on the outcome of the 

incident under review. 

12.49 The Firearms Command Suite 

12.50 The main role of the FIM is to ensure that an appropriate response is 

afforded to each incident as it occurs within the force area. The 

management of firearms incidents is a small but important aspect of 

that role. 

12.51 Within the Cumbria Force Control Room there is an allocated 

workspace where a FIM can access all force communication and 

computer systems to ensure they possess all relevant information to 

perform their role. 

12.52 When the FIM hands over a firearms operation to a Tactical Firearms 

Commander, it is essential that the Tactical Firearms Commander 



68


has access to the same systems and has an appropriate environment 

in order to enable them to command the incident as effectively as 

possible. 

12.53 The review team does not believe that the Cumbria Constabulary 

Headquarters control room affords the Tactical Firearms Commander 

the right environment within which to effectively command an ongoing 

incident. 

12.54 The only option at the moment is to co-locate with the FIM which can 

disrupt other control room business and does not afford the Tactical 

Firearms Commander easy access to systems. This arrangement 

could also make the transfer of command, from the FIM to the 

Tactical Firearms Commander, less defined and risks confusion. 

12.55 Adjacent to the control room is a Gold Command suite which is 

ideally situated and could easily be adapted to provide the right 

infrastructure for the Tactical Firearms Commander. 

12.56 Ambiguity over who is actually in command of an incident at any 

given time is a common criticism following high profile incidents. 

12.57 On the 2nd June 2010, Cumbria Constabulary had other significant 

operations to manage namely, a Fatal Road Traffic Collision, the 

initial phase of Appleby Fair and a large funeral of victims from the 

school coach collision that occurred in Keswick some weeks earlier. 

12.58 All of these incidents would benefit from the FIM having oversight, to 

ensure sufficient resources were available to manage them, and that 

policing elsewhere was uncompromised by the major incident. 


That Cumbria Constabulary converts the existing Gold Command Suite, 

at Force Headquarters, into a fully functioning Command Suite suitable 

for a Tactical Firearms Commander to take command of a firearms 

operation. 

12.59 Implementing this recommendation would enable the Tactical 

Firearms Commander to attend the control room, receive a briefing 

from the FIM and then take the management of the whole incident 

away from them. 

12.60 Interoperability with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary 

12.61 The Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) has a responsibility for 

providing protection to civil nuclear licensed sites, safeguarding 

nuclear material and those that are employed by the industry. 

Sellafield in Cumbria is one site that the CNC has a responsibility to 

protect. 



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12.62 CNC officers are routinely armed and therefore a significant armed 

policing presence exists within Cumbria on a daily basis. 

12.63 The relationship between CNC and Cumbria Constabulary is 

excellent. 

12.64 Standard operating procedures (SOP) have been developed between 

the two forces to outline the way that the two organisations can coexist 

whilst affording support to each other where appropriate. 

12.65 This relationship is demonstrated by the fact that recently, officers 

from each force have exchanged roles for a period of time in order to 

afford an opportunity for both organisations to have a better 

understanding of each others business. 

12.66 Interaction between the two organisations is inevitable. CNC officers 

routinely patrol the exterior perimeter fence of the nuclear site. In 

addition to the main site, other locations associated with Sellafield are 

found in the County and it is common place for CNC patrols to travel 

across the county to these other locations. 

12.67 It is a regular occurrence that CNC officers will happen across 

incidents and will liaise with Cumbria colleagues to resolve the 

incident. During 2nd June 2010, the immediate availability of 

additional armed assets was a welcome opportunity for Cumbria 


12.68 The CNC were notified by the Cumbria FIM shortly after the first 

shooting was reported in order to give prior warning to them for the 

safety of their site. Subsequently, CNC deployed several patrols into 

Cumbria to support their neighbouring colleagues. 

12.69 Difficulties arose when the Tactical Firearms Commander gave an 

authority to the armed patrols to deploy a specific vehicle tactic to 

stop Derrick BIRD if he was located whilst driving his vehicle. 

12.70 The tactic was acknowledged by the CNC officers but their firearms 

commander had to notify the Cumbria Tactical Firearms Commander 

that the CNC patrols did not have the training to deliver that tactic. 

The CNC officers had heard the tactic but it actually had a different 

meaning to them. 

12.71 This could have resulted in a Cumbria and CNC ARV being deployed 

together and having a different understanding of what action the other 

patrol would take following appropriate tactical options being given by 

the Tactical Firearms Commander. 



70


12.72 This situation did not arise and so had no detrimental impact on the 

result of this incident. 


That the CNC adopt the full range of firearms tactical options as used by 

the Home Office forces nationally. That they also adopt the same 

glossary of terms that are used to describe this tactic to facilitate an 

effective interoperability. 

It is recognised that the CNC has a unique role and will require a range 

of additional bespoke tactics and equipment to undertake their daily 

duties to protect the nuclear industry which this recommendation does 

not seek to alter. 

12.73 The Recording of Information Relating to the Management, 

Command and Deployment of Armed Officers. 

12.74 Cumbria Constabulary has created a number of documents that are 

used by firearms commanders to record information that they have 

been given and decisions that they make with regards to a firearms 

authority. 

12.75 The documents provide the framework on which authorisation for 

deployment of Firearms officers are recorded and are used to 

document issues associated with the application of the CMM. 

12.76 The documents are also used to record the working strategy, any 

tactical parameters and details of all resources deployed. 

12.77 In managing and deploying Firearms officers, the FIM’s routinely 

record their decisions directly onto the telephone message that relate 

to the incident as it is reported to them. 

12.78 As part of the review, I have examined a number of historical 

telephone messages where various FIM’s, including the officer 

working on the 2nd June 2010, had authorised armed officers to 

deploy. 

12.79 Overall the content of the information recorded is very basic. In many 

cases, the information that was relied upon to make the decision to 

arm is not presented. The process of considering the CMM is often 

not shown and the working strategy and tactical parameters are not 

always recorded. This lack of recorded detail makes these critical 

decisions more difficult to justify post event. 

12.80 We have noted that the FIM who was on duty on the 2nd June 2010 

does not as a matter of course record a great deal of information 

when commanding firearms deployments. Whilst this is not to 



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suggest criticism of his ability, the review team would recommend 

that as a minimum the following information should be recorded. 

- A brief summary of information. 

- Application of the CMM 

- Authority to arm (or not) and the time of that decision 

- The working strategy 

- The tactical parameters 

- The tactical options (inc. the preferred option) 

- Notification of Tactical Advisor 

- Time of arrival of Tactical Advisor 

- Amendments to tactical options based on tactical advice 

- Notification of Strategic Firearms Commander 

- Any changes to strategy as a result of their direction 

- Handover to Tactical Firearms Commander and time of transfer of 

command 

12.81 It is appropriate to record this information onto a telephone message 

as long as the information can be accessed by the firearms 

department for statistical and quality assurance purposes. 


That Cumbria Constabulary reviews the manner in which their Force 

Incident Managers contemporaneously record their decisions in respect 

of authorising the deployment of armed officers. 

The use of a loggist in more complex incidents would be a particularly 

useful consideration. 

The use of a Dictaphone has been a useful means of capturing 

decisions where the pace of an incident means that the recording of 

written material is impracticable. 

12.82 Call Signs 

12.83 Cumbria Constabulary has a call sign structure that identifies patrols 

to the role that they perform. 

12.84 The call signs allocated to officers performing ARV duty are not 

immediately obvious. Call signs ending in a “0” indicate that the 

vehicle is being used as an ARV. 

12.85 On the 2nd June 2010, staff who were trained Authorised Firearms 

Officers (AFO’s) but, at that time not performing an armed role, were 

requested to take possession of firearms and create additional ARVs. 

12.86 Some were able to access vehicles that are routinely used for ARV 

duty, whilst others used vehicles that were readily available. 



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12.87 As a result, a mixture of call signs were used which did not support 

the immediate recognition of them being used by armed officers. 

12.88 The FIM and Tactical Firearms Commander would not have been 

able to distinguish which patrols were ARVs and therefore could not 

gain an accurate appreciation of the armed assets they had at their 

disposal. 


That Cumbria Constabulary create a readily recognised call sign 

structure for its resources that more accurately identifies their role, 

their usual geographic location and most importantly whether they are 

an armed resource. 


That Cumbria Constabulary consider raising the subject of call signs 

with the ACPO Lead for Airwave Communications. If the UK were to 

adopt a national call sign structure for specialist roles, any patrol 

deployed on mutual aid would be immediately recognised. 

(This would be particularly useful for PSU’s, Dog Handlers, DVI Teams, 

Negotiators, Search Teams and Firearms Officers). 

12.89 Automatic Resource Location System (ARLS) 

12.90 Effective communication between operational police officers and 

police staff is an important element of an effective command and 

control system. The majority of operational staff routinely carry a 

police radio whilst performing their duties and the majority of police 

vehicles also have a radio fitted within. 

12.91 All radios are permanently linked to the communication network and 

ARLS converts this link to accurately identify where each radio is 

located. The force control room can simply view a map on which all 

police patrols are displayed. The nearest resources can be identified 

where there is an incident requiring police attendance. 

12.92 Cumbria Constabulary do not utilise ARLS. 

12.93 During this incident, the ability for the FIM and the Tactical Firearms 

Commander to be able to see the exact location of its patrols, 

particularly the ARVs, would have been a significant advantage. 

12.94 Derrick BIRD drove a considerable distance during the incident and 

at all times Cumbria Constabulary were trying to coordinate its 

response to intercept him. 

12.95 Due to the large geographic area and sparsely populated 

communities, this system would have allowed a live time view on a 



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map of police deployments over which the latest intelligence on the 

location of the suspect could be overlaid. 

12.96 This would have provided a valuable tool to the Tactical Firearms 

Commander in an extremely complex and fact moving incident. 

12.97 As a result of this incident Cumbria Constabulary have planned to 

introduce this system and this fact is presented within the evidence 

provided to the inquest into this incident. 


That Cumbria Constabulary completes its planned introduction of 

ARLS. 

12.98 Helicopter (Air Support) to Cumbria Constabulary 

12.99 Cumbria Constabulary does not have its own Air Unit and relies on 

collaborative arrangements with neighbouring forces. This 

arrangement involves reimbursing neighbouring forces for Air Support 

services. 

12.100 Cumbria has an excellent relationship with the military Search and 

Rescue service and the Coastguard who operate routinely around the 

Cumbrian Mountains, lakes and coastline. 

12.101 Cumbria Constabulary regularly calls upon these organisations to 

support them when they are dealing with missing climbers and 

walkers or those taking part in the water based activities on the large 

expanses of water that exists within the county. 

12.102 On the 2nd June 2010, Lancashire Constabulary Air Support Unit 

provided support to Cumbria with the use of their helicopter. 

12.103 In order for the Lancashire helicopter to fly to West Cumbria, a 

significant amount of fuel is used simply to reach the coastline towns. 

This clearly reduces the effective flying time that the service can 

provide without having to relocate in order to refuel. 

2.104 Cumbria Constabulary also notified the control room at RAF Kinloss 

who provide the coordination of military Search and Rescue aircraft. 

A number of military helicopters were deployed to assist with the 

police response and in particular to assist with any casualty 

evacuation. 

2.105 The military aircraft did not appear to have communication systems 

that were compatible with the police systems, meaning that they were 



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not effectively tasked. In fact the majority of the military aircraft 

landed at Workington and were not further deployed. 

2.106 Calls to the Ambulance Service also prompted the deployment of the 

Yorkshire air ambulance service. 

2.107 The air ambulance was used in a casualty evacuation of Harry 

BERGER but its potential was not fully realised. 

2.108 As a result, a significant number of air assets were available to 

Cumbria Constabulary, but it is clear that these aircraft were not used 

to maximum effect. 


Cumbria Constabulary may wish to re-examine the standard operating 

procedures and interoperability between the various organisations that 

provide air support within Cumbria. 

The difficulties that were presented with the use of the helicopters were not 

unique to the police service. Their primary use was casualty evacuation and 

therefore the Ambulance Service should play a pivotal role. 

Visibility for the staff within the various helicopters was particularly poor on 

the 2nd June 2010. The low cloud made flying particularly difficult. The 

crews of each of the aircraft should be commended for their perseverance. 

2.109 Armed response arrangements 

2.110 In common with other forces of a similar demographic nature, 

Cumbria Constabulary’s ARV’s are not deployed solely on firearms 

related duties. On a day to day basis their main duties relate to roads 

policing. The vehicles are however also equipped as ARV’s crewed 

by Authorised Firearms Officers (AFO). 

2.111 When the vehicle is being deployed in its dual function, firearms are 

carried within a safe in the vehicle. Authorised access to these 

firearms relies on the authority of the relevant firearms commander, 

except where officers ‘self authorise’ in response to a perceived 

immediate threat to life. 

2.112 The majority of police forces in Great Britain now deploy their armed 

officers with sidearms being worn at all times. 

2.113 Coincidentally, my own force (West Mercia Police) and Cumbria 

Constabulary are two of those forces where officers performing an 

ARV role do not operationally patrol wearing holstered weapons. 



75


2.114 The fact that Cumbria Constabulary does not deploy its ARV’s in this 

way had no bearing on the outcome of this incident. 


That Cumbria Constabulary take the opportunity to reassess its position 

with regards to the overt carriage of firearms by its ARV crews. 

2.115 NB. West Mercia Police is also reviewing its position on routine 

arming. 

2.116 Accreditation of the Firearms Commanders 

2.117 As one of the most significant members of staff involved with the 

management of the firearms response on the 2nd June 2010, I have 

examined the training and experience of the FIM to ensure 

compliance with policy and procedure. 

2.118 It is clear that the FIM is very experienced and has worked within the 

control room for many years. 

2.119 The FIM has successfully completed the original courses that were 

required to enable him to manage firearms operations. 

2.120 The role of the Tactical Firearms Commander has evolved over the 

years and some significant amendments have been made to the role 

and the way it is conducted. 

2.121 On the 1st November 2009 the previous Manual of Guidance that 

was used to manage firearms operations was replaced by The ACPO 

Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and Deployment 

of Armed Officers. 

2.122 Greater emphasis was placed on the Tactical Firearms Commander 

to manage a firearms incident and to provide the armed officers with 

clear tactics and command during every aspect of the operation. 

2.123 As per national guidelines, Cumbria Constabulary updated every 

firearms commander with the training in relation to the new manual as 

part of their re-accreditation process. 

2.124 The FIM who was on duty during this incident was due to leave his 

current role within the Control Room and so did not attend the 

training. 

2.125 For personal reasons that have no relevance to the review process, 

the FIM did not leave his current role and as a result, continued to 

perform his role without the advantage of the additional training. 




76


Cumbria constabulary should instigate a process for monitoring the 

accreditation retraining of all Firearms Commanders so as to ensure 

that all accreditations remain current. 



77

SECTION 13 


RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION IN RELATION TO 

DERRICK BIRD 

13. Derrick BIRD was born in Whitehaven on 27th November 1957 and 

was, therefore, 52 years of age at the time of this incident. He lived 

at 26 Rowrah Road, Rowrah, West Cumbria. He owned this property 

and had no outstanding mortgage. 

13.1 Derrick BIRD had lived with his partner between 1978 – 1994 during 

which time they had two children. 

13.2 Derrick BIRD had always lived in Cumbria and was educated at local 

schools before taking various employment opportunities within the 

county. 

13.3 A valid question that has been raised within the media following this 

incident is whether Cumbria Constabulary should have known about 

the risks posed by Derrick BIRD and whether they missed any 

opportunity to prevent the events of 2nd June. 

13.4 To answer this, the review has sought to establish all previous 

contact that Derrick BIRD has had with Cumbria Constabulary in 

order to identify if there had been any opportunities for them to 

recognise the potential risks that he posed. This will obviously 

include the contact during which the firearms and shotgun licences 

were granted and renewed. 

13.5 The following summary outlines each occasion that records will show 

that he had any contact with the police service. 

13.6 Assaults / Road Traffic Collisions/Crimes 

13.7 Between 24th and 25th March 1998, Derrick BIRD’S car was stolen 

from outside his house. The vehicle was subsequently abandoned 

nearby. No-one was convicted for this offence. 

13.8 On 21st February 1999, three youths made off from his taxi without 

paying; one was caught and later convicted. 

13.9 On 4th October 2002, Derrick BIRD was assaulted outside Fusion 

Nightclub in Workington. He claimed to have been kicked in the face 

after being knocked to the floor by the offender. He had a broken 

nose and a swollen upper lip. He later withdrew his complaint as he 

did not wish to attend court. 



78


13.10 On 7th October 2007, Derrick BIRD was assaulted by passengers 

from his taxi. He had a laceration to his head which required medical 

attention. He also had broken dentures and a chipped front tooth and 

suffered a bruised right shoulder. He was admitted to hospital 

overnight. A suspect was charged and convicted for this offence. 

13.11 On 15th February 2008, Derrick BIRD reported damage to his taxi 

whilst outside Shakers on Duke Street, Whitehaven. A suspect was 

charged and convicted for this offence. 

13.12 On 28th May 2009, Derrick BIRD attended the Accident and 

Emergency Department at West Cumberland Hospital after a road 

traffic collision. He had pain to the right side of his neck and 

shoulder. He was diagnosed with a sprained neck and discharged. 

On 3rd June 2009 he requested a physiotherapy assessment in 

relation to an accident claim. 

13.13 There is no indication that during the timeframe of these incidents 

Derrick BIRD was suffering any breakdown of his mental health. 

There is no reference within the Cumbria Constabulary records that 

any police officers who had dealings with Derrick BIRD as a result of 

these incidents, raised or documented any concerns about his 

emotional or mental state. 

13.14 Medical 

13.15 The investigation team have identified that in 1994, Derrick BIRD 

began to suffer from back pain whilst subcontracting as a joiner. This 

is why he changed his employment and became a taxi driver. 

13.16 As a result of the two assaults and the road traffic collision referred to 

above, Derrick BIRD was treated at West Cumberland Hospital, 

Whitehaven. 

13.17 On 31st January 2008, he saw a Doctor as he was feeling stressed 

following the assault in 2007 and felt under pressure to keep working. 

He disclosed he was getting flashbacks and there was an ongoing 

court case. He stated it had affected his work and he was finishing 

early on Friday and Saturday nights. He also stated that he thought 

about the incident daily and had flashbacks most days. 

13.18 On 23rd February 2010, Derrick BIRD attended his Doctors 

complaining of losing his sense of smell, which had been getting 

progressively worse over the previous ten months. He received nasal 

spray and antibiotics. 

13.19 On 11th May 2010, he attended his Doctors again complaining of loss 

of smell. He received a different nasal spray and antibiotics and was 



79


referred to an ear nose and throat specialist. He also reported feeling 

“down” on this visit. 

13.20 Derrick BIRD was due to attend an Ear Nose and Throat Surgery on 

23rd July 2010. 

13.21 Cumbria Constabulary had no knowledge of any detail within these 

consultations with his GP or local hospital. Currently there is no 

requirement for Health Officials to be alerted to the fact that a patient 

holds a shotgun or firearms licence. 

13.22 The separate Peer Review into the firearms licensing has made 

specific recommendations about information sharing between the 

police service and the medical profession where the patient holds a 

firearms or shotgun certificate. 

13.23 Vehicles 

13.24 Derrick BIRD owned a dark grey Citroën Xsara Picasso, Registration 

Number, ND55ZFC. The vehicle was lawfully owned and maintained 

and with the exception of the traffic collision previously referred to, his 

vehicle ownership did not result in any contact with the police. 

13.25 All taxi licensing issues were managed by the local licensing authority 

and again there is no evidence that Cumbria Constabulary were 

involved in any aspect of this process. 

13.26 Interests and Hobbies 

13.27 Derrick BIRD was a member of a local diving club and enjoyed his 

scuba diving. This hobby involved overseas travel to countries such 

as Thailand. 

13.28 In addition, he enjoyed clay pigeon shooting and rough shooting on 

local farmers’ land. 

13.29 I have found no links between this aspect of his life and any 

interaction with Cumbria Constabulary. 

13.30 Previous Arrests/Incidents 

13.31 On 16th January 1998, the Police attended a domestic abuse incident 

at 26 Rowrah Road. No details were forthcoming and both parties 

were drunk. There were no complaints and no arrests were made. 

13.32 On the 15th November 1999, Derrick BIRD was arrested for 

demanding money with menaces but no further action was taken. 

13.33 Previous convictions 



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13.34 In July 1990, Derrick BIRD was arrested for theft and handling stolen 

items from BNFL Sellafield, where he was employed. His 

employment was terminated and he received a suspended sentence 

at Carlisle Crown Court. 

13.35 He also had one previous conviction for driving with excess alcohol. 

13.36 Firearms licensing 

13.37 Derrick BIRD had been initially granted a shotgun certificate on 19th 

November 1974. This certificate was continuously renewed up until 

his death. 

13.38 He was subsequently issued with a firearms certificate on 21st March 

2007. 

13.39 The Firearms certificate was issued with the authority to purchase a 

.22 rifle and a .22RF sound moderator. 

13.40 The licensing conditions restricted the quantity of ammunition that 

could be held and Derrick BIRD was authorised to purchase a 

maximum of 500 rounds of ammunition in any single transaction and 

could hold a maximum of 1500 rounds of ammunition at any one 

time. 

13.41 On 27th March 2007 Derrick BIRD bought a .22 rifle, a sound 

moderator, a 10 shot magazine and 500 rounds of .22 rim fire 

ammunition. 

13.42 As a result of these purchases, on the 2nd June 2010 Derrick BIRD 

was known to have lawful possession of; 

• a 20 Gauge Breda shotgun, single barrelled, with a serial number 

of 041906, 

• a 12 Gauge Winchester over and under shotgun with the serial 

number K435377 

• a 12 Gauge Fisher side by side shotgun with the serial number 

33188. 

• a .22LR rim fire calibre bolt action rifle fitted with a telescopic sight 

and a 10 round magazine. 

13.43 On 9th May 2007, Derrick BIRD purchased 400 rounds of .22 

ammunition. 



81


13.44 On 30th April 2009, Derrick BIRD purchased a further 500 rounds of 

.22 ammunition. 

13.45 The separate Peer Review had examined the issue of the firearms 

and shotgun licences and had concluded that Cumbria Constabulary 

had issued the licences appropriately. 

13.46 This review does not seek to overlap with the findings of the firearms 

licensing review. 

13.47 It is worthy of note that there are no adverse incidents relating to 

Derrick BIRD’S ownership of firearms that would have any impact on 

the findings of this report. 

13.48 The contact between Cumbria Constabulary and Derrick BIRD would 

have been minimal with regard to his renewal of firearms licences as 

these are predominantly administrative functions for someone who 

has already been granted the licences. 

13.49 Derrick BIRD’S Finances 

13.50 It would appear that Derrick BIRD had recently become concerned 

over his finances after he had received letters from Her Majesty’s 

Revenue and Customs (HMRC) who had queries relating to his low 

declaration of income. 

13.51 In the weeks prior to the shootings, Derrick BIRD enlisted the 

assistance of his twin brother, David BIRD. 

13.52 David had a close friend who was a solicitor, Kevin COMMONS. 

David suggested that Kevin would be able to assist his brother with 

his concerns. 

13.53 Kevin attempted to help but advised him that he would benefit from 

more specialist assistance from an accountant and recommended 

someone who he knew, Peter ELLWOOD. 

13.54 Derrick BIRD appears to have developed irrational fears about being 

imprisoned for the tax matters and formed the impression that his 

brother and Kevin COMMONS were conspiring against him. 

13.55 A meeting was planned for the 2nd June 2010 for Derrick BIRD to 

meet Kevin COMMONS; he was sure that he would be arrested 

during this meeting and imprisoned. 

13.56 Significant detail has been collated with regards to these facts and 

several friends have described how Derrick BIRD’S behaviour had 

become irrational in the weeks prior to the 2nd June. 



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13.57 Derrick BIRD had significant savings within his bank accounts and 

owned his home without a current mortgage. 

13.58 Mr ELLWOOD, the Accountant, who was recommended to Derrick 

BIRD, had advised him that he had nothing to fear from the HMRC 

enquiry and that it was entirely routine. 

13.59 Importantly, Mr ELLWOOD had informed Derrick BIRD that he would 

not be at risk of imprisonment and that the worse case scenario 

would be that the amount of income tax that he had paid would be 

recalculated and that he would have to pay an additional sum. 

13.60 Due to the significant savings he had accrued, this should not have 

caused him any major difficulty. 

13.61 Mr ELLWOOD had taken responsibility for managing contact with 

HMRC on Derrick BIRD’S behalf. 

13.62 Cumbria Constabulary were not in a position to know that his 

emotional and mental state were showing signs of deterioration and 

he was losing any sense of perspective and proportion in respect of 

the HMRC investigation. 

13.63 The HMRC would have had no cause to inform Cumbria 

Constabulary of their investigation. 



83

SECTION 14 


CONCLUSION 

14. In response to the question, “Could this have been prevented before 

it started?” I am satisfied beyond any doubt that Cumbria 

Constabulary had no opportunity to prevent this incident prior to 2nd 

June 2010. 

14.1 Given that Cumbria Constabulary were not made aware of Derrick 

BIRD’S deteriorating emotional and mental state, the Peer Review 

team are satisfied that there was no action that could have been 

taken by the force in preventing him from setting out on his shooting 

spree. 

14.2 I am confident that the first opportunity Cumbria Constabulary had to 

mitigate the threat posed by Derrick BIRD was at 10.13 hrs on the 

2nd June 2010 when they received the initial 999 call. 

14.3 The entire incident from where Cumbria Constabulary were first made 

aware to the point where Derrick BIRD was last seen alive was only 2 

hours. (10:13 am – 12:15 pm) 

14.4 During this period he had travelled a distance of approximately 52 

miles over terrain that he was very familiar with. 

14.5 By the end of the incident there were in excess of 40 armed police 

officers actively engaged in the search for Derrick BIRD. The on-duty 

ARVs were supplemented by officers who were redeployed from 

Appleby Fair and by mutual aid from the CNC. The review team 

found that, hearing of the incident, many officers reported for duty 

from home and assisted in the search. 

14.6 Throughout the incident police officers saw Derrick BIRD only twice. 

The first sighting was when the unarmed officers encountered him in 

Whitehaven at the beginning of the police response. The second 

occasion was at 11:32 hrs on the A595 between Holmbrook and 

Ravenglass, when the ARV passed him going the other way. On 

both occasions officers had no opportunity to stop him. 

14.7 The Air Unit was actively looking for Derrick BIRD’S vehicle but never 

had sight of it at any stage during the search. 

14.8 An incident of this nature will always result in investigation and review 

in an effort to learn lessons and possibly to apportion blame. I can 

not imagine any circumstances, under which a post incident review of 



84


an incident of this magnitude, would not expose areas of weakness in 

the response and make relevant recommendations. 

14.9 This review has found areas of weakness in the response. For 

example, there should have been more clarity of command in the 

early stages. In addition, as both ARVs were in Penrith, West 

Cumbria did not have armed officers immediately available; however, 

this incident would have stretched any police force. 

14.10 Overwhelmingly Cumbria Constabulary staff, whether in the control 

room or out on the ground, whether armed or unarmed, did their best 

to prevent Derrick BIRD from causing further harm. The review team 

is unable to conclude that had these areas of weakness not been 

present that he would have been stopped any sooner 8 . 

14.11 We have found examples of bravery, for example, the officers who 

searched the woods and found Derrick BIRD’S body, and unselfish 

professionalism, for example, the control room operator who 

remained at her station despite the fact that her own family were in 

serious danger. We have also found examples of best practice, for 

example the individuals who took responsibility to think ahead and 

‘warn and inform’ the public, I have no doubt this saved lives. 

14.12 Derrick BIRD was responsible for this incident and to answer the 

Chief Constable’s overriding question “was the response of Cumbria 

Constabulary reasonable under the circumstances?” My response is 

unequivocally “yes”. 


UNTIL 4PM MONDAY 28 TH 8 

A summary report of where the Review team have recognised good practice and incidents 

of individual work that is worthy of recognition is attached at Appendix 5 

85 

MARCH 2011

SECTION 15 


GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 

HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System 

SFO Specialist Firearms Officers 

TSG Tactical Support Group 

AFO’s Authorised Firearms Officers 

ARV’s Armed Response Vehicles 

PSU’s Police Support Units 

DVI Disaster Victim Identification 

ARLS Automatic Resource Location System 

SLP Self Loading Pistols 

RPU Roads Policing Unit 

ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition 

FIM Force Incident Manager 

TFC Tactical Firearms Commander 

OFC Operational Firearms Commander 

SFC Strategic Firearms Commander 

Tac Ad Tactical Advisor 

CMM Conflict Management Model 

NPIA The National Police Improvement Agency 

CIA Community Impact Assessment 

STRA Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment 

CNC Civil Nuclear Constabulary 

SOP Standard Operating Procedures 



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OPERATION BRIDGE - Cumbria Constabulary

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