WO2007042393A1 - Method for generating a digital message encryption key according to a pilot voice signature - Google Patents

Method for generating a digital message encryption key according to a pilot voice signature Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2007042393A1
WO2007042393A1 PCT/EP2006/066751 EP2006066751W WO2007042393A1 WO 2007042393 A1 WO2007042393 A1 WO 2007042393A1 EP 2006066751 W EP2006066751 W EP 2006066751W WO 2007042393 A1 WO2007042393 A1 WO 2007042393A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
signature
pilot
aircraft
database
encryption key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2006/066751
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Matthieu Borel
Nicolas Rossi
Michel Subelet
Original Assignee
Thales
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Thales filed Critical Thales
Publication of WO2007042393A1 publication Critical patent/WO2007042393A1/en

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14Relay systems
    • H04B7/15Active relay systems
    • H04B7/185Space-based or airborne stations; Stations for satellite systems
    • H04B7/18502Airborne stations
    • H04B7/18506Communications with or from aircraft, i.e. aeronautical mobile service
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method for generating a digital communication message encryption key issued by an aircraft pilot from a voice signature of the pilot.
  • a first solution for injecting encryption keys into on-board communication management systems on aircraft consists in entrusting the loading of the keys to the maintenance teams. This solution has the advantage of being an automated and renewable procedure but has the disadvantage of expanding the circle of people with access to encryption keys.
  • a second solution to the problem of managing encryption keys is to have the drivers manually load an encryption key into the communications management system before sending a first message. By doing so, the distribution of the key is extremely restricted. But this operation is quickly tedious and represents a source of potential errors, since an encryption key may consist of a sequence of several hundred bytes.
  • the present invention overcomes the disadvantages of the two solutions presented above. Its purpose is to automatically generate an encryption key from the acquisition of a signature specific to the driver, this signature uniquely identifying and unique driver.
  • the subject of the invention is a method for generating a digital communication message encryption key issued by an aircraft pilot on a communication network, a database embedded on the aircraft comprising pilot signatures. authorized to send messages from the aircraft, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
  • the database contains the elaborate signature, generate an encryption key from the signature developed to encrypt the digital messages issued by the pilot of the aircraft, and communicate the signature on the communication network.
  • FIG. 1 schematically shows the architecture of a security system associated with a communications management system
  • FIG. 2 represents a flowchart of the method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 1 represents a SYS security system 1 associated with a CMS 15 communication management system.
  • the SYS security system and the CMS communication management system are embedded on the same aircraft, the SYS system supplies the management system with communication CMS the means to perform the encryption of the communication messages issued by a pilot of the aircraft for example, the messages are issued by the pilot to a ground-based air traffic control authority.
  • the SYS security system comprises a GSIG signature generation device 12, a BDDS signature database 1 1, and a GCLE encryption key generation device 10.
  • the GSIG signature generation device generates a signature that is specific to each pilot from personal data provided by the pilot.
  • This signature is for example a voice signature that is to say a signature that is developed from the pronunciation by the driver of a predefined sentence.
  • the voice of the driver pronouncing the predefined sentence is for example recorded by the GSIG device on a digital medium.
  • the BDDS signature database contains signatures of all drivers authorized to send messages over the communication network through the CMS communication management system.
  • the content of the BDDS signature database is periodically updated by maintenance teams.
  • the security system SYS can on request determine the membership of a signature developed by the GSIG signature generation device to the BDDS signature database.
  • the security system When the security system has determined the membership of the signature in the database BDDS, it transmits the signature to the device GCLE key generation and the CMS communication management system.
  • the device GCLE From the signature, the device GCLE generates an encryption key which is transmitted to the communication management system CMS.
  • the SGC system uses the key, which can be a sequence of one to several hundred bytes, to encrypt all messages emitted by the pilot of the aircraft and to decrypt the received messages.
  • the communication management system SGC sends the signature on the communication network before a first transmission of communication message by the pilot.
  • receiving stations connected to the network establish the identity of the pilot retrieve elements to decrypt the messages sent by the pilot of the aircraft and use these same elements to encrypt the messages sent back.
  • FIG. 2 represents a flowchart of the method for generating an encryption key according to the invention.
  • pilots Before issuing a communication message from a communication network, all pilots must identify themselves by providing personal data to a SYS security system.
  • the development of the pilot signature is performed at the initialization of communications on the communication network.
  • the signature is developed from the pronunciation by the pilot of a predefined sentence.
  • the driver pronounces the predefined sentence in front of a digital voice data recording means forming part of the SYS security system.
  • a GSIG signature generation device From this personal data, a GSIG signature generation device generates a signature specific to the pilot. Whenever the SYS security system prepares a new signature, it ensures that it is part of the signatures stored in a security system signature database. The development of the pilot's signature constitutes a step 100 of the method according to the invention.
  • the determination of the membership of the elaborated signature in the database of signatures is carried out at the initialization of the communications on the communication network, the determining the membership of the signature in the database BDDS constitutes a step 101 of the method according to the invention.
  • the SYS security system When the SYS security system has established the membership of the signature in the database BDDS, it authorizes the transmission of encrypted digital communication messages on the communication network. To do this, the SYS security system generates an encryption key (step 102), from the elaborate signature, which is used by the CMS management system to encrypt all the messages sent by the driver on the network. communication. At the initialization of the communications on the communication network, in other words, before a first sending by the pilot of a communication message, the elaborated signature is sent (step 103) by the security system on the communication network. Receiving stations connected to the communication network comprise a signature database associating the signatures of the persons authorized to send messages on the communication network and means making it possible to decrypt the encrypted messages that they transmit.
  • the digital message transmission from the aircraft is inhibited on the communication network during a step 105.

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for generating the encryption key of a digital communication message, which is transmitted by an aircraft pilot, according to the pilot voice signature. An onboard database stores the signatures of the aircraft pilots enabling them to transmit messages therefrom. The inventive method consists in producing a pilot signature, in determining whether the produced signature is recorded to the signature database, in the case, when said signature is stored in the database, in generating an encryption key according to the produced signature for encrypting the digital messages transmitted by the aircraft pilot and in communicating the signature via a communication network, and when the produced signature is not stored in the database, in inhibiting the digital communication message transmission by the aircraft pilot.

Description

Procédé de génération de clé de chiffrement de message numérique à partir d'une signature vocale du pilote Method for generating a digital message encryption key from a pilot's voice signature
La présente invention concerne un procédé de génération de clé de chiffrement de message de communication numérique émis par un pilote d'aéronef à partir d'une signature vocale du pilote.The present invention relates to a method for generating a digital communication message encryption key issued by an aircraft pilot from a voice signature of the pilot.
Dans le cadre du déploiement du CNS-ATM (Communication Navigation Surveillance Air Traffic Management), les autorités aéronautiques représentées par NCAO (acronyme anglais pour International Civil Aeronautical Organization) ont défini des recommandations précises concernant lïmplémentation des futures applications de gestion du trafic aérien (ATC ou Air Traffic Control). Cependant l'ouverture des communications aéronautiques civiles aux technologies numériques « grand public » rend ces échanges plus vulnérables faces à des individus mal intentionnés. L'espionnage des échanges, la falsification des messages échangés, constituent les menaces principales. C'est la raison pour laquelle des mécanismes sont mis en place pour contribuer à la sûreté des communications bord/sol en empêchant les accès non autorisés aux données échangées.As part of the CNS-ATM (Communication Navigation Surveillance Air Traffic Management) deployment, the aeronautical authorities represented by NCAO (International Civil Aeronautical Organization) have defined specific recommendations for the implementation of future air traffic management applications (ATC). or Air Traffic Control). However, the opening of civil aeronautical communications to "mainstream" digital technologies makes these exchanges more vulnerable to malicious individuals. The espionage of the exchanges, the falsification of the exchanged messages, constitute the main threats. This is why mechanisms are put in place to contribute to the safety of edge / ground communications by preventing unauthorized access to exchanged data.
La quasi-totalité des techniques mises en œuvre dans les systèmes de sûreté est fondée sur l'emploi d'algorithmes de chiffrement qui sont publics. La robustesse de ces techniques repose sur le choix de clés de chiffrement qui permettent de réaliser un cryptage parmi un ensemble de cryptages possibles. Les algorithmes en question fonctionnent par échange de clés privées, ou à l'aide de clés publiques/privées, dans les deux cas le talon d'Achille des systèmes de sûreté réside dans la confidentialité de la clé utilisée. A la différence de l'algorithme, qui reste figé à l'échelle de plusieurs années, il est souhaitable que la clé de chiffrement soit changée assez fréquemment. La périodicité de ce changement doit être inférieure à la durée supposée de « cassage » de l'algorithme, plus la clé est longue et complexe et plus la charge de travail pour « casser » le système est importante. La gestion des clés de chiffrement et leur mise à jour est une opération névralgique des systèmes de sécurité.Almost all the techniques implemented in safety systems are based on the use of encryption algorithms that are public. The robustness of these techniques is based on the choice of encryption keys that make it possible to perform encryption among a set of possible encryptions. The algorithms in question operate by exchange of private keys, or using public / private keys, in both cases the Achilles heel of the security systems lies in the confidentiality of the key used. Unlike the algorithm, which remains fixed at the scale of several years, it is desirable that the encryption key is changed quite frequently. The periodicity of this change must be less than the supposed "break" duration of the algorithm, the longer and more complex the key, and the greater the workload to "break" the system. The management of encryption keys and their updating is a critical operation of security systems.
Une première solution pour injecter des clés de chiffrement dans des systèmes de gestion des communication embarqués sur des aéronefs consiste à confier le chargement des clés aux équipes de maintenance. Cette solution présente l'intérêt d'être une procédure automatisée et renouvelable mais a l'inconvénient d'élargir le cercle des personnes ayant accès aux clés de chiffrement. Une deuxième solution au problème posé par la gestion des clés de chiffrement consiste à confier aux pilotes le soin de charger manuellement une clé de chiffrement dans le système de gestion des communications avant d'envoyer un premier message. En procédant ainsi, la diffusion de la clé est extrêmement restreinte. Mais cette opération se révèle rapidement fastidieuse et représente une source d'erreurs potentielles, car une clé de chiffrement peut être constituée d'une séquence de plusieurs centaines d'octets.A first solution for injecting encryption keys into on-board communication management systems on aircraft consists in entrusting the loading of the keys to the maintenance teams. This solution has the advantage of being an automated and renewable procedure but has the disadvantage of expanding the circle of people with access to encryption keys. A second solution to the problem of managing encryption keys is to have the drivers manually load an encryption key into the communications management system before sending a first message. By doing so, the distribution of the key is extremely restricted. But this operation is quickly tedious and represents a source of potential errors, since an encryption key may consist of a sequence of several hundred bytes.
La présente invention pallie les inconvénients des deux solutions présentées ci-dessus. Elle a pour but de générer automatiquement une clé de chiffrement à partir de l'acquisition d'une signature propre au pilote, cette signature identifiant de façon certaine et unique le pilote.The present invention overcomes the disadvantages of the two solutions presented above. Its purpose is to automatically generate an encryption key from the acquisition of a signature specific to the driver, this signature uniquely identifying and unique driver.
A cet effet, l'invention a pour objet un procédé de génération de clé de chiffrement de message de communication numérique émis par un pilote d'aéronef sur un réseau de communication, une base de donnée embarquée sur l'aéronef comportant des signatures de pilotes habilités à émettre des messages à partir l'aéronef, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte les étapes suivantes :For this purpose, the subject of the invention is a method for generating a digital communication message encryption key issued by an aircraft pilot on a communication network, a database embedded on the aircraft comprising pilot signatures. authorized to send messages from the aircraft, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
- élaborer une signature du pilote ; - déterminer l'appartenance de la signature élaborée à la base de données des signatures ;- develop a pilot's signature; - determine the membership of the elaborate signature in the database of signatures;
- si la base de données contient la signature élaborée, générer une clé de chiffrement à partir de la signature élaborée pour crypter les messages numériques émis par le pilote de l'aéronef, et communiquer la signature sur le réseau de communication.- If the database contains the elaborate signature, generate an encryption key from the signature developed to encrypt the digital messages issued by the pilot of the aircraft, and communicate the signature on the communication network.
- si la base de données ne contient pas la signature élaborée, inhiber l'émission de message de communication numérique par le pilote de l'aéronef. D'autres caractéristiques et avantages de l'invention apparaîtront à la lecture de la description détaillée qui suit et qui est faite en référence aux dessins annexés dans lesquels :if the database does not contain the elaborated signature, inhibit the transmission of digital communication message by the pilot of the aircraft. Other features and advantages of the invention will appear on reading the detailed description which follows and which is given with reference to the appended drawings in which:
- la figure 1 représente schématiquement l'architecture d'un système de sûreté associé à un système de gestion de communications ;- Figure 1 schematically shows the architecture of a security system associated with a communications management system;
- la figure 2 représente un organigramme du procédé selon l'invention.FIG. 2 represents a flowchart of the method according to the invention.
La figure 1 représente un système de sûreté SYS 1 associé à un système de gestion de communication SGC 15. Le système de sûreté SYS et le système de gestion de communication SGC sont embarqués sur un même aéronef, le système SYS fournit au système de gestion de communication SGC les moyens de réaliser le cryptage des messages de communication émis par un pilote de l'aéronef par exemple, les messages sont émis, par le pilote, à destination d'une autorité de contrôle aérien basée au sol.FIG. 1 represents a SYS security system 1 associated with a CMS 15 communication management system. The SYS security system and the CMS communication management system are embedded on the same aircraft, the SYS system supplies the management system with communication CMS the means to perform the encryption of the communication messages issued by a pilot of the aircraft for example, the messages are issued by the pilot to a ground-based air traffic control authority.
Le système de sûreté SYS comporte un dispositif de génération de signature GSIG 12, une base de données de signature BDDS 1 1 , et un dispositif de génération de clé de chiffrement GCLE 10.The SYS security system comprises a GSIG signature generation device 12, a BDDS signature database 1 1, and a GCLE encryption key generation device 10.
Le dispositif de génération de signature GSIG élabore une signature qui est propre à chaque pilote à partir de données personnelles fournies par le pilote. Cette signature est par exemple une signature vocale c'est à dire une signature qui est élaborée à partir de la prononciation par le pilote d'une phrase prédéfinie. La voix du pilote prononçant la phrase prédéfinie est par exemple enregistrée par le dispositif GSIG sur un support numérique.The GSIG signature generation device generates a signature that is specific to each pilot from personal data provided by the pilot. This signature is for example a voice signature that is to say a signature that is developed from the pronunciation by the driver of a predefined sentence. The voice of the driver pronouncing the predefined sentence is for example recorded by the GSIG device on a digital medium.
La base de données de signature BDDS contient des signatures de tous les pilotes habilités à émettre des messages sur le réseau de communication au travers du système de gestion de communication SGC. Le contenu de la base de données de signature BDDS est mis à jour périodiquement par des équipes de maintenance. Le système de sûreté SYS peut sur requête déterminer l'appartenance d'une signature élaborée par le dispositif de génération de signature GSIG à la base de donnée de signature BDDS.The BDDS signature database contains signatures of all drivers authorized to send messages over the communication network through the CMS communication management system. The content of the BDDS signature database is periodically updated by maintenance teams. The security system SYS can on request determine the membership of a signature developed by the GSIG signature generation device to the BDDS signature database.
Lorsque le système de sûreté a déterminé l'appartenance de la signature à la base de données BDDS, il transmet la signature au dispositif de génération de clé GCLE et au système de gestion de communication SGC.When the security system has determined the membership of the signature in the database BDDS, it transmits the signature to the device GCLE key generation and the CMS communication management system.
A partir de la signature, le dispositif GCLE génère une clé de chiffrement qui est transmise au système de gestion de communication SGC. Le système SGC emploie la clé, qui peut être une séquence d'une à plusieurs centaines d'octets, pour crypter tous les messages émis par le pilote de l'aéronef et décrypter les messages reçus.From the signature, the device GCLE generates an encryption key which is transmitted to the communication management system CMS. The SGC system uses the key, which can be a sequence of one to several hundred bytes, to encrypt all messages emitted by the pilot of the aircraft and to decrypt the received messages.
Le système de gestion de communication SGC envoie la signature sur le réseau de communication avant un premier envoi de message de communication par le pilote. Ainsi, des stations de réception connectées au réseau établissent l'identité du pilote récupèrent des éléments pour décrypter les messages envoyé par le pilote de l'aéronef et utilisent ces mêmes éléments pour crypter les messages émis en retour.The communication management system SGC sends the signature on the communication network before a first transmission of communication message by the pilot. Thus, receiving stations connected to the network establish the identity of the pilot retrieve elements to decrypt the messages sent by the pilot of the aircraft and use these same elements to encrypt the messages sent back.
La figure 2 représente un organigramme du procédé de génération de clef de chiffrement selon l'invention.FIG. 2 represents a flowchart of the method for generating an encryption key according to the invention.
Avant d'émettre un message de communication à partir d'un réseau de communication, tout pilote doit s'identifier en fournissant des données personnelles à un système de sûreté SYS. Avantageusement, l'élaboration de la signature du pilote est réalisée à l'initialisation des communications sur le réseau de communication.Before issuing a communication message from a communication network, all pilots must identify themselves by providing personal data to a SYS security system. Advantageously, the development of the pilot signature is performed at the initialization of communications on the communication network.
Avantageusement, la signature est élaborée à partir de la prononciation par le pilote d'une phrase prédéfinie. Dans ce cas, le pilote prononce la phrase prédéfinie devant un moyen d'enregistrement numérique de données vocales faisant partie du système de sûreté SYS.Advantageously, the signature is developed from the pronunciation by the pilot of a predefined sentence. In this case, the driver pronounces the predefined sentence in front of a digital voice data recording means forming part of the SYS security system.
A partir de ces données personnelles, un dispositif de génération de signature GSIG élabore une signature propre au pilote. Chaque fois que le système de sûreté SYS élabore une nouvelle signature, il s'assure que celle-ci fait partie des signatures stockées dans une base de données de signature du système de sûreté. L'élaboration de la signature du pilote constitue une étape 100 du procédé selon l'invention.From this personal data, a GSIG signature generation device generates a signature specific to the pilot. Whenever the SYS security system prepares a new signature, it ensures that it is part of the signatures stored in a security system signature database. The development of the pilot's signature constitutes a step 100 of the method according to the invention.
Avantageusement, la détermination de l'appartenance de la signature élaborée à la base de données des signatures est réalisée à l'initialisation des communications sur le réseau de communication, la détermination de l'appartenance de la signature à la base de données BDDS constitue une étape 101 du procédé selon l'invention.Advantageously, the determination of the membership of the elaborated signature in the database of signatures is carried out at the initialization of the communications on the communication network, the determining the membership of the signature in the database BDDS constitutes a step 101 of the method according to the invention.
Lorsque le système de sûreté SYS a établi l'appartenance de la signature à la base de donnée BDDS, il autorise l'émission de messages de communication numériques cryptés sur le réseau de communication. Pour ce faire, le système de sûreté SYS génère une clé de chiffrement (étape 102), à partir de la signature élaborée, qui est employée par le système de gestion des communications SGC pour crypter tous les messages envoyés par le pilote sur le réseau de communication. A l'initialisation des communications sur le réseau de communication, autrement dit, avant un premier envoi par le pilote d'un message de communication, la signature élaborée est envoyée (étape 103) par le système de sûreté sur le réseau de communication. Des stations de réception connectées au réseau de communication comportent une base de données de signatures associant les signatures des personnes autorisées à émettre des message sur le réseau de communication et des moyens permettant de décrypter les messages cryptés qu'ils émettent.When the SYS security system has established the membership of the signature in the database BDDS, it authorizes the transmission of encrypted digital communication messages on the communication network. To do this, the SYS security system generates an encryption key (step 102), from the elaborate signature, which is used by the CMS management system to encrypt all the messages sent by the driver on the network. communication. At the initialization of the communications on the communication network, in other words, before a first sending by the pilot of a communication message, the elaborated signature is sent (step 103) by the security system on the communication network. Receiving stations connected to the communication network comprise a signature database associating the signatures of the persons authorized to send messages on the communication network and means making it possible to decrypt the encrypted messages that they transmit.
Lorsque la signature est absente de la base de donnée de signature, l'émission de message numérique à partir de l'aéronef, est inhibée sur le réseau de communication au cours d'une étape 105. When the signature is absent from the signature database, the digital message transmission from the aircraft is inhibited on the communication network during a step 105.

Claims

REVENDICATIONS
1. Procédé de génération de clé de chiffrement de message de communication numérique émis par un pilote d'aéronef sur un réseau de communication, une base de donnée embarquée sur l'aéronef comportant des signatures de pilotes habilités à émettre des messages à partir l'aéronef, comportant les étapes suivantes :1. A method of generating a digital communication message encryption key issued by an aircraft pilot on a communication network, a database embedded on the aircraft comprising pilot signatures authorized to send messages from the aircraft. aircraft, comprising the following steps:
- élaborer une signature du pilote ;- develop a pilot's signature;
- déterminer l'appartenance de la signature élaborée à la base de données des signatures ;- determine the membership of the elaborate signature in the database of signatures;
- si la base de données contient la signature élaborée, générer une clé de chiffrement à partir de la signature élaborée pour crypter les messages numériques émis par le pilote de l'aéronef, et communiquer la signature sur le réseau de communication.- If the database contains the elaborate signature, generate an encryption key from the signature developed to encrypt the digital messages issued by the pilot of the aircraft, and communicate the signature on the communication network.
- si la base de données ne contient pas la signature élaborée, inhiber l'émission de message de communication numérique par le pilote de l'aéronef, caractérisé en ce que la signature est élaborée à partir de la prononciation par le pilote d'une phrase prédéfinie.- if the database does not contain the elaborate signature, inhibit the transmission of digital communication message by the pilot of the aircraft, characterized in that the signature is developed from the pronunciation by the pilot of a sentence predefined.
2. Procédé selon la revendication 1 caractérisé en ce que l'élaboration de la signature du pilote est réalisée à l'initialisation des communications sur le réseau de communication.2. Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the development of the signature of the driver is performed at the initialization of communications on the communication network.
3. Procédé selon la revendication 1 caractérisé en ce que la détermination de l'appartenance de la signature élaborée à la base de données des signatures est réalisée à l'initialisation des communications sur le réseau de communication.3. Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the determination of the membership of the elaborate signature to the database of signatures is performed at the initialization of communications on the communication network.
4. Procédé selon la revendication 1 caractérisé en ce que les messages sont émis à destination d'une autorité de contrôle aérien basée au sol. 4. Method according to claim 1 characterized in that the messages are sent to a ground based air traffic control authority.
PCT/EP2006/066751 2005-10-07 2006-09-26 Method for generating a digital message encryption key according to a pilot voice signature WO2007042393A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR0510280A FR2891970B1 (en) 2005-10-07 2005-10-07 METHOD FOR GENERATING A DIGITAL MESSAGE ENCRYPTION KEY FROM A DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF THE PILOT
FR0510280 2005-10-07

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2007042393A1 true WO2007042393A1 (en) 2007-04-19

Family

ID=36579323

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2006/066751 WO2007042393A1 (en) 2005-10-07 2006-09-26 Method for generating a digital message encryption key according to a pilot voice signature

Country Status (2)

Country Link
FR (1) FR2891970B1 (en)
WO (1) WO2007042393A1 (en)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113890658A (en) * 2021-10-20 2022-01-04 四川启睿克科技有限公司 Safe broadcasting method and system based on android machine system

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114490963B (en) * 2021-12-17 2023-11-24 中国人民解放军空军军医大学 Full-media publishing system

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4903298A (en) * 1988-07-27 1990-02-20 Sunstrand Data Control, Inc. System for providing encryption and decryption of voice and data transmissions to and from an aircraft
US20020104025A1 (en) * 2000-12-08 2002-08-01 Wrench Edwin H. Method and apparatus to facilitate secure network communications with a voice responsive network interface device
WO2003035475A1 (en) * 2001-10-26 2003-05-01 Firaco S.R.L. Security apparatus and method for transport vehicles, in particular aircraft
US20050021984A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2005-01-27 Thumbaccess Biometrics Corporation Pty Ltd. Encryption system

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4903298A (en) * 1988-07-27 1990-02-20 Sunstrand Data Control, Inc. System for providing encryption and decryption of voice and data transmissions to and from an aircraft
US20020104025A1 (en) * 2000-12-08 2002-08-01 Wrench Edwin H. Method and apparatus to facilitate secure network communications with a voice responsive network interface device
WO2003035475A1 (en) * 2001-10-26 2003-05-01 Firaco S.R.L. Security apparatus and method for transport vehicles, in particular aircraft
US20050021984A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2005-01-27 Thumbaccess Biometrics Corporation Pty Ltd. Encryption system

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113890658A (en) * 2021-10-20 2022-01-04 四川启睿克科技有限公司 Safe broadcasting method and system based on android machine system
CN113890658B (en) * 2021-10-20 2023-05-05 四川启睿克科技有限公司 Safe broadcasting method and system based on android machine system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
FR2891970A1 (en) 2007-04-13
FR2891970B1 (en) 2008-01-25

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP3547203A1 (en) Method and system for managing access to personal data by means of an intelligent contract
WO2018158102A1 (en) Integrated method and device for storing and sharing data
EP0797329B1 (en) Method for establishing secure communications, and corresponding encrypting/decrypting system
FR3050555B1 (en) METHOD OF PROCESSING AN AIRCRAFT AVIONICS EQUIPMENT UPDATE, COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCT, ELECTRONIC PROCESSING DEVICE AND TREATMENT SYSTEM THEREOF
EP3732818A1 (en) Method and system for cryptographic activation of a plurality of equipement items
EP3586258B1 (en) Segmented key authentication system
FR2789536A1 (en) DEVICE AND METHOD FOR AUTHENTICATING A REMOTE USER
CN112202713A (en) User data security protection method under Kubernetes environment
FR3063406A1 (en) METHOD AND DEVICE FOR EXCHANGING INTEGRATED DATA
WO2007042393A1 (en) Method for generating a digital message encryption key according to a pilot voice signature
WO2006035159A1 (en) Public key cryptographic method and system, certification server and memories adapted for said system
FR3081652A1 (en) METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING KEYS FOR CONTROLLING ACCESS TO A SERVICE OR A RESOURCE
EP4024239A1 (en) Method and system for storing and sharing data
EP2471214A1 (en) Method for establishing an electronic authorization for a user bearing an electronic identity document, and method for supervising said authorization
EP2285042A1 (en) Software security module using the ciphering of a hash from a password concatenated with a seed
CH716294A2 (en) Decentralized signature process, under biometric control and under conditions of personal identification and geolocation, of a transaction intended for a blockchain.
AU2021100143A4 (en) Computer - implemented method for encryption over a blockchain data sharing in secure network
US20240054482A1 (en) Secure web-based platform for de-centralized financing
CA2831167C (en) Non-hierarchical infrastructure for managing twin-security keys of physical persons or of elements (igcp/pki)
FR3039956A1 (en) CONFIGURATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS
FR3137769A1 (en) Process for saving sensitive personal data on a blockchain
EP3863219A1 (en) Method and device for assessing matching of sets of structured data protected by encryption
WO2003105096A2 (en) Method for updating data on a chip, in particular of a smart card
EP1989819B1 (en) Method for certifying a public key by an uncertified provider
FR2973140A1 (en) METHOD FOR GENERATING AND USING A DEMATERIALIZED TITLE IN A PORTABLE DEVICE AND CORRESPONDING TITLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 06806832

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1