WO2005069864A2 - Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior - Google Patents
Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005069864A2 WO2005069864A2 PCT/US2005/001235 US2005001235W WO2005069864A2 WO 2005069864 A2 WO2005069864 A2 WO 2005069864A2 US 2005001235 W US2005001235 W US 2005001235W WO 2005069864 A2 WO2005069864 A2 WO 2005069864A2
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- shared secret
- request
- user
- address
- tunnel
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0272—Virtual private networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/14—Session management
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/164—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the network layer
Definitions
- the present invention relates to network technology.
- the present invention relates to establishing virtual private network (“VPN”) tunnels for a user whose IP address is not known in advance, known in the art and referred to herein as a "road warrior.”
- VPN virtual private network
- the private network may be, for example, a home network, the private network of a business or other entity, etc.
- One commonly used method for accomplishing this goal is to establish a VPN tunnel, which to a user seems like a point-to-point connection between the user and the private network, but which does not allow an unauthorized third party to "snoop" the communications on the VPN tunnel.
- One such well-known protocol is known as Internet Protocol Security (“IPSec").
- private network 101 includes user PC 105.
- the user wants to establish a VPN tunnel between PC 105 and server 125 in private network 121.
- Security gateways 110 and 120 control communications between Internet 115 and private networks 101 and 121, respectively. Accordingly, security gateways 110 and 120 provide firewall and network address translation functions for private networks 101 and 121. Moreover, security gateways 110 and 120 will negotiate the parameters of a desired VPN tunnel, e.g., the types of authentication and encryption. Security gateway 110 will detect packets destined for a VPN tunnel (for example, because the destination is the address of server 125 within private network 121) , encrypt the packets and encapsulate them with a header indicating security gateways 110 and 120 as the IP source and destination. Security gateway 120 receives the packet, strips off the encapsulation and decrypts the contents of packet. Then, security gateway 120 reads the destination address and forwards the packet to server 125.
- VPN tunnel for example, because the destination is the address of server 125 within private network 121
- Security gateway 120 receives the packet, strips off the encapsulation and decrypts the contents of packet. Then, security gateway 120 reads the destination address and forwards the packet
- a digital certificate is a one-way hash, which is a way of encoding information that only the road warrior's PC knows.
- the hash is then "signed" by a reputable certification authority, such as a third-party authentication server controlled by, for example, VerisignTM.
- a public key of the certification authority is used to view the contents and determine whether the packet includes an authorized IP address.
- Digital certificates require a substantial amount of infrastructure, including the involvement of a third- party certification authority. The complexity and expense of this involvement make the use of digital certificates less than optimal for, e.g., forming a VPN tunnel to a home network.
- Other methods enable any IP address to establish a VPN tunnel (for example, an IPSec tunnel) using a particular widely shared secret. However, it is well known that such widely shared secrets can easily be discovered and used by unauthorized persons.
- shared secrets are shared by everyone involved and are not separate secrets for each client.
- Methods and devices are provided for establishing a VPN tunnel for a road warrior.
- the road warrior first initiates a secure authentication session with a security gateway.
- the road warrior provides a username/password pair that the security gateway compares to a database of usernames that have been authorized to initiate a VPN tunnel.
- the security gateway determines the IP address of the road warrior, then makes a correlation between the authenticated user and a shared secret allocated to the road warrior. If the road warrior uses the proper shared secret in connection with a request to establish a VPN tunnel, the security gateway will establish the VPN tunnel.
- Some implementations of the invention provide a method of establishing a virtual private network tunnel.
- the method includes the following steps: receiving, from a user whose IP address is not known in advance, a first request to form an encrypted tunnel with a security gateway; forming the encrypted tunnel; authenticating the user; determining an IP address of the user; establishing a correspondence between the IP address and a first shared secret authorized for the user; receiving a second request from the user to form a virtual private network tunnel, the request incorporating a second shared secret; determining whether the first shared secret matches the second shared secret; and forming the virtual private network tunnel when the first shared secret matches the second shared secret.
- the first request may be a request to form a Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer session.
- the authenticating step may involve receiving and verifying a username/password pair from the user.
- the second request may be a request to form an IPSec tunnel.
- the establishing step may involve comparing a username and password provided by the user with a database of usernames, passwords and shared secrets.
- the second request may incorporate a hashing function based on the second shared secret.
- the step of determining whether the first shared secret matches the second shared secret may involve attempting to decrypt at least a portion of the second request.
- the establishing step may involve entering the IP address and the first shared secret in an IPSec table.
- the entry may be a temporary entry that is deleted after the occurrence of a predetermined event, such as a passage of a predetermined time.
- the virtual private network tunnel is preferably torn down when the temporary entry is deleted.
- Some embodiments of the invention provide a computer program embodied in a machine-readable medium.
- the computer program includes instructions for controlling a security gateway to perform the following steps: receiving, from a user whose IP address is not known in advance, a first request to form an encrypted tunnel with a security gateway; forming the encrypted tunnel; authenticating the user; determining an IP address of the user; establishing a correspondence between the IP address and a first shared secret authorized for the user; receiving a second request from the user to form a virtual private network tunnel, the request incorporating a second shared secret; determining whether the first shared secret matches the second shared secret; and forming the virtual private network tunnel when the first shared secret matches the second shared secret.
- the first request may be a request to form a Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer session.
- the authenticating step may involve receiving and verifying a username/password pair from the user.
- the second request may be a request to form an IPSec tunnel.
- the establishing step may involve comparing a username and password provided by the user with a database of usernames, passwords and shared secrets.
- the second request may incorporate a hashing function based on the second shared secret .
- the step of determining whether the first shared secret matches the second shared secret may involve attempting to decrypt at least a portion of the second request.
- the securing gateway includes the following: a first port configured for communication with the Internet; a second port configured for communication with a private network; and one or more processors.
- the processor or processors are configured to do the following: receive, via the first port, a first request to form an encrypted tunnel with a security gateway from a user whose IP address is not known in advance; form the encrypted tunnel; authenticate the user; determine an IP address of the user; establish a correspondence between the IP address and a first shared secret authorized for the user; receive a second request from the user to form a virtual private network tunnel, the request incorporating a second shared secret; determine whether the first shared secret matches the second shared secret; and form the virtual private network tunnel when the first shared secret matches the second shared secret.
- implementations of the invention provide a method of establishing a virtual private network tunnel.
- the method includes the following steps: receiving, from a user whose IP address is not known in advance, a first request to form an encrypted tunnel with a security gateway; forming the encrypted tunnel; authenticating the user; determining an IP address of the user; establishing a correspondence between the IP address and a subject of a digital certificate; receiving a second request from the user to form a virtual private network tunnel , the request incorporating the digital certificate; determining that the subject of the digital certificate is an expected subject; and forming the virtual private network tunnel when the subject of the digital certificate is the expected subject.
- Fig. 1 is a network diagram illustrating two private networks connected by the Internet .
- Fig. 2A is a network diagram that indicates one context for implementing the present invention.
- Fig. 2B is a flow chart that outlines a method according to some aspects of the invention.
- Fig. 3 is a table that illustrates contents of a database used by some aspects of the invention.
- Fig. 4 is a table that illustrates contents of a database used by some aspects of the invention.
- Fig. 5 is a flow chart that outlines a method according to some aspects of the invention.
- Fig. 6 illustrates a simplified version of a network device that may be configured to implement some aspects of the present invention.
- Fig. 2A is a network diagram that indicates one context for implementing the present invention.
- road warrior 252 is operating device 250, which is a notebook computer in this example.
- Device 250 is communicating with security gateway 260 via Internet 255.
- Road warrior 252 wants to establish a VPN tunnel between device 250 and server 270 of private network 265.
- Fig. 2B is a flow chart that provides a high-level description of some implementations of the invention. The steps of method 200 are described from the perspective of a security gateway.
- a security gateway receives a request via the Internet from a road warrior (e.g., from device 250 operated by road warrior 252 of Fig. 2A) to be authenticated in order to form an encrypted tunnel between the road warrior and the security gateway (e.g., security gateway 260 of Fig. 2) .
- a road warrior e.g., from device 250 operated by road warrior 252 of Fig. 2A
- security gateway e.g., security gateway 260 of Fig. 2
- the security gateway receives a request to initiate an HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer, or HTTP over SSL) session in step 205 and forms an encrypted tunnel according to the https protocol in step 210.
- HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer
- HTTPS is a protocol developed by NetscapeTM and built into Netscape's browser. HTTPS is also built into virtually every modern browser and is the basis for all secure monetary transactions over the Internet.
- HTTPS encrypts and decrypts user page requests and the pages that are returned to the user.
- HTTPS uses Netscape's Secure Socket Layer (SSL) as a sublayer under its HTTP application layering.
- SSL Secure Socket Layer
- the request is processed by a daemon responsible for processing https requests, which may be, e.g., an HTTP daemon, an HTTPS daemon, or a combination of the two.
- Those of skill in the art will appreciate that there are various other authentication methods, such as those provided by Radius ® , CRYPTOCardTM, RSA'sTM SecurlD ® and Secure ComputingTM' s SafeWord ® . These methods typically require additional hardware and proprietary software to be installed and maintained.
- the road warrior is authenticated.
- the encrypted tunnel is used to transmit authentication information from the road warrior, e.g., a username/password pair, according to methods known by those of skill in the art.
- Fig. 2B implies that the road warrior would always be successfully authenticated, it should be understood that this would not be the case if the road warrior did not provide the proper authentication information to the security gateway. For example, the road warrior might be given a predetermined number of attempts to provide this information before the security gateway refuses the request .
- the security gateway determines the road warrior's IP address.
- the security gateway performs step 220 by running a JavaTM applet.
- other browser scripting methods such as ActiveX or C# from Microsoft, could be also be used. This could also be accomplished in implementations that do not allow for NAT addressing by simple inspection of the source address of the HTTPS request packets.
- a user activated program on device 250 could query its own IP address and send this information in an encrypted or unencrypted format to security gateway 260.
- the security gateway then establishes a correspondence between the IP address determined in step 220 and a shared secret associated with the road warrior. An example of this process will now be described with reference to Figs. 3 and 4.
- table 300 is a table that illustrates how authentication information may be associated with shared secrets in a database accessible by a security gateway.
- the information in the database is provisioned ahead of time, i.e., before the time that a road warrior initiates the process illustrated in Fig. 2.
- table 300 includes username field 305, password field 310 and shared secret field 315.
- road warrior JoeB has a password "Kibble" and an associated shared secret 325.
- shared secret 325 could be any string of numbers, letters, etc.
- the security gateway can establish a correspondence between the user name determined in 215, and the appropriate shared secret 325, which is the authorized shared secret for JoeB in this example. Further, the security gateway can establish a correspondence between the user name determined in 215, and the ip address established in 220. Using the above two correspondences, the security gateway can transitively establish a correspondence between the shared secret 325, and the IP address 220. This correspondence is illustrated by the table shown in Fig. 4, which includes IP address field 405 and shared secret field 410. JoeB's IP address 415 is associated with the shared secret 325 authorized for his use. As will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, Figs. 3 and 4 may be part of the same data structure .
- the database that is schematically depicted in Fig. 4 does not need to exist except ephemerally until VPN provisioning.
- the database that conceptually links a specific IP address to a specific shared secret is the configuration file of the IPSec software. This implementation must have a distinct database for IPSec software and another database for the "glue" software.
- the next step (230) of method 200 is the receipt of a request to form a VPN tunnel between the road warrior and a device within the private network controlled by the security gateway (e.g., private network 265, shown in Fig. 2A) .
- the request incorporates a shared secret known by the road warrior (or at least by device 250) , but the shared secret need not be sent in the form of a password.
- the shared secret may be incorporated in various ways.
- the shared secret is used as an input in forming at least a portion of the request, e.g., as a product of a hashing operation.
- the security gateway determines whether the shared secret incorporated in the request is the same shared secret authorized for use by the road warrior. For example, the security gateway may accept or deny a request from JoeB based on whether the security gateway can successfully decrypt his request (or a portion thereof) . In this example, the decryption is based on shared secret 325 authorized for JoeB and corresponding to his current IP address (see Fig. 4) . However, any convenient method of validating the shared secret proffered by the road warrior may be used in step 235.
- the security gateway forms the requested VPN tunnel (step 245) . If not, the request is denied (step 240) . Some embodiments may permit the road warrior to make multiple requests before the tunnel formed in step 210 is torn down, but others will tear down the tunnel even if only a single request is denied.
- the security gateway only temporarily associates the IP address of a road warrior with an authorized shared secret. For example, when a VPN tunnel is formed based upon a request from road warrior JoeB, IP Address 415 and its corresponding shared secret as per figure 4 is preferably stored by the gateway only during the time that the VPN tunnel exists.
- Fig. 5 is a flow chart that illustrates a process of tearing down a VPN tunnel according to some implementations of the invention.
- a VPN tunnel has already been established.
- the security gateway determines whether a predetermined event has transpired.
- the event may be, for example, a predetermined period of time that the VPN tunnel has been formed, a predetermined period of time that there has been no traffic on the VPN tunnel, a request from a user, etc. If so, the VPN tunnel is torn down (step 515) and the road warrior's IP address/shared secret is deleted from the figure 4 data base (step 520) . It will be appreciated by those of skill in the art that step 520 may take place prior to step 515.
- Network device 660 includes a master central processing unit (CPU) 662, interfaces 668, and a bus 667 (e.g., a PCI bus).
- interfaces 668 include ports 669 appropriate for communication with the appropriate media.
- one or more of interfaces 668 includes at least one independent processor 674 and, in some instances, volatile RAM.
- Independent processors 674 may be, for example ASICs or any other appropriate processors. According to some such embodiments, these independent processors 674 perform at least some of the functions of the logic described herein.
- one or more of interfaces 668 control such communications-intensive tasks as media control and management . By providing separate processors for the communications-intensive tasks, interfaces 668 allow the master microprocessor 662 efficiently to perform other functions such as routing computations, network diagnostics, security functions, etc.
- the interfaces 668 are typically provided as interface cards (sometimes referred to as "linecards" ) . Generally, interfaces 668 control the sending and receiving of data packets over the network and sometimes support other peripherals used with the network device 660. Among the interfaces that may be provided are FC interfaces, Ethernet interfaces, frame relay interfaces, cable interfaces, DSL interfaces, token ring interfaces, and the like. In addition, various very high-speed interfaces may be provided, such as fast Ethernet interfaces, Gigabit Ethernet interfaces, ATM interfaces, HSSI interfaces, POS interfaces, FDDI interfaces, ASI interfaces, DHEI interfaces and the like.
- CPU 662 may be responsible for implementing specific functions associated with the functions of a desired network device. According to some embodiments, CPU 662 accomplishes all these functions under the control of software including an operating system (e.g., Cisco IOS, a proprietary operating system developed by Cisco Systems, Inc., etc.) and any appropriate applications software.
- an operating system e.g., Cisco IOS, a proprietary operating system developed by Cisco Systems, Inc., etc.
- CPU 662 may include one or more processors 663 such as a processor from the Motorola family of microprocessors or the MIPS family of microprocessors. In an alternative embodiment, processor 663 is specially designed hardware for controlling the operations of network device 660. In a specific embodiment, a memory 661 (such as non-volatile RAM and/or ROM) also forms part of CPU 662. However, there are many different ways in which memory could be coupled to the system. Memory block 661 may be used for a variety of purposes such as, for example, caching and/or storing data, programming instructions, etc.
- network device may employ one or more memories or memory modules (such as, for example, memory block 665) configured to store data, program instructions for the general -purpose network operations and/or other information relating to the functionality of the techniques described herein.
- the program instructions may control the operation of an operating system and/or one or more applications, for exampl . Because such information and program instructions may be employed to implement the systems/methods described herein, the present invention relates to machine -readable media that include program instructions, state information, etc. for performing various operations described herein.
- machine-readable media include, but are not limited to, magnetic media such as harrd disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tape; optical media such as CD-ROM disks; magneto-optical media; and hardware devices that are specially configured to store and perform program instructions, such as read-only memory devices (ROM) and random access memory (RAM) .
- ROM read-only memory
- RAM random access memory
- the invention may also be embodied in a carrier wave traveling over an appropriate medium such as airwaves, optical lines, electric lines, etc.
- program instructions include both machine code, such as produced by a compiler, and files containing higher level code that may be executed by the computer using an interpreter.
- interfaces/linecards may be bus based (as shown in Fig. 6) or switch fabric based (such as a cross-bar) .
- the techniques of the present invention may be implemented on software and/or hardware. For example, they can be implemented in an operating system ker-nel, in a separate user process, in a library package bound into network applications, on a specially constructed machine, or on a network interface card. In a specific embodiment of this invention, the technique of the present invention is implemented in software such as an operating system or in an application running on an operating system.
- a software or software/hardware hybrid implementation of the techniques of this invention may be implemented on a general-purpose programmable machine selectively activated or reconfigured by a computer program stored in memory.
- a programmable machine may be a network device designed to handle network traffic, such as, for example, the network device described above with reference to Fig. 6.
- the techniques of this invention may be implemented on a general-purpose network host machine such as a personal computer or workstation.
- the invention may be at least partially implemented on a card (e.g., an interface card) for a network device or a general-purpose computing device.
- a correspondence is established between a user whose IP address is not known in advance and a subject of a digital certificate.
- a VPN tunnel will be established if the subject of the digital certificate is an expected subject. Accordingly, the present embodiments are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the invention is not to be limited to the details given herein, but may be modified within the scope and equivalents of the appended claims.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU2005206904A AU2005206904B2 (en) | 2004-01-15 | 2005-01-13 | Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior |
CN2005800013848A CN101076796B (en) | 2004-01-15 | 2005-01-13 | Virtual special purpose network established for roam user |
EP05705710.1A EP1730651B1 (en) | 2004-01-15 | 2005-01-13 | Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior |
CA002548341A CA2548341C (en) | 2004-01-15 | 2005-01-13 | Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US10/758,757 US7305706B2 (en) | 2004-01-15 | 2004-01-15 | Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior |
US10/758,757 | 2004-01-15 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2005069864A2 true WO2005069864A2 (en) | 2005-08-04 |
WO2005069864A3 WO2005069864A3 (en) | 2006-10-26 |
Family
ID=34749571
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/US2005/001235 WO2005069864A2 (en) | 2004-01-15 | 2005-01-13 | Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7305706B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1730651B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN101076796B (en) |
AU (1) | AU2005206904B2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2548341C (en) |
WO (1) | WO2005069864A2 (en) |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN102882859A (en) * | 2012-09-13 | 2013-01-16 | 广东电网公司电力科学研究院 | Security protection method based on public network data transmission information system |
WO2013126852A2 (en) | 2012-02-24 | 2013-08-29 | Missing Link Electronics, Inc. | Partitioning systems operating in multiple domains |
EP3228059A4 (en) * | 2014-12-04 | 2017-10-11 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Secure connections establishment |
Families Citing this family (23)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7391865B2 (en) | 1999-09-20 | 2008-06-24 | Security First Corporation | Secure data parser method and system |
US20060041741A1 (en) * | 2004-08-23 | 2006-02-23 | Nokia Corporation | Systems and methods for IP level decryption |
US8266438B2 (en) | 2004-10-25 | 2012-09-11 | Security First Corp. | Secure data parser method and system |
JP2006148661A (en) * | 2004-11-22 | 2006-06-08 | Toshiba Corp | Remote control system for information terminal, remote access terminal therefor, gateway server therefor, information terminal controller therefor, information terminal apparatus. and remote control method therefor |
US8547874B2 (en) * | 2005-06-30 | 2013-10-01 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Method and system for learning network information |
US8621577B2 (en) * | 2005-08-19 | 2013-12-31 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Method for performing multiple pre-shared key based authentication at once and system for executing the method |
US7962743B2 (en) * | 2006-05-22 | 2011-06-14 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | System and method for protected spoke to spoke communication using an unprotected computer network |
US20070283430A1 (en) * | 2006-06-02 | 2007-12-06 | Research In Motion Limited | Negotiating vpn tunnel establishment parameters on user's interaction |
US8417868B2 (en) * | 2006-06-30 | 2013-04-09 | Intel Corporation | Method, apparatus and system for offloading encryption on partitioned platforms |
US20080137859A1 (en) * | 2006-12-06 | 2008-06-12 | Ramanathan Jagadeesan | Public key passing |
JP5138359B2 (en) * | 2007-12-27 | 2013-02-06 | エヌ・ティ・ティ アイティ株式会社 | Remote access method |
US8312147B2 (en) * | 2008-05-13 | 2012-11-13 | Adobe Systems Incorporated | Many-to-one mapping of host identities |
WO2010127610A1 (en) * | 2009-05-04 | 2010-11-11 | 成都市华为赛门铁克科技有限公司 | Method, equipment and system for processing visual private network node information |
CA2781872A1 (en) | 2009-11-25 | 2011-06-09 | Security First Corp. | Systems and methods for securing data in motion |
JP5663083B2 (en) | 2010-03-31 | 2015-02-04 | セキュリティー ファースト コープ. | System and method for securing data in motion |
US8824492B2 (en) | 2010-05-28 | 2014-09-02 | Drc Computer Corporation | Accelerator system for remote data storage |
CN105071936B (en) | 2010-09-20 | 2018-10-12 | 安全第一公司 | The system and method shared for secure data |
CN102281179A (en) * | 2011-06-27 | 2011-12-14 | 上海安达通信息安全技术股份有限公司 | VPN tunnel relay acceleration technology |
CN103259736A (en) * | 2013-05-24 | 2013-08-21 | 杭州华三通信技术有限公司 | Tunnel building method and network equipment |
US9942200B1 (en) * | 2014-12-02 | 2018-04-10 | Trend Micro Inc. | End user authentication using a virtual private network |
US10051000B2 (en) * | 2015-07-28 | 2018-08-14 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Efficient use of IPsec tunnels in multi-path environment |
US10231151B2 (en) | 2016-08-24 | 2019-03-12 | Parallel Wireless, Inc. | Optimized train solution |
US10868803B2 (en) * | 2017-01-13 | 2020-12-15 | Parallel Wireless, Inc. | Multi-stage secure network element certificate provisioning in a distributed mobile access network |
Family Cites Families (31)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
KR100317443B1 (en) * | 1996-04-24 | 2002-01-16 | 블레이어 에프.모리슨 | Internet protocol filter |
US6061346A (en) * | 1997-01-17 | 2000-05-09 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Secure access method, and associated apparatus, for accessing a private IP network |
US6275941B1 (en) * | 1997-03-28 | 2001-08-14 | Hiatchi, Ltd. | Security management method for network system |
US6229894B1 (en) * | 1997-07-14 | 2001-05-08 | Entrust Technologies, Ltd. | Method and apparatus for access to user-specific encryption information |
US6202156B1 (en) * | 1997-09-12 | 2001-03-13 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Remote access-controlled communication |
US6064736A (en) * | 1997-09-15 | 2000-05-16 | International Business Machines Corporation | Systems, methods and computer program products that use an encrypted session for additional password verification |
US6574661B1 (en) * | 1997-09-26 | 2003-06-03 | Mci Communications Corporation | Integrated proxy interface for web based telecommunication toll-free network management using a network manager for downloading a call routing tree to client |
US6070244A (en) * | 1997-11-10 | 2000-05-30 | The Chase Manhattan Bank | Computer network security management system |
US6339595B1 (en) * | 1997-12-23 | 2002-01-15 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Peer-model support for virtual private networks with potentially overlapping addresses |
JPH11338798A (en) * | 1998-05-27 | 1999-12-10 | Ntt Communication Ware Kk | Network system and computer readable recording medium recording program |
US6470453B1 (en) * | 1998-09-17 | 2002-10-22 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Validating connections to a network system |
US6154543A (en) * | 1998-11-25 | 2000-11-28 | Hush Communications Anguilla, Inc. | Public key cryptosystem with roaming user capability |
US6678283B1 (en) * | 1999-03-10 | 2004-01-13 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | System and method for distributing packet processing in an internetworking device |
US6081900A (en) * | 1999-03-16 | 2000-06-27 | Novell, Inc. | Secure intranet access |
US6678827B1 (en) * | 1999-05-06 | 2004-01-13 | Watchguard Technologies, Inc. | Managing multiple network security devices from a manager device |
GB2364477B (en) * | 2000-01-18 | 2003-11-05 | Ericsson Telefon Ab L M | Virtual private networks |
GB2366631B (en) * | 2000-03-04 | 2004-10-20 | Ericsson Telefon Ab L M | Communication node, communication network and method of recovering from a temporary failure of a node |
JP2002077274A (en) * | 2000-08-31 | 2002-03-15 | Toshiba Corp | Home gateway device, access server and communication method |
US20020042883A1 (en) * | 2000-10-04 | 2002-04-11 | Soundvoice Limited | Method and system for controlling access by clients to servers over an internet protocol network |
US20030041268A1 (en) * | 2000-10-18 | 2003-02-27 | Noriaki Hashimoto | Method and system for preventing unauthorized access to the internet |
KR100416541B1 (en) * | 2000-11-30 | 2004-02-05 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Method for accessing to home-network using home-gateway and home-portal sever and apparatus thereof |
US6983381B2 (en) * | 2001-01-17 | 2006-01-03 | Arcot Systems, Inc. | Methods for pre-authentication of users using one-time passwords |
US20020129271A1 (en) * | 2001-03-12 | 2002-09-12 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Method and apparatus for order independent processing of virtual private network protocols |
GB2378009B (en) * | 2001-07-27 | 2005-08-31 | Hewlett Packard Co | Method of establishing a secure data connection |
US20030204752A1 (en) * | 2001-08-13 | 2003-10-30 | Garrison Greg B. | System and method for securely accessing a database from a remote location |
JP2003091503A (en) * | 2001-09-14 | 2003-03-28 | Toshiba Corp | Authentication method using port access and server equipment to which the same is applied |
JP3864743B2 (en) * | 2001-10-04 | 2007-01-10 | 株式会社日立製作所 | Firewall device, information device, and information device communication method |
KR100470915B1 (en) * | 2001-12-28 | 2005-03-08 | 한국전자통신연구원 | Method for controlling internet information security system in ip packet level |
JP2003304268A (en) * | 2002-04-12 | 2003-10-24 | Nec Corp | Server, user restriction type home server access system having the server and access control method |
US7159242B2 (en) * | 2002-05-09 | 2007-01-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure IPsec tunnels with a background system accessible via a gateway implementing NAT |
US7596629B2 (en) * | 2002-11-21 | 2009-09-29 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | System and method for interconnecting heterogeneous layer 2 VPN applications |
-
2004
- 2004-01-15 US US10/758,757 patent/US7305706B2/en active Active
-
2005
- 2005-01-13 CA CA002548341A patent/CA2548341C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-01-13 WO PCT/US2005/001235 patent/WO2005069864A2/en active Application Filing
- 2005-01-13 CN CN2005800013848A patent/CN101076796B/en active Active
- 2005-01-13 AU AU2005206904A patent/AU2005206904B2/en not_active Ceased
- 2005-01-13 EP EP05705710.1A patent/EP1730651B1/en active Active
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of EP1730651A4 * |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2013126852A2 (en) | 2012-02-24 | 2013-08-29 | Missing Link Electronics, Inc. | Partitioning systems operating in multiple domains |
CN102882859A (en) * | 2012-09-13 | 2013-01-16 | 广东电网公司电力科学研究院 | Security protection method based on public network data transmission information system |
CN102882859B (en) * | 2012-09-13 | 2015-08-05 | 广东电网公司电力科学研究院 | A kind of safety protecting method based on public network data transmission information system |
EP3228059A4 (en) * | 2014-12-04 | 2017-10-11 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Secure connections establishment |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CA2548341C (en) | 2010-01-12 |
US7305706B2 (en) | 2007-12-04 |
AU2005206904A1 (en) | 2005-08-04 |
CN101076796A (en) | 2007-11-21 |
EP1730651A2 (en) | 2006-12-13 |
CA2548341A1 (en) | 2005-08-04 |
AU2005206904B2 (en) | 2010-02-11 |
EP1730651A4 (en) | 2013-12-25 |
US20050160290A1 (en) | 2005-07-21 |
CN101076796B (en) | 2010-12-15 |
EP1730651B1 (en) | 2018-10-31 |
WO2005069864A3 (en) | 2006-10-26 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
CA2548341C (en) | Establishing a virtual private network for a road warrior | |
Aboba et al. | Ppp eap tls authentication protocol | |
US7039713B1 (en) | System and method of user authentication for network communication through a policy agent | |
US7003662B2 (en) | System and method for dynamically determining CRL locations and access methods | |
US20160072787A1 (en) | Method for creating secure subnetworks on a general purpose network | |
US20070150946A1 (en) | Method and apparatus for providing remote access to an enterprise network | |
US20020129271A1 (en) | Method and apparatus for order independent processing of virtual private network protocols | |
JP2005503047A (en) | Apparatus and method for providing a secure network | |
US7076653B1 (en) | System and method for supporting multiple encryption or authentication schemes over a connection on a network | |
WO2002089444A1 (en) | Method and system for authenticating a personal security device vis-a-vis at least one remote computer system | |
US20230336529A1 (en) | Enhanced privacy preserving access to a vpn service | |
US8078739B1 (en) | Solution for handling URL-substitution for data access in a private network architecture | |
Aboba et al. | RFC2716: PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol | |
EP2920912A1 (en) | Electronic rendezvous-based two stage access control for private networks | |
Cisco | Configuring VPN Client Remote Access | |
Cisco | Configuring VPN Client Remote Access | |
Cisco | Configuring VPN Client Remote Access | |
Cisco | VPN Client Configuration Examples | |
JP2000312203A (en) | Method and system for passing control in encryption communication | |
Khandkar et al. | Masking host identity on internet: Encrypted TLS/SSL handshake | |
JP2004147252A (en) | Electronic certificate, forming method therefor, and authentication system by electronic certificate | |
KR100555745B1 (en) | Security system and method for internet commumication between client system and sever system of specific domain | |
Bonachea et al. | SafeTP: Transparently securing FTP network services | |
Cam-Winget et al. | Dynamic Provisioning Using Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-FAST) | |
Ekström | Securing a wireless local area network: using standard security techniques |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 200580001384.8 Country of ref document: CN |
|
AK | Designated states |
Kind code of ref document: A2 Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BW BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE EG ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NA NI NO NZ OM PG PH PL PT RO RU SC SD SE SG SK SL SY TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VC VN YU ZA ZM ZW |
|
AL | Designated countries for regional patents |
Kind code of ref document: A2 Designated state(s): BW GH GM KE LS MW MZ NA SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LT LU MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2548341 Country of ref document: CA |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWW | Wipo information: withdrawn in national office |
Ref document number: DE |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2005206904 Country of ref document: AU |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2005206904 Country of ref document: AU Date of ref document: 20050113 Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 2005206904 Country of ref document: AU |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2005705710 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 2005705710 Country of ref document: EP |