WO2004034321A1 - A challenged-based tag authentication model - Google Patents
A challenged-based tag authentication model Download PDFInfo
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- WO2004034321A1 WO2004034321A1 PCT/US2003/029542 US0329542W WO2004034321A1 WO 2004034321 A1 WO2004034321 A1 WO 2004034321A1 US 0329542 W US0329542 W US 0329542W WO 2004034321 A1 WO2004034321 A1 WO 2004034321A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- challenge
- tag
- reader
- value
- response
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/0723—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips the record carrier comprising an arrangement for non-contact communication, e.g. wireless communication circuits on transponder cards, non-contact smart cards or RFIDs
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
- G06K7/0008—General problems related to the reading of electronic memory record carriers, independent of its reading method, e.g. power transfer
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2103—Challenge-response
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2129—Authenticate client device independently of the user
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
- H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
Definitions
- the invention relates to a remote communication system. More particularly, the invention relates to a radio frequency (RF) identification system and methods for secure communications between a RFID reader and RFID tags.
- RF radio frequency
- Radio frequency (RF) technology which is employed in many industries.
- RF technology is in locating, identifying, and tracking objects, such as animals, inventory, and vehicles.
- RF identification (RFID) tag systems have been developed to identify, monitor or control remote objects.
- a basic RFID system 10 includes an interrogator 18 and transponders (commonly called RF tags) 16.
- the interrogator 18 includes a transceiver with decoder 14 and an antenna 12.
- the tag 16 includes an antenna 24.
- the antenna 12 emits and receives electromagnetic radio signals generated by the transceiver 14 to activate the tag 16 and receive signals from the tag.
- data can be read from or written to the tag.
- the transceiver and antenna 12 are components of an interrogator (or reader) 18, which can be configured either as a hand-held or a fixed- mount device.
- the interrogator 18 emits the radio signals 20 in range from one inch to one hundred feet or more, depending upon its power output and the radio frequency used.
- an RF tag 16 passes through the electromagnetic radio waves 20, the tag detects the signal 20 and is activated. Data encoded in the tag 16 is then transmitted by a modulated data signal 22 through an antenna 24 to the interrogator 18 for subsequent processing.
- RFID systems An advantage of RFID systems is the non-contact, non-line-of-sight capability of the technology. Tags can be read through a variety of substances such as snow, fog, ice, paint, dirt, and other visually and environmentally challenging conditions where bar codes or other optically-read technologies would be useless. RF tags can also be read at remarkable speeds, in most cases responding in less than one hundred milliseconds.
- the beam-powered RFID tag is often referred to as a passive device because it derives the energy needed for its operation from the radio frequency energy beamed at it.
- the tag rectifies the field and changes the reflective characteristics of the tag itself, creating a change in reflectivity that is seen at the interrogator.
- a battery-powered semi- passive RFID tag operates in a similar fashion, modulating its RF cross-section in order to change its reflectivity that is seen at the interrogator to develop a communication link.
- the battery is the only source of the tag's operational power.
- both the tag and reader have transceivers to communicate and are powered by a battery.
- a typical RF tag system 10 will contain at least one tag 16 and one interrogator 18.
- the range of communication for such tags varies according to the transmission power of the interrogator 18 and the tag 16.
- Battery-powered tags operating at 2,450 MHz have traditionally been limited to less than ten meters in range. However, devices with sufficient power can reach in excess of 100 meters in range, depending on the frequency and environmental characteristics.
- Conventional RF tag systems utilize continuous wave backscatter to communicate data from the tag 16 to the interrogator 18. More specifically, the interrogator 18 transmits a continuous-wave radio signal to the tag 16, which modulates the signal 20 using modulated backscattering wherein the electrical characteristics of the antenna 24 are altered by a modulating signal from the tag that reflects a modulated signal 22 back to the interrogator 18.
- the modulated signal 22 is encoded with information from the tag 16.
- the interrogator 18 then demodulates the modulated signal 22 and decodes the information.
- a problem in RFID systems is in authentication and secure communications between the reader and RF tags in the field of view of the reader.
- One aspect of the invention provides a method and apparatus for authenticating reader or tags over a public, open channel. Another aspect of the invention provides a method and apparatus that is more robust against spoofing and other illicit access attempts than password-based methods.
- the invention provides a method of securing communications in an RFID system including a reader and an RF tag having a memory configured to store information, the method comprising: sending, from the reader, a message to the tag; the tag, in response to the message, generating a challenge value and sending the challenge value to the reader; in any order: the reader performing a mathematical operation on the challenge value based upon a key value to generate a challenge reply and sending the challenge reply to the tag and the tag independently computing a challenge response based on the key value and mathematical operation; the tag comparing the challenge response computed by the tag with the challenge reply send by the reader; and the tag authenticating the reader if the challenge response matches the challenge reply.
- Another aspect of the invention provides a method of securing communications in an RFID system including a reader and an RF tag having a memory configured to store information, the method comprising: sending, from the tag, a message to the reader; the reader, in response to the message, generating a challenge value and sending the challenge value to the tag; in any order: the tag performing a mathematical operation on the challenge value based upon a key value to generate a challenge reply and sending the challenge reply to the reader and the reader independently computing a challenge response based on the key value and mathematical operation; the reader comparing the challenge response computed by the reader with the challenge reply sent by the tag; and the reader authenticating the tag if the challenge response matches the challenge reply.
- An RFID communications system comprising: an RF tag having a memory configured to store information; and a reader configured to send a message to the tag; the tag being configured to, in response to the message, generate a challenge value and send the challenge value to the reader; the reader being configured to perform a mathematical operation on the challenge value based upon a key value to generate a challenge reply and send the challenge reply to the tag; the tag being further configured to independently compute a challenge response based on the key value and mathematical operation, to compare the challenge response computed by the tag with the challenge reply sent by the reader, and to authenticate the reader if the challenge response matches the challenge reply.
- An RFID communications system comprising: an RF tag having a memory configured to store information; and a reader configured for RF communication with the tag, the tag being configured to send a message to the reader; the reader being configured to, in response to the message, generate a challenge value and send the challenge value to the tag; the tag being configured to perform a mathematical operation on the challenge value based upon a key value to generate a challenge reply and send the challenge reply to the reader; the reader being further configured to independently compute a challenge response based on the key value and mathematical operation, to compare the challenge response computed by the reader with the challenge reply sent by the tag, and to authenticate the tag if the challenge response matches the challenge reply.
- a method of securing communications in an RFID system including a reader and an RF tag having a memory configured to store information, the method comprising the following steps, in order: sending, from the tag, a message to the reader; the reader, in response to the message, generating a challenge value and sending the challenge value to the tag; the reader independently computing a challenge response based on the key value and mathematical operation; the tag performing a mathematical operation on the challenge value based upon a key value to generate a challenge reply and sending the challenge reply to the reader; the reader directly comparing the challenge response computed by the reader with the challenge reply sent by the tag, without a need to first perform a mathematical operation on the challenge reply; and the reader authenticating the tag if the challenge response matches the challenge reply.
- An RFID communications system comprising: an RF tag having a memory configured to store information; and a reader configured for RF communication with the tag, the tag being configured to send a message to the reader, the reader being further configured to, in response to the message: generate a challenge value and send the challenge value to the tag, the tag being further configured to perform a mathematical operation on the challenge value based upon a key value to generate a challenge reply and send the challenge reply to the reader; independently compute a challenge response based on the key value and mathematical operation prior to receiving the challenge reply from the tag; directly compare the challenge response computed by the reader with the challenge reply sent by the tag without a need to first perform a mathematical operation on the challenge reply sent by the tag; and authenticate the tag if the challenge response matches the challenge reply.
- Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a conventional RFID communication system, including a tag and reader in which the invention could be incorporated.
- Fig. 2 is a block diagram of an RFID communication system, including a tag and reader, embodying various aspects of the invention.
- Fig. 3 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by the tag and reader of Fig. 2.
- an embodiment of the present invention is directed to an RF communication system 30 that employs backscatter signals.
- the RF communication system 30 includes a reader or interrogator 32 that includes an antenna 34 through which the reader can transmit an interrogation signal 36 to an RF tag 44.
- the RF tag modulates the continuous wave interrogation signal 36 to produce a backscatter response signal 40 that is transmitted back to the interrogator 32.
- the signal 40 can include an identification code stored in memory 50, or other data. While Fig. 2 shows only two tags 44, there would typically be multiple tags 44 in use, capable of communicating with the reader 32.
- the RF tag 44 includes an antenna 42 coupled to a modulator defined by processor 48.
- the tag 44 includes a switch coupled between the antenna 42 and processor 48.
- the switch is included in the processor 48.
- the switch can be a switch external to the processor 48, such as an n-channel MOS transistor, a p-channel MOS transistor, a bipolar transistor, or any of numerous other types of switches.
- a modulating signal from the processor 48 is input to the antenna 42 to cause the antenna to alternately reflect or not reflect.
- One item that can be transmitted from the tag to the reader is an identification code that is stored in memory 50 of the RF tag 44.
- the reader after receiving a command, sends a carrier wave or interrogation signal 36 that is received by the antenna 42, and that signal is selectively reflected or not reflected back by the antenna 42 by the tag 44 shorting or not shorting dipole halves of the antenna 42 to produce portions of the response signal 40 (backscatter communications).
- a carrier wave or interrogation signal 36 that is received by the antenna 42, and that signal is selectively reflected or not reflected back by the antenna 42 by the tag 44 shorting or not shorting dipole halves of the antenna 42 to produce portions of the response signal 40 (backscatter communications).
- Other communication methods are possible.
- the interrogator 32 can be the receiver described in U.S. Patent No. 4,360,810 to Landt, which is incorporated herein by reference, modified as described below.
- the reader 32 includes a processor 54, which in turn includes an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) 56 and a random number generator 58.
- the processor 54 further includes a memory 64; alternatively, the reader 32 includes a memory separate from the processor 54.
- the memory 64 stores a secret key value 68, the use of which will be described in greater detail below.
- the memory 50 of each tag 44 also stores a secret key value 66 which, in the illustrated embodiment, is the same value as the key value 68.
- the processor 54 includes other features typically included in processors of the type typically employed in RFID readers.
- the random number generator 58 actually generates pseudo random numbers; i.e., the numbers generated may follow a pattern that could be recreated. While the random number generator 58 is shown as being separate from the ALU 56, in one embodiment, the random number generator 58 is defined in part by the ALU 56.
- each of the RF tags 44 is shown as including an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) 60 and a random number generator 62. Depending on whether the tags 44 or the reader 32 will be the authenticator (as will be described below), the random number generator may be omitted from either the RF tags 44 or from the reader 32.
- ALU arithmetic logic unit
- Fig. 3 is a flowchart illustrating steps performed by the tag and reader of Fig. 2. Aspects of the invention that will be described in connection with Fig. 3 can be embodied in methods and apparatus employing tags of varying levels of sophistication. Multiple IF frequencies or read-while-write capability are not required. An advantage is that the amount of communication between the reader and the tags is minimized. This is useful to increase the speed of discovering the identities of tags. Aspects of the invention described in connection with Fig. 3 also provide authentication (identity verification) over a public, open channel. This method can be used by the tag to authenticate the reader, or by the reader to authenticate the tag.
- the Requestor device requesting access (can be either a tag or the reader) sends a message to the Authenticator.
- the Requestor is a tag 44 and the Authenticator is the reader 32.
- the Requestor is the reader 32 and the Authenticator is a tag 44.
- the Authenticator In step S2, the Authenticator generates an "Access Challenge” number. More particularly, in one embodiment, the "Access Challenge” number is a pseudo random number generated by the random number generator 58 or 62. Still more particularly, in one embodiment, the "Access Challenge” value is a long binary value, which is randomly generated. The length can be 128 bits, 256 bits, 512 bits, or any desired value selected depending on the desired security level versus cost and processing time.
- step S3 the Authenticator sends the "Access Challenge” number or value to the Requestor.
- step S4 the Requestor performs a long mathematical operation (or series of mathematical operations) on the "Access Challenge” number based upon the secret key value 66 or 68 (see Fig. 2) to define a "Challenge Response.”
- step S5 the Requestor replies to the Authenticator with a "Challenge Response".
- step S6 the Authenticator independently computes its own "Challenge
- Step S6 could be performed after step S1 and before step S2, simultaneously with step S2, or at any time between step S1 and step S7.
- step S7 the Authenticator compares the received "Challenge Response" from the Requestor matches the value computed by the Authenticator. If not, the Authenticator denies access in step S8. If so, the Authenticator grants access in step S9.
- step S10 the Authenticator sends a message to the Requestor informing the
- step S10 normal communications occur in step S11 , including transmission of information stored in the Authenticator to the Requestor (e.g., identification information, account information, financial information, etc.).
- information stored in the Authenticator e.g., identification information, account information, financial information, etc.
- the "Access Challenge” number is a generally random number
- the length of the keys and challenge values can be configured to the security requirement at hand. Tradeoffs can be made between level of security and system cost. Greater security requires longer keys, longer messages, and more processor power.
- Fig. 3 The approach of Fig. 3 is used to generate encryption values for a data stream, in an alternative embodiment.
- the challenge response is not transmitted, but is used to encrypt the data stream.
- This approach can be implemented in a passive or semi-passive RFID application to provide a level of security and/or data encryption not presently available.
- the passive or semi-passive RFID application will require that the Authenticator initiate all communication processes with the Requestors.
- Various embodiments of the invention could be employed in security and inventory management applications.
- Reader authentication occurs as follows. The reader requests to read or write tag data. The tag responds with a challenge value (random number). The reader encrypts the challenge value using its private key. The reader sends the encrypted challenge response to the tag. The tag uses the reader public key to decrypt the challenge response. The tag compares the results to the original challenge value and, if there is a match, the reader is authenticated.
- the process for a tag authentication is as follows. The reader issues a request to a tag including a non-encrypted challenge value. The tag encrypts the challenge value using its private key, creating a challenge response. The tag sends the challenge response to the reader (no key is sent). The reader decrypts the challenge response using the known tag's public key. If the reader-computed result matches the original challenge value, the tag is authenticated.
- both a tag and a reader function to authenticate the other.
- a reader sends a non-encrypted first challenge value to a tag.
- the tag encrypts the first challenge value using a tag private key and sends it to the reader, as a first response, along with a non-encrypted second challenge value.
- the reader decrypts the first response using a tag public key, and compares the result with the non-encrypted first challenge value. If the comparison is valid, then the tag is determined to be authentic.
- the reader then encrypts the second challenge value using a reader private key and sends it to the tag as a second response.
- the tag then decrypts the second response using a reader public key, and compares the result with the non-encrypted second challenge value. If the comparison in valid, then the reader is also determined to be authentic. The tag and the reader may now continue with the exchange of data or commands.
- both the reader and the tag(s) know the public key or keys of the other, in advance of the authentication process. This is a valid assumption if both (all) belong to the same application.
- multiple keys may be used to realize corresponding level of security. Generally, the longer (i.e., more complex) the key length, the greater the level of security within the exchange.
- the non-encrypted first and second challenge values may be the same; responses would be different due to different private keys. Other embodiments using public and private keys are also possible.
- Inventory management incorporates a wide variety of situations where RF tags can be used. These situations include the simple inventory/locating task of critical or high value items in storage, transport, or final use locations. Integrating authentication capability into the tags as described above would greatly increase the security of data contained within the tag and the item to which it is attached.
- Any design of RF tag can be used for security purposes.
- the addition of authentication capability described above provides an additional mechanism against spoofing.
- the security needs are many, with potential theft being high on the list.
- the traditional means of detecting when a theft has occurred is to track inventory. Items can be identified as they are removed from a monitored area or when subsequent inventories are made of the storage location.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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AU2003270786A AU2003270786A1 (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2003-09-16 | A challenged-based tag authentication model |
EP03752498A EP1547008A1 (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2003-09-16 | A challenge-response-based tag and reader authentication system and method |
CA002500779A CA2500779A1 (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2003-09-16 | A challenged-based tag authentication model |
MXPA05003546A MXPA05003546A (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2003-09-16 | A challenged-based tag authentication model. |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US10/263,635 | 2002-10-04 | ||
US10/263,635 US6842106B2 (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2002-10-04 | Challenged-based tag authentication model |
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WO2004034321A1 true WO2004034321A1 (en) | 2004-04-22 |
WO2004034321B1 WO2004034321B1 (en) | 2004-06-10 |
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PCT/US2003/029542 WO2004034321A1 (en) | 2002-10-04 | 2003-09-16 | A challenged-based tag authentication model |
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US (1) | US6842106B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1547008A1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU2003270786A1 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2500779A1 (en) |
MX (1) | MXPA05003546A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2004034321A1 (en) |
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DE102004059391A1 (en) * | 2004-12-09 | 2006-06-14 | Eberwein, Jörg | Crypto-wireless-tag |
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EP1788534A2 (en) * | 2005-11-09 | 2007-05-23 | Progressive Gaming International Corporation | Secure identification devices and methods for detecting and monitoring access thereof |
KR100720962B1 (en) | 2005-07-01 | 2007-05-28 | 강원대학교산학협력단 | Method of mutual authentication and secure data communication in rfid-system |
KR100723862B1 (en) | 2005-11-05 | 2007-05-31 | 한국전자통신연구원 | RFID access contol method and system for the same |
KR100728629B1 (en) | 2005-11-16 | 2007-06-14 | 에스케이 텔레콤주식회사 | System and Method for Preventing Forgery of RFID Tag |
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WO2007132420A2 (en) * | 2006-05-15 | 2007-11-22 | Nxp B.V. | Pseudo-random authentification code altering scheme for a transponder and a base station |
KR100796438B1 (en) | 2006-05-23 | 2008-01-21 | 경북대학교 산학협력단 | Apparatus and method for RFID Authentication Protocol |
KR100847787B1 (en) * | 2006-07-06 | 2008-07-23 | 주식회사 스마트로 | System and Method for Authenticating RFID Readeror Terminal, Secure RFID Tag for Authenticating RFID Readeror Terminal and Recording Medium |
KR100862009B1 (en) * | 2006-07-06 | 2008-10-07 | 주식회사 이비 | System and Method for Authenticating RFID Readeror Terminal, Secure RFID Tag for Authenticating RFID Readeror Terminal |
US11213773B2 (en) | 2017-03-06 | 2022-01-04 | Cummins Filtration Ip, Inc. | Genuine filter recognition with filter monitoring system |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20040066278A1 (en) | 2004-04-08 |
AU2003270786A1 (en) | 2004-05-04 |
MXPA05003546A (en) | 2005-09-30 |
CA2500779A1 (en) | 2004-04-22 |
WO2004034321B1 (en) | 2004-06-10 |
EP1547008A1 (en) | 2005-06-29 |
US6842106B2 (en) | 2005-01-11 |
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