EP0244332A1 - Remotely controlled system for relay-operated locking devices - Google Patents
Remotely controlled system for relay-operated locking devices Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0244332A1 EP0244332A1 EP87450009A EP87450009A EP0244332A1 EP 0244332 A1 EP0244332 A1 EP 0244332A1 EP 87450009 A EP87450009 A EP 87450009A EP 87450009 A EP87450009 A EP 87450009A EP 0244332 A1 EP0244332 A1 EP 0244332A1
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- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- key
- lock
- locks
- state
- code
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/0023—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks with encription of the transmittted data signal
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00238—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00261—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the keyless data carrier having more than one function
- G07C2009/00277—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the keyless data carrier having more than one function opening of different locks separately
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00761—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by connected means, e.g. mechanical contacts, plugs, connectors
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/08—With time considerations, e.g. temporary activation, valid time window or time limitations
Definitions
- the present invention uses only a transmission function for the key and reception for the lock.
- the key-lock assembly of the invention meets all the security requirements in this area.
- the key can only operate the lock if the lock number Y has been stored in its memory, and the lock can only be activated by the key if it has been stored in its store the number X of the key.
- the messages sent by the key cannot be used if they are intercepted, they include the combination of the lock and key numbers with the state of an internal counter with unequivocal increment, the lock checking before accepting the message, that this counter has been incremented on the one hand, and on the other hand, that the numbers of the locks are correct and that the combination generated by the lock after the incrementation of the internal counter of the latter at the level of that emitted by the key , combination variable with each emission due to the incrementation of the key and lock counters, therefore not likely to actuate the lock again if it is reproduced.
- the known computer means make it possible to prevent the reading in the memory of the key or of the lock, of information written therein by construction or by writing, in particular of the algorithm, the temporary possession of the key or of the lock. , by a fraudster not thereby authorizing the subsequent generation of correct messages in the absence of possession of the key.
- the invention therefore provides complete operational safety on the basis of a key transmitter and a lock receiver, the latter actuating the electromechanical relays "1" for opening and closing.
- the key-lock assemblies thus formed are inviolable; they allow a set of keys to open a lock by intro duction in each key of the lock information, and in the lock of key information, and with each key to open a set of locks by the same method.
- the irreversibility of the algorithm does not allow future opening messages to be determined from successive messages received from the key, even if the latter are intercepted.
- the open-close function of key-lock assemblies associates the remote control with absolute inviolability and meets the proposed goal.
- each lock requires that a certain number LC of characters of a code Cl, the said number chosen by the owner of the lock, and the said code C1 chosen by the user of the key, has been introduced into the key for a time less than a maximum delay TY imposed by the lock, before any operation.
- the key includes a memory "K” of this code C1 chosen by the user, a comparator L giving the number Lc of characters, identical to those of the code C1 introduced into the key, a clock "M” giving the time T2x since which this portion of code was introduced.
- the LC and T2x signals are sent by "F” and received by "F” in the lock.
- the lock comprises a memory "L” of the number Ly of minimum characters imposed and a memory "M” of the maximum delay Ty imposed by the key since the introduction of the code into the key.
- the lock includes a comparator "J '" comparing the length Lc of the code sent by the key to the minimum length Ly imposed, and the delay T2x given by the key to the maximum delay Ty granted by the lock, said lock prohibiting any operation if Ly or T2x are respectively greater than Lc and Ty.
- This device allows the lock to control the use of a code of minimum length in the key within a certain period, without this code being transmitted to the lock, thus neutralizing any attempt to intercept this code during emissions and ensuring the safe use of the key by the lock.
- the proposed invention ensures the total inviolability of the key-lock remote control system, because on the one hand, the combination emitted varying with each operation, is both unpredictable, ineffective f ective if it is reproduced, distinct for each key and other fPart in case of loss of cél, an authorization system code neutralizes the use of the key by a fraudster, said prohibition being controlled by the lock.
Abstract
Description
SYSTEME DE TRES HAUTE SECURITE DE TELECOMt1ANDE SANS FIL PERMETTANT L'OUVERTURE OU LA FERMETURE INVIOLABLE DE RELAIS ACTIONNANT DES SYSTEMES TELS QUE'SERRURES.VERY HIGH SECURITY WIRELESS REMOTE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR THE OPENING OR CLOSING OF RELIABLE RELAYS OPERATING SYSTEMS SUCH AS LOCKS.
La présente invention concerne un système de très haute sécurité de télécommande sans fil, permettant l'ouverture ou la fermeture inviolable de relais actionnant des systèmes tels que serrures et l'association de ce système :
- - à une fonction antivol de la clé, à des conditions de sécurité choisies par l'utilisateur et imposées à la serrure.
- - to an anti-theft function of the key, to security conditions chosen by the user and imposed on the lock.
Les systèmes actuels à télécommande permettent la reconnaissance d'un code transmis par une clé vers une serrure, et d'actionner cette dernière.Current remote control systems allow recognition of a code transmitted by a key to a lock, and actuation of the latter.
Mais ils présentent l'inconvénient majeur de permettre l'interception des codes émis par la clé et leur reproduction et sont, de ce fait, d'une sécurité discutable.However, they have the major drawback of allowing the interception of the codes emitted by the key and their reproduction and are, therefore, of questionable security.
Des systèmes à N codes multiples pré-enregistrés, successivement émis à partir d'un compteur et d'une table, le dit compteur étant remis à zéro périodiquement, ont été proposés mais les messages ainsi émis sont périodiquement réémis et sont donc interceptables et ils exigent une parfaite transmission de l'émetteur vers le récepteur afin d'éviter le décalage des compteurs entre eux.Systems with N multiple pre-registered codes, successively transmitted from a counter and a table, the said counter being reset periodically, have been proposed but the messages thus transmitted are periodically re-transmitted and are therefore interceptable and they require a perfect transmission from the transmitter to the receiver in order to avoid the offset of the counters between them.
Des systèmes surs utilisent dans chaque clé et serrure un émetteur et un récepteur et sont, de ce fait, onéreux.Safe systems use in each key and lock a transmitter and a receiver and are therefore expensive.
La présente invention n'utilise qu'une fonction d'émission pour la clé et de réception pour la serrure.The present invention uses only a transmission function for the key and reception for the lock.
Elle interdit toute utilisation des messages interceptés lors d'une manoeuvre, car tout message ayant servi une fois à actionner une serrure, ne pourra être utilisé une nouvelle fois pour actionner cette dernière.It prohibits any use of messages intercepted during a maneuver, since any message that served once for action ner lock, can not be used again to operate it.
Elle ajoute à ces avantages les fonctions supplémentaires ci- avant évoquées, toujours en n'utilisant que les fonctions d'émission par la clé et de réception par la serrure, et complète en un seul élément les dispositifs de commande avec un dispositif antivol n'autorisant l'usage de la clé que sous les conditions imposées avant chaque manoeuvre, par la propriétaire de la serrure, maître du niveau de sécurité d'utilisation des couples clé-serrure.It adds to these advantages the additional functions mentioned above, still using only the functions of transmission by the key and reception by the lock, and completes in a single element the control devices with an anti-theft device. authorizing the use of the key only under the conditions imposed before each operation, by the owner of the lock, master of the level of security of use of the key-lock pairs.
Le système clé-serrure, objet de l'invention, comporte une clé numéro X comprenant
- - une mémoire "A" des repères Ry des serrures à actionner, associées aux numéros Y de ces serrures.
- Ry et Y sont introduits dans la clé par son utilisateur et mémorisés dans "A" une fois pour toutes.
- Le repère Ry de la clé, librement choisi par son utilisateur, est unique pour chaque clé qui l'associe à Y, numéro de la serrure, dans une table de correspondance.
- Une serrure sera désignée au clavier de la clé par son repère, lequel repère peut, si l'utilisateur le désire, être identique au numéro de la clé.
- La mémoire "A" comporte donc la liste de tous les duos Ry, Y des serrures à actionner.
- - Une mémoire "B" du numéro X de la clé considérée.
- A chaque clé correspond un numéro X unique, inscrit dans "B" par construction de la clé.
- Un compteur interne à la clé avec sa mémoire "C" qui s'incré- mente d'une façon univoque à chaque manoeuvre de la clé d'une valeur quelconque permettant de vérifier l'incrémentation univoque de l'état T, X, Y du compteur de la clé.
- Un calculateur "D" combinant, par un algorithme irréversible à clé secrète, le numéro Y de la serrure repéré par le repère Ry de la serrure que l'on désire actionner, avec d'une part le numéro X de la clé, et d'autre part, l'état T, X, Y du compteur à incrémentation univoque, variable, la dite combinaison T C X S Y, obtenue et transmise à la serrure, variant donc à chaque utilisation de la clé.
- Une mémoire "E" comportant par construction de la clé deux signaux F1+ et Fl-, chacun de ces signaux reconnaissables par la serrure, signifiant à cette dernière le type d'ordre reçu, ouverture ou fermeture.
- - Un émetteur "F" transmettant à la serrure par tous moyens connus le numéro Y de la serrure à actionner, le numéro X de la clé en action, l'état T X Y du compteur interne, le résultat T C X S Y de la combinaison des numéros X et Y de la serrure et de la clé avec T X Y.
- Y, X, T X Y et T CX SY,, émis et interceptables, ne sont pas secrets.
- T X Y et T C X S Y changent lors de chaque émission.
- Seule la clé numéro X peut générer T C X S Y car X est unique et l'algorithme de génération de T C X S Y est secret.
- - Des moyens "G" d'introduction des Ry, Y dans "A" et de repérage de la serrure concernée dans "A" par Ry, avec les liaisons "H" correspondantes, les liaisons "I" de "A", "B" et "C" avec "D", et de commande de "C".
- - a memory "A" of the marks Ry of the locks to be actuated, associated with the numbers Y of these locks.
- Ry and Y are entered into the key by its user and stored in "A" once and for all.
- The key mark Ry, freely chosen by its user, is unique for each key which associates it with Y, the lock number, in a correspondence table.
- A lock will be designated on the keyboard of the key by its mark, which mark can, if the user wishes, be identical to the number of the key.
- The memory "A" therefore contains the list of all the duos Ry, Y of the locks to be actuated.
- - A memory "B" of the number X of the key considered.
- Each key corresponds to a unique number X, entered in "B" by construction of the key.
- A counter internal to the key with its memory "C" which is incremented unequivocally with each operation of the key of any value allowing to check the unequivocal incrementation of the state T, X, Y of the key counter.
- A computer "D" combining, by an irreversible secret key algorithm, the number Y of the lock identified by the reference mark Ry of the lock which one wishes to actuate, with on the one hand the number X of the key, and d on the other hand, the state T, X, Y of the counter with unequivocal increment, variable, the so-called combination TCXSY, obtained and transmitted to the lock, therefore varying with each use of the key.
- A memory "E" comprising by construction of the key two signals F1 + and Fl-, each of these signals recognizable by the lock, signifying to the latter the type of order received, opening or closing.
- - A transmitter "F" transmitting to the lock by any known means the number Y of the lock to be actuated, the number X of the key in action, the state TXY of the internal counter, the result TCXSY of the combination of the numbers X and Y of the lock and key with TX Y.
- Y, X, TXY and T CX SY ,, transmitted and interceptable, are not secret.
- TXY and TCXSY change during each transmission.
- Only key number X can generate TCXSY because X is unique and the algorithm for generating TCXSY is secret.
- - Means "G" of introduction of the Ry, Y into "A" and of location of the lock concerned in "A" by Ry, with the corresponding "H" connections, the "I" connections of "A", "B" and "C" with "D", and of control of "C".
Le système clé-serrure, objet de l'invention, comporte une serrure comprenant
- - une mémoire "A" des numéros X des clés autorisées à l'actionner, associés à l'état T Y X du compteur interne de chaque clé reçu lors de la dernière action de chaque clé sur la serrure. Les numéros des clés sont introduits dans la serrure par son utilisation et mémorisés dans "A".
- - Une mémoire "B" du numéro Y de la serrure, mémorisé dans la serrure par construction. A chaque serrure correspond par construction un numéro Y unique.
- - Une liaison "C" incrémentant au niveau T X Y émis par la clé, l'état du compteur serrure de chaque T Y X relatif à chaque clé X, lors de chaque manoeuvre effective de la serrure Y par la clé X, les numéros X et Y étant émis par la clé, et reçus par la serrure avec l'état T X Y du compteur clé.
- - Un calculateur "D" identique,à celui de la clé combinant par un algorithme irréversible à clé secrète, le numéro Y de la serrure avec, d'une part, le numéro X de la clé reçu lors de l'émission de cette dernière, et d'autre part, l'état du compteur interne T X Y reçu de la clé, après que la serrure ait vérifié que T X Y est à un niveau incrémenté par rapport à l'état antérieur à l'action de la clé, T Y X mémorisé dans "A".
- - Une mémoire "E" comprenant par construction de la serrure deux signaux F1+ et F1-, les dits signaux identiques à ceux de la clé et signifiant à la serrure par comparaison, le type d'ordre reçu, ouverture ou fermeture.
- - Un récepteur "F" recevant de la clé les informations émises par cette dernière.
- - Des moyens "G" d'introduction des X dans "A" et les liaisons "H" correspondantes, les liaisons "I" de "A", "B" et "F" avec "D", de commande "C", et de liaison avec le comparateur "J".
- - Un comparateur "J" vérifiant que le numéro Y reçu de la clé correspond bien au numéro Y de la serrure, que le numéro X de la clé est bien mémorisé dans la serrure, que l'état du compteur T X Y reçu de la clé est bien à un niveau supérieur à l'état T Y X mémorisé dans la mémoire "A" du message précédent correspondant reçu de la clé, que la combinaison T C X S Y reçue de la clé est identique à la combinaison T S Y C X déterminée par la serrure, le dit comparateur autorisant l'action F1+ ou F1- selon le signal reçu de la clé, si toutes les conditions précédentes sont réunies et incrémentant le dit compteur T Y X de la serrure au niveau T X Y du compteur clé.
- - a memory "A" of the X numbers of the keys authorized to activate it, associated with the TYX state of the internal counter of each key received during the last action of each key on the lock. The key numbers are entered into the lock by its use and stored in "A".
- - A memory "B" of the number Y of the lock, memorized in the lock by construction. Each lock corresponds by construction to a unique Y number.
- - A link "C" incrementing at the TXY level sent by the key, the state of the lock counter of each TYX relative to each key X, during each effective operation of the lock Y by the key X, the numbers X and Y being emitted by the key, and received by the lock with the TXY state of the key counter.
- - A calculator "D" identical to that of the key combining by an irreversible secret key algorithm, the number Y of the lock with, on the one hand, the number X of the key received during the transmission of the latter , and on the other hand, the state of the internal counter TXY received from the key, after the lock has verified that TXY is at an incremented level compared to the state prior to the action of the key, TYX stored in "AT".
- - A memory "E" comprising by construction of the lock two signals F1 + and F1-, said signals identical to those of the key and signifying to the lock by comparison, the type of order received, opening or closing.
- - A receiver "F" receiving from the key the information transmitted by the latter.
- - Means "G" for introducing the Xs into "A" and the corresponding "H" links, the "I" links from "A", "B" and "F" with "D", of command "C" , and of connection with the comparator "J".
- - A comparator "J" verifying that the number Y received from the key corresponds to the number Y of the lock, that the number X of the key is correctly stored in the lock, that the state of the counter TXY received from the key is indeed at a level higher than the TYX state memorized in the memory "A" of the corresponding previous message received from the key, that the combination TCXSY received from the key is identical to the combination TSYCX determined by the lock, the said comparator authorizing the 'F1 + or F1- action depending on the signal received from the key, if all of the above conditions are met and incrementing the said TYX counter of the lock at the TXY level of the key counter.
L'ensemble clé-serrure de l'invention répond à toutes les sécurités exigées en la matière.The key-lock assembly of the invention meets all the security requirements in this area.
La clé ne peut actionner la serrure que si l'on a enregistré dans sa mémoire le numéro Y de la serrure, et la serrure ne peut être actionnée par la clé que si l'on a enregistré dans sa mémoire le numéro X de la clé.The key can only operate the lock if the lock number Y has been stored in its memory, and the lock can only be activated by the key if it has been stored in its store the number X of the key.
Ces introductions sont protégées par un code d'accès à la mémoire de chacun des éléments.These introductions are protected by an access code to the memory of each of the elements.
Afin que les messages émis par la clé ne puissent être utilisés s'ils sont interceptés, ils comprennent la combinaison des numéros serrure et clé avec l'état d'un compteur interne à incrémentation univoque, la serrure vérifiant avant d'accepter le message, que ce compteur a été incrémenté d'une part, et d'autre part, que les numéros des serrures sont corrects et que la combinaison générée par la serrure après l'incrémentation du compteur interne de cette dernière au niveau de celui émis par la clé, combinaison variable à chaque émission en raison de l'incrémentation des compteurs clé et serrure, donc non susceptible d'actionner une nouvelle fois la serrure si elle est reproduite.So that the messages sent by the key cannot be used if they are intercepted, they include the combination of the lock and key numbers with the state of an internal counter with unequivocal increment, the lock checking before accepting the message, that this counter has been incremented on the one hand, and on the other hand, that the numbers of the locks are correct and that the combination generated by the lock after the incrementation of the internal counter of the latter at the level of that emitted by the key , combination variable with each emission due to the incrementation of the key and lock counters, therefore not likely to actuate the lock again if it is reproduced.
Les moyens informatiques connus permettent d'empêcher la lecture dans la mémoire de la clé ou de la serrure, des informations qui y sont inscrites par construction ou par écriture, en particulier de l'algorithme, la possession temporaire de la clé ou de la serrure, par un fraudeur n'autorisant pas, de ce fait, la génération ultérieure de messages corrects en l'absence de la possession de la clé.The known computer means make it possible to prevent the reading in the memory of the key or of the lock, of information written therein by construction or by writing, in particular of the algorithm, the temporary possession of the key or of the lock. , by a fraudster not thereby authorizing the subsequent generation of correct messages in the absence of possession of the key.
L'invention assure donc toute sécurité de fonctionnement sur la base d'un émetteur formant clé et d'un récepteur formant serrure, cette dernière actionnant les relais électromécaniques "1" d'ouverture et de fermeture.The invention therefore provides complete operational safety on the basis of a key transmitter and a lock receiver, the latter actuating the electromechanical relays "1" for opening and closing.
Les ensembles clé-serrure ainsi constitués sont inviolables ; ils permettent à un ensemble de clés d'ouvrir une serrure par introduction dans chaque clé des informations serrure, et dans la serrure des informations clé, et à chaque clé d'ouvrir un ensemble de serrures par la même méthode.The key-lock assemblies thus formed are inviolable; they allow a set of keys to open a lock by intro duction in each key of the lock information, and in the lock of key information, and with each key to open a set of locks by the same method.
Toutes combinaisons de passe-partout sont ainsi possibles.Any combination of master keys is thus possible.
L'interception des messages ne permet en aucun cas, même s'ils sont reproduits, d'actionner la serrure ou de perturber son fonctionnement car l'état T Y X du compteur serrure, miroir du compteur clé, n'est mis au niveau T X Y du compteur de la clé que si la serrure a été effectivement actionnée.The interception of messages does not in any case allow, even if they are reproduced, to activate the lock or to disturb its operation because the TYX state of the lock counter, mirror of the key counter, is not set to the TXY level of the counter of the key only if the lock has actually been actuated.
L'utilisation d'un algorithme secret à clé partiellement secrète pour la génération de T C X S Y, message d'ouverture, le dit algorithme étant inscrit d'une façon non lisible dans le calculateur, ne permet en aucun cas de générer un T C X S Y correct si l'on n'est pas possesseur de la clé, car le numéro de la clé est unique et l'algorithme secret.The use of a secret algorithm with partially secret key for the generation of TCXSY, opening message, the said algorithm being written in a non-readable manner in the computer, does not in any case allow the generation of a correct TCXSY if the 'we are not the owner of the key, because the key number is unique and the algorithm secret.
Enfin, l'irréversibilité de l'algorithme ne permet pas de déterminer les futurs messages d'ouverture à partir des messages successifs reçus de la clé, même si ces derniers sont interceptés.Finally, the irreversibility of the algorithm does not allow future opening messages to be determined from successive messages received from the key, even if the latter are intercepted.
La fonction ouverture-fermeture des ensembles clé-serrures associe la télécommande à une inviolabilité absolue et répond au but proposé.The open-close function of key-lock assemblies associates the remote control with absolute inviolability and meets the proposed goal.
Afin qu'un fraudeur s'emparant:de la clé ne puisse l'utiliser, cette dernière comporte une sécurité d'utilisation : chaque serrure impose qu'un certain nombre LC de caractères d'un code Cl, le dit nombre choisi par le propriétaire de la serrure, et le dit code C1 choisi par l'utilisateur de la clé, ait été introduit dans la clé depuis un temps inférieur à un délai maximum TY imposé par la serrure, avant toute manoeuvre.In order for a fraudster to seize: the key cannot use it, the latter includes security of use: each lock requires that a certain number LC of characters of a code Cl, the said number chosen by the owner of the lock, and the said code C1 chosen by the user of the key, has been introduced into the key for a time less than a maximum delay TY imposed by the lock, before any operation.
Pour réaliser ce système, la clé comporte une mémoire "K" de ce code C1 choisi par l'utilisateur, un comparateur L donnant le nombre Lc de caractères, identiques à ceux du code C1 introduits dans la clé, une horloge "M" donnant le temps T2x depuis lequel cette portion de code a été introduite.To implement this system, the key includes a memory "K" of this code C1 chosen by the user, a comparator L giving the number Lc of characters, identical to those of the code C1 introduced into the key, a clock "M" giving the time T2x since which this portion of code was introduced.
Les signaux LC et T2x sont émis par "F" et reçus par "F" dans la serrure.The LC and T2x signals are sent by "F" and received by "F" in the lock.
La serrure comporte une mémoire "L'" du nombre Ly de caractères minimum imposés et une mémoire "M'" du délai maximum Ty imposé par la clé depuis l'introduction du code dans la clé.The lock comprises a memory "L" of the number Ly of minimum characters imposed and a memory "M" of the maximum delay Ty imposed by the key since the introduction of the code into the key.
La serrure comporte un comparateur "J'" comparant la longueur Lc du code émis par la clé à la longueur minimale Ly imposée, et le délai T2x donné par la clé au délai maximum Ty accordé par la serrure, la dite serrure interdisant toute manoeuvre si Ly ou T2x sont respectivement supérieurs à Lc et Ty.The lock includes a comparator "J '" comparing the length Lc of the code sent by the key to the minimum length Ly imposed, and the delay T2x given by the key to the maximum delay Ty granted by the lock, said lock prohibiting any operation if Ly or T2x are respectively greater than Lc and Ty.
Ce dispositif permet le contrôle par la serrure de l'utilisation d'un code d'une longueur minimale dans la clé dans un certain délai, sans que ce code soit émis vers la serrure neutralisant ainsi toute tentative d'interception de ce code lors des émissions et assurant la sécurité d'utilisation de la clé par la serrure.This device allows the lock to control the use of a code of minimum length in the key within a certain period, without this code being transmitted to the lock, thus neutralizing any attempt to intercept this code during emissions and ensuring the safe use of the key by the lock.
Cette sécurité supplémentaire interdit l'utilisation de la clé par un fraudeur en laissant à l'utilisateur le choix du niveau de la sécurité choisi introduit dans la serrure.This additional security prohibits the use of the key by a fraudster by leaving the user the choice of the level of security chosen introduced into the lock.
L'invention proposée assure la totale inviolabilité du système clés-serrures à télécommande, car d'une part, la combinaison émise variable à chaque manoeuve, est à la fois imprévisible, inef- ficace si elle est reproduite, particulière à chaque clé et d'autre fpart, en cas de perte de la cél, un système d'autorisation par code neutralise l'utilisation de la clé par un fraudeur,la dite interdiction étant controlée par la serrure.The proposed invention ensures the total inviolability of the key-lock remote control system, because on the one hand, the combination emitted varying with each operation, is both unpredictable, ineffective f ective if it is reproduced, distinct for each key and other fPart in case of loss of cél, an authorization system code neutralizes the use of the key by a fraudster, said prohibition being controlled by the lock.
Claims (11)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR8606217A FR2597538B1 (en) | 1986-04-22 | 1986-04-22 | SECURITY LOCK ASSEMBLY WITH REMOTE CONTROL IN WHICH THE KEY HAS ONLY A TRANSMISSION FUNCTION AND THE RECEPTION LOCK |
FR8606217 | 1986-04-22 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP0244332A1 true EP0244332A1 (en) | 1987-11-04 |
EP0244332B1 EP0244332B1 (en) | 1991-07-24 |
Family
ID=9334748
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP87450009A Expired - Lifetime EP0244332B1 (en) | 1986-04-22 | 1987-04-16 | Remotely controlled system for relay-operated locking devices |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US5107258A (en) |
EP (1) | EP0244332B1 (en) |
DE (1) | DE3771560D1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2023433B3 (en) |
FR (1) | FR2597538B1 (en) |
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WO1997036264A1 (en) * | 1996-03-22 | 1997-10-02 | Activcard | Function access control system with encryption using a plurality of dynamic variables |
FR2747815A1 (en) * | 1996-04-17 | 1997-10-24 | Activcard | Control system for access to services |
US7529939B2 (en) | 2000-12-19 | 2009-05-05 | Azoteq Pty Ltd. | Method of and apparatus for transferring data |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE3771560D1 (en) | 1991-08-29 |
FR2597538A1 (en) | 1987-10-23 |
FR2597538B1 (en) | 1995-03-31 |
ES2023433B3 (en) | 1992-01-16 |
EP0244332B1 (en) | 1991-07-24 |
US5107258A (en) | 1992-04-21 |
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