CA2465626A1 - Program security through stack segregation - Google Patents

Program security through stack segregation Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2465626A1
CA2465626A1 CA002465626A CA2465626A CA2465626A1 CA 2465626 A1 CA2465626 A1 CA 2465626A1 CA 002465626 A CA002465626 A CA 002465626A CA 2465626 A CA2465626 A CA 2465626A CA 2465626 A1 CA2465626 A1 CA 2465626A1
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Canada
Prior art keywords
stack data
data structures
execution items
stack
classes
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CA002465626A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2465626C (en
Inventor
Michael L. Asher
Charles C. Giddens
Harold Jeffrey Stewart
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
AT&T Corp
Original Assignee
At&T Corp.
Michael L. Asher
Charles C. Giddens
Harold Jeffrey Stewart
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by At&T Corp., Michael L. Asher, Charles C. Giddens, Harold Jeffrey Stewart filed Critical At&T Corp.
Publication of CA2465626A1 publication Critical patent/CA2465626A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA2465626C publication Critical patent/CA2465626C/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G06F12/1416—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights
    • G06F12/1425—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights the protection being physical, e.g. cell, word, block
    • G06F12/1441—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights the protection being physical, e.g. cell, word, block for a range
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow

Abstract

For each process a stack data structure that includes two stacks, which are joined at their bases, is created. The two stacks include a normal stack, which grows downward, and an inverse stack, which grows upward. Items on the stack data structure are segregated into protected and unprotected classes. Protected items include frame pointers and return addresses, which are stored on the normal stack. Unprotected items are function parameters and local variables. The unprotected items are stored on the inverse stack.

Claims (20)

1. A method for executing computer processes comprising receiving execution items for each said computer process, creating a plurality of stack data structures, segregating said execution items into a plurality of classes of execution items, pushing execution items in at least a first set of said classes on respective ones of a set of first stack data structures, each of said first stack data structures being addressed by a stack pointer, storing execution items in at least a second set of said classes in respective ones of a set of second stack data structures, each of said first stack data structures being addressed by an inverse stack pointer, and applying said execution items to an instruction execution unit by selectively popping said execution items in said at least a first set of said classes from said first set of stack data structures, and selectively reading said execution items in said at least a second set of said classes from said second stack data structures.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein said execution items comprise stack pointers, frame pointers, return addresses, global variables, local variables, string variables, array variables.
3. The method of claim 1 wherein said segregating said execution items into a plurality of classes of execution items comprises segregating said execution items into at least a protected class of execution items acid a non-protected class of execution items.
4. The method of claim 1 wherein said set of first stack data structures comprises at least one normal stack data structure.
5. The method of claim 3 wherein said pushing of execution items in at least a first set of said classes in respective ones of a set of first stack data structures comprises pushing sand protected class of execution items on respective ones of a set of first stack data structures.
6. The method of claim 5 wherein said set of first stack data structures comprises at least one normal stack data structure.
7. The method of claim 6 wherein said set of first stack data structures comprises exactly one normal stack data structure.
8. The method of claim 1 wherein said set of second stack data structures comprises at least one inverse stack data structure.
9. The method of claim 3 wherein said storing execution items in at least a second set of said classes in respective ones of a set of second stack data structures comprises storing said non-protected class of execution items on respective ones of a set of second stack data structures.
10. The method of claim 9 wherein said set of second stack data structures comprises at least one inverse stack data structure.
11. The method of claim 10 wherein said set of second stack data structures comprises exactly one inverse stack data structure.
12. The method of claim 5 wherein said selectively popping said execution items in said at least a first set of said classes from said first set of stack data structures comprises popping said protected class of execution items from respective ones of said set of first stack data structures.
13. The method of claim 12 wherein said set of first stack data structures comprises at least one normal stack data structure.
14. The method of claim 12 wherein said set of first stack data structures comprises exactly one normal stack data structure.
15. The method of claim 5 wherein said selectively reading said execution items in said at least a second set of said classes from said second stack data structures comprises reading said non-protected class of execution items from respective ones of said set of second stack data structures.
16. The method of claim 15 wherein said set of second stack data structures comprises at least one inverse stack data structure.
17. The method of claim 15 wherein said set of second stack data structures comprises exactly one inverse stack data structure.
18. The method of claim 1 wherein said execution items in said at least a second set of said classes comprises string variables.
19. The method of claim 1 wherein said execution items in said at least a second set of said classes comprises string variables.
20. The method of claim 1 wherein said execution items in said at least a first set of said classes comprises stack pointers, frame pointers and return addresses.
CA2465626A 2003-04-30 2004-04-30 Program security through stack segregation Expired - Fee Related CA2465626C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US46647503P 2003-04-30 2003-04-30
US60/466,475 2003-04-30

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2465626A1 true CA2465626A1 (en) 2004-10-30
CA2465626C CA2465626C (en) 2010-09-21

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CA2465626A Expired - Fee Related CA2465626C (en) 2003-04-30 2004-04-30 Program security through stack segregation

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US (2) US7660985B2 (en)
CA (1) CA2465626C (en)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US7660985B2 (en) 2010-02-09
US20100095069A1 (en) 2010-04-15
US20040255146A1 (en) 2004-12-16
US8010788B2 (en) 2011-08-30
CA2465626C (en) 2010-09-21

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