CA2424067A1 - Peer-to-peer name resolution protocol (pnrp) security infrastructure and method - Google Patents

Peer-to-peer name resolution protocol (pnrp) security infrastructure and method Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2424067A1
CA2424067A1 CA002424067A CA2424067A CA2424067A1 CA 2424067 A1 CA2424067 A1 CA 2424067A1 CA 002424067 A CA002424067 A CA 002424067A CA 2424067 A CA2424067 A CA 2424067A CA 2424067 A1 CA2424067 A1 CA 2424067A1
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Canada
Prior art keywords
node
message
peer
pac
steps
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Granted
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CA002424067A
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French (fr)
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CA2424067C (en
Inventor
Rohit Gupta
Alexandru Gavrilescu
John L. Miller
Graham A. Wheeler
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Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC
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Microsoft Corp
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/104—Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
    • H04L61/45—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1458—Denial of Service
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10—TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
    • Y10S—TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10S707/00—Data processing: database and file management or data structures
    • Y10S707/99931—Database or file accessing
    • Y10S707/99939—Privileged access

Abstract

A security infrastructure and methods are presented that inhibit the ability of a malicious node from disrupting the normal operations of a peer-to-peer network. The methods of the invention allow both secure and insecure identities to be use d by nodes by making them self verifying. When necessary or opportunistic, ID ownership is validated by piggybacking the validation on existing messages. The probability of connecting initially to a malicious node is reduced by randomly selecting to which node to connect. Further, information from malicious nodes is identified and can be disregarded by maintaining information about prior communications that will require a future response. Denial of service attacks are inhibited by allowing the node to disregard requests when its resource utilization exceeds a predetermined limit. The ability for a malicious node to remove a valid node is reduced by requiring that revocation certificates be signed by the node to b e removed.

Claims (41)

1. A method of generating a self-verifiable insecure peer address certificate to preventing a malicious node from publishing another node's secure identification in an insecure peer address certificate in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of-:
generating an insecure peer address certificate (PAC) for a resource discoverable in the peer-to-peer network, the resource having a peer-to-peer identification (ID); and including an uniform resource identifier (URI) in the insecure PAC from which the peer-to-peer ID is derived.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of including an URI in the insecure PAC from which the peer-to-peer ID is derived comprises the step of including the URI
in the format "p2p://URI".
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the peer-to-peer ID is insecure.
4. A method of opportunistically validating a peer address certificate at a first node in a peer-to-peer network, the first node utilizing a multilevel cache for storage of peer address certificates, comprising the steps of receiving a peer address certificate (PAC) purportedly from a second node;
determining in which level of the multilevel cache the PAC is to be stored;
when the PAC is to be stored in one of two lowest cache levels (a) placing the PAC in a set aside list, (b) generating an INQUIRE message containing an ID of the PAC to be validated, (c) transmitting the INQUIRE message to the second node; and when the PAC is to be stored in an upper cache level other than one of the two lowest cache levels, storing the PAC in the upper cache level.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the step of transmitting the INQUIRE
message includes the step of requesting a certificate chain for the PAC.
6. The method of claim 4, wherein the step of generating the INQUIRE
message comprises the step of generating a transaction ID to be included in the INQUIRE
message.
7. The method of claim 4, further comprising the steps of:
receiving an AUTHORITY message from the second node in response to the INQUIRE message;
removing the PAC from the set aside list; and storing the PAC in the one of the two lowest cache levels.
8. The method of claim 5, further comprising the steps of receiving an AUTHORITY message from the second node in response to the INQUIRE message;
removing the PAC from the set aside list;
examining the AUTHORITY message to determine if the certificate chain is present and valid;
storing the PAC in the one of the two lowest cache levels when the certificate chain is present and valid; and deleting the PAC when the certificate chain is not present and valid.
9. The method of claim 6, further comprising the steps of:
receiving an AUTHORITY message from the second node in response to the INQUIRE message;
removing the PAC from the set aside list;
examining the AUTHORITY message to determine if the transaction ID is present;
storing the PAC in the one of the two lowest cache levels when the transaction ID is present; and deleting the PAC when the transaction ID is not present.
10. The method of claim 4, further comprising the steps of:
selecting the PAC stored in an upper cache level other than one of the two lowest cache levels to route a RESOLVE packet;

transmitting the RESOLVE packet to the second node, the RESOLVE packet having piggybacked therewith ID ownership validation information; and marking the PAC as valid when the second node validates ID ownership.
11. The method of claim 10, further comprising the steps of:
deleting the PAC from an upper cache level other than one of the two lowest cache levels when the second node is unable to validate ID ownership; and reprocessing the RESOLVE packet with a different PAC.
12. The method of claim 11, wherein the step of deleting the PAC from an upper cache level other than one of the two lowest cache levels when the second node is unable to validate ID ownership comprises the step of waiting a predetermined period of time for the second node to validate ID ownership before deleting the PAC.
13. The method of claim 11, wherein the step of deleting the PAC from an upper cache level other than one of the two lowest cache levels when the second node is unable to validate ID ownership comprises the steps of receiving an AUTHORITY message from the second node;
examining the AUTHORITY message to determine if the second node was able to validate ID ownership;
determining that the second node was unable to validate ID ownership; and deleting the PAC.
14. The method of claim 13, wherein the step of determining that the second node was unable to validate ID ownership comprises the step of determining that the second node set a flag in the AUTHORITY message indicating that it was unable to validate ID
ownership of the PAC.
15. The method of claim 13, wherein the step of determining that the second node was unable to validate ID ownership comprises the step of examining the AUTHORITY
message to determine that a certificate chain is not present and valid.
16. The method of claim 10, wherein the step of marking the PAC as valid when the second node validates ID ownership comprises the step of receiving an AUTHORITY
message from the second node validating ID ownership.
17. The method of claim 10, wherein the step of marking the PAC as valid when the second node validates ID ownership comprises the step of receiving an AUTHORITY
message from the second node having a certificate chain validating ID
ownership.
18. A method of discovering a node in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:
broadcasting a discovery message in the peer-to-peer network without including any IDs locally registered;

receiving a response from a node in the peer-to-peer network; and establishing a peering relationship with the node.
19. The method of claim 18, wherein the step of receiving a response from a node comprises the step of receiving a response from at least two nodes in the peer-to-peer network, and wherein the step of establishing a peering relationship with the node comprises the steps of randomly selecting one of the at least two nodes and establishing a peering relationship with the randomly selected one of the at least two nodes.
20. A method of inhibiting a denial of service attack based on a synchronization process in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:
receiving a SOLICIT message requesting cache synchronization from a first node, the SOLICIT message containing a peer address certificate (PAC) for the first node;
examining the PAC to determine its validity; and dropping the SOLICIT packet when the step of examining the PAC determines that the PAC is not valid.
21. The method of claim 20, wherein the step of examining the PAC
determines that the PAC is valid, further comprising the steps of:
generating a nonce;
encrypting the nonce with a public key of the first node;
generating an ADVERTISE message including the encrypted nonce;

sending the ADVERTISE message to the first node;
receiving a REQUEST message from the first node;
examining the REQUEST message to determine if the first node was able to decrypt the encrypted nonce; and processing the REQUEST message when the step of examining the REQUEST
message indicates that the first node was able to decrypt the encrypted nonce.
22. The method of claim 21, further comprising the steps of:
maintaining connection information specifically identifying the communication with the first node;
examining the REQUEST message to ensure that it is specifically related to the ADVERTISE message; and rejecting the REQUEST message when the step of examining the REQUEST
message to ensure that it is specifically related to the ADVERTISE message indicates that it is not specifically related to the ADVERTISE message.
23. The method of claim 22, wherein the step of maintaining connection information specifically identifying the communication with the first node comprises the steps of:
calculating a first bitpos as the hash of the nonce and the first node's identity; and setting a bit at the first bitpos in a bit vector.
24. The method of claim 23, wherein the step of examining the REQUEST
message to ensure that it is specifically related to the ADVERTISE message comprises the steps of:
extracting the nonce and the first node's identity from the REQUEST message;
calculating a second bitpos as the hash of the nonce and the first node's identity;
examining the bit vector to determine if it has a bit set corresponding to the second bitpos; and indicating that the REQUEST is not specifically related to the ADVERTISE
message when the step of examining the bit vector does not find a bit set corresponding to the second bitpos.
25. A method of inhibiting a denial of service attack based on a synchronization process in a peer-to-peer network; comprising the steps of:
receiving a REQUEST message purportedly from a first node;
determining if the REQUEST message is in response to prior communication with the first node; and rejecting the REQUEST message when the REQUEST message is not in response to prior communication with the first node.
26. The method of claim 25, wherein the step of determining if the REQUEST
message is in response to prior communication with the first node comprises the steps of:

extracting a nonce and an identity purportedly of the first node from the REQUEST
message;
calculating a bitpos as the hash of the nonce and the identity;
examining a bit vector to determine if it has a bit set corresponding to the bitpos; and indicating that the REQUEST is not in response to prior communication with the first node when the step of examining the bit vector does not find a bit set corresponding to the bitpos.
27. A method of inhibiting denial of service attacks based on node resource consumption in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:
receiving a message from a node in the peer-to-peer network;
examining current resource utilization; and rejecting processing of the message when the step of examining current resource utilization indicates that the current resource utilization is above a predetermined level.
28. The method of claim 27, wherein the step of receiving a message comprises the step of receiving a RESOLVE message, and wherein the step of rejecting processing of the message comprises the step of sending an AUTHORITY message to the first node, the AUTHORITY message containing an indication that the RESOLVE message will not be processed because the current resource utilization too high.
29. The method of claim 27, wherein the step of receiving a message comprises the step of receiving a FLOOD message containing a peer address certificate (PAC), further comprising the step of determining that the PAC should be stored in one of two lowest cache levels, wherein the step of rejecting processing of the message comprises the step of placing the PAC in a set aside list for later processing.
30. The method of claim 27, wherein the step of receiving a message comprises the step of receiving a FLOOD message containing a peer address certificate (PAC), further comprising the step of determining that the PAC should be stored in a cache level higher than two lowest cache levels, wherein the step of rejecting processing of the message comprises the step of rejecting the FLOOD message.
31. A method of inhibiting denial of service attacks based on node bandwidth consumption in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:
receiving a request for cache synchronization from a node in the peer-to-peer network;
examining a metric indicating a number of cache synchronizations performed in the past; and rejecting processing of the request for cache synchronization when the step of examining the metric indicates that the number of cache synchronization performed in the past exceed a predetermined maximum.
32. The method of claim 31, wherein the step of examining a metric comprises the step of examining the metric to determine the number of cache synchronizations performed during a predetermined preceding period of time, and wherein the step of rejecting processing of the request comprises the step of rejecting processing of the request for cache synchronization when the step of examining the metric indicates that the number of cache synchronization performed in the predetermined preceding period of time exceed a predetermined maximum.
33. A method of inhibiting a search based denial of service attack in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:
examining cache entries of known peer address certificates to determine appropriate nodes to which to send a resolution request;
randomly selecting one of the appropriate nodes; and sending the resolution request to the randomly selected node.
34. The method of claim 33, wherein the step of randomly selecting one of the appropriate nodes comprises the steps of calculating a weighted probability for each of the appropriate nodes based on an inverse proportionality of a distance to the node.
35. A method of inhibiting a search based denial of service attack in a peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:
receiving a RESPONSE message;

determining if the RESPONSE message is in response to a prior RESOLVE message;
rejecting the RESPONSE message when the RESPONSE message is not in response to the prior RESOLVE message.
36. The method of claim 35, wherein the step of determining if the RESPONSE message is in response to a prior RESOLVE message comprises the steps of calculating a bitpos as a hash of information in the RESPONSE message, and examining a bit vector to determine if a bit corresponding to the bitpos is set therein.
37. The method of claim 35, wherein the RESPONSE message contains an address list, further comprising the steps of determining if tie RESPONSE
message has been modified in an attempt to hamper resolution, and rejecting the RESPONSE
message when the RESPONSE message has been modified in an attempt to hamper resolution.
38. The method of claim 37, wherein the step of determining if the RESPONSE message has been modified in an attempt to hamper resolution comprises the steps of calculating a bitpos as a hash of the address list in the RESPONSE message, and examining a bit vector to determine if a bit corresponding to the bitpos is set therein.
39. A method of inhibiting a malicious node from removing a valid node from the peer-to-peer network, comprising the steps of:

receiving a revocation certificate purportedly from the valid node having a peer address certificate (PAC) stored in cache; and verifying that the revocation certificate is signed by the valid node.
40. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 1.
41. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 4.
43. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 18.
44. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 20.
45. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 25.
46. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 27.

47. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 31.
48. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 33.
49. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 35.
50. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps recited in claim 39.
CA2424067A 2002-04-29 2003-04-01 Peer-to-peer name resolution protocol (pnrp) security infrastructure and method Expired - Fee Related CA2424067C (en)

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US10/134,780 2002-04-29

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EP (1) EP1361728B1 (en)
JP (1) JP4716648B2 (en)
KR (1) KR100965716B1 (en)
CN (1) CN100474851C (en)
AU (1) AU2003203717B2 (en)
BR (1) BR0301300A (en)
CA (1) CA2424067C (en)
ES (1) ES2384964T3 (en)
HK (1) HK1060459A1 (en)
MX (1) MXPA03003318A (en)
MY (1) MY135693A (en)
NO (1) NO334257B1 (en)
PL (1) PL359916A1 (en)
RU (1) RU2320008C2 (en)
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