The Organon, Or Logical Treatises, of Aristotle: With the Introduction of Porphyry. Literally Translated, with Notes, Syllogistic Examples, Analysis, and Introduction, Volume 1 |
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Common terms and phrases
according Aldrich Anal angles animal Archytas Aristomenes Aristotle assumed present biped Boethius Buhle called cated cause CHAP clusion conclusion consequent contingent contradiction contrary converted definition demon demonstration difference Enthymeme enunciation evident Example exist genus gism happens hence Hill's Logic horse hypothesis hypothetical syllogism impossibile impossible indefinite individual induction inesse infer inherent instance latter let the terms major major premise manner Mansel's Logic medium Metap middle figure middle term minor mode monstration nature neces necessarily present necessary necessity nega non-inesse noun opinion opposites paronymously particular partly false Plato possible predicated premises principles prior produced proved quæ qualia reciprocate respect Rhet sary Scholia sentence shown signifies singulars sion Socrates species stration subsist substance subverted sumed swan syllogistic Taylor thing third figure tion tive triangle true universal universal proposition universally predicated verb versal Waitz wherefore whole
Popular passages
Page 27 - As when some one peculiar quality Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, In their confluctions, all to run one way, This may be truly said to be a humour.
Page 38 - What is a man, If his chief good and market of his time Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more. Sure he that made us with such large discourse, Looking before and after, gave us not That capability and god-like reason To fust in us unus'd.
Page 82 - term," into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it is predicated, whether to be or not to be is added or separated.
Page 267 - Logic is entirely conversant about language. If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind, without any employment of language, orally or mentally, (a metaphysical question which I shall not here discuss) such a process does not come within the province of the science here treated of.
Page 238 - S. i.) envy hate:" the latter is a singular Proposition, which however is not regarded as a sign, except relatively to some other Proposition, which it is supposed may be inferred from it. The eixo'j, when employed in an Enthymeme, will form the major premise of a Syllogism such as the following: Most men who envy hate, This man envies, Therefore, This man (probably) hates. The reasoning is logically faulty; for, the major premise not being absolutely universal, the middle term is not distributed....
Page 53 - Xoyor (oratio), and is not limited, as by Aldrich, to the Proposition (oratio enunciativa). Thus Petrus Hispanus : " Vocum significativarum ad placitum alia complexa, ut oratio, alia incomplexa, ut nomen et verbum. Orationum perfectarum alia indicativa, ut homo currit ; alia imperativa, ut Petre...
Page 70 - ... proceeds only from their faintness and unsteadiness, not from any capacity in the mind to receive any impression which in its real existence has no particular degree nor proportion. That is a contradiction in terms, and even implies the flattest of all contradictions, viz., that 'tis possible for the same thing both to be and not to be.
Page 86 - For if A is predicated of every B, and B of every C, it is necessary for A to be predicated of every C (we have already explained what we mean by "predicated of every").
Page 60 - Again, if a thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so that of anything that has taken place it was always true to say 'it is
Page 14 - ... and the opinion are not said to be capable of contraries in that they have received any thing, but, in that about something else, a passive quality has been produced, for in that a thing is, or is not, in this, is the sentence said to be true, or false, not in that itself, is capable of contraries. In short, neither is a sentence nor an opinion moved by any thing, whence they cannot be capable of contraries, no passive quality being in them ; substance at least, from the fact of itself receiving...